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PREFACE
A graduate thesis on Rui Barbosa sparked the au
thor's interest in Brazil's attendance at the Second Hague
Peace Conference and the fascinating relationships between
and

among individuals and countries that developed on the

occasion of the conference.

The search for materials for

this study led the author to the examination of holdings at
the United States National Archives in Washington, D.C., and
».

those at the Fundagao Casa de Rui Barbosa, the Arquivo Nacional, the Arquivo Historico de Itamarati, the Arquivo
Joaquim Nabuco, and the Arquivo Barao do Rio-Branco, all in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
This study examines the Brazilian concern for status
and prestige at the personal, national, and international
levels as reflected in private and official correspondence
during 1905-1908, the period bracketing the Second Hague
Conference.

The study seeks to emphasize the human dimen

sion that is often obscured in the chronology of events.
For.this purpose, extensive use has been made of written
communications.
The author is grateful to the staff of the diploma
tic section of the National Archives for assistance in iden
tification of pertinent United States embassy and consular
ii

material and State Department communications with the United
States delegation to the Second Hague Conference.

He grate

fully acknowledges a debt of gratitude to Dr. Francisco de
Assis Barbosa, director of the Fundagao Casa de Rui Barbosa,
and the archival staff, especially Maria Elena.

Dr. Raul

Lima and the staff of the reading room provided invaluable
assistance in the use of the Arquivo Nacional, Arquivo Joaquim Nabuco, and Arquivo Afonso Pena.

Dra. Martha Gongalves

and her staff at the Arquivo HistSrico do Itamarati were
most helpful with Foreign Ministry records and archival rec
ords of the Arquivo Barao do Rio-Branco.
A special debt of gratitude is owed to my disserta
tion committee, especially Dr. Jane DeGrummond who offered
aid, advice and encouragement through many long years.

Dr.

Paul Hoffman is highly commended for his incisive critiques
and helpful suggestions for the manuscript.

As directors of

the Latin American Studies Institute (LASI) during prepara
tion and completion of this dissertation, Dr. Roland Chardon
and Dr. Leonard Cardenas gave indispensable guidance and
support.

Dr. Peter Lunardini and Dr. Charles Patterson,

representatives of my minor fields, provided much helpful
support and advice.

These individuals are responsible for

the success of this study, but the author assumes full re
sponsibility for any errors and omissions.

I thank LASI for

fellowship support, and the Education Commission of the
Southern Baptist Convention for a scholarship/loan, without
both of which the study could never have been completed.
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A special vote of thanks is due Mrs. Miriam DeHart,
secretary of LASI, who was always a friend eager to give aid
with so many details of scheduling, deadlines, etc.

The

support and assistance of my collegues at Mobile College was
indispensable to the success of this venture.

Finally, I

wish to thank my family, especially my wife, for patience
and forbearance during the long years of study, preparation,
research, and writing culminating in the completion of this
study.
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ABSTRACT
This study traces the two traditional Brazilian for
eign policy objectives of securing recognition as an impor
tant member of the international community, and friendship
with the United States, during the period 1905-1908.

These

two objectives are examined in the light of Brazilian con
cern for status and prestige at the personal, national, and
international levels.

The themes of gaining international

recognition, and Brazilian-American friendship are inter
woven with the interpersonal relations that developed on the
occasion of the Second Hague Peace Conference.
The Second Hague Conference (1907) was the first
global meeting in which Brazil was represented.

It was an

opportunity for Brazil to distinguish herself from lesser
powers and to enhance her image as a leader in Latin Amer
ica.

An aspiration for great power status led to the culti

vation and projection of an image of Brazil as a nation that
was European in culture and orientation in spite of its geo
graphic isolation.

To support her claims, Brazil mounted an

impressive public relations campaign.

Furthermore, economic

and political considerations fostered a special relationship
with the United States.

The world conference was the stage

upon which the emerging nation made its debut.
vi

Baron Rio-Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, and Rui Barbosa
were the principal Brazilian actors on stage and behind the
scenes at the conference.

The search for status was the

principal motivation for Brazil's attendance at the Hague
Conference and played a role in the selection of her dele
gate, her stance on the conference issues, and her relation
ship with the United States.

Brazil's unrealistic goal of

becoming the ninth world power and her conference stance,
jeopardized her special relationship with the United States.
During this period these two traditional Brazilian
foreign policy objectives were not mutually exclusive, de
spite some incompatability.

Through the tenacious efforts

of Nabuco, the Brazilian-American relationship was salvaged
in spite of the hostility of Rui, and the indifference of
Rio-Branco.

Despite the conflicts over status, the Second

Hague Conference did gain for Brazil the reputation of a
cultured and cosmopolitan nation able to give a respectable
showing in a meeting with the powerful nations of the world.

vii

INTRODUCTION
World events test national goals and aspirations
giving rise to new courses of action while providing the op
portunity for nations to make an imprint on history.

Such

was the challenge posed to the emerging Brazilian nation in
1907 by the Second Hague Conference.

The Second Interna

tional Peace Conference (Second Hague Conference) was the
first global meeting in which Brazil was represented.

It

was an opportunity for Brazil to distinguish herself from
lesser powers and to enhance her image as a leader in Latin
America, especially vis-a-vis Argentina.

The aspiration for

great power status led to the cultivation and projection of
an image of Brazil as a nation that was European in culture
and orientation in spite of its geographic isolation.

A

competent and cosmopolitan foreign service was displayed as
evidence.

Furthermore, the desire to be the hegemonic power

of South America, and thus an equal of her neighbor to the
north, fostered a special relationship with the United
States.

The world conference was the stage upon which the

emerging nation made its debut.
Earlier studies dealing with the Second Hague Con
ference and with the three principal men responsible for
Brazil's role there, do not provide a comprehensive treat

ment of their interpersonal relations nor do they address
the concern for status and prestige on the three levels;
personal, national, and international.
The two most important books dealing with the Second
Hague Conference say little about Brazil's role during that
meeting .^

Calvin D. Davis' The United States and the Second

Hague Peace Conference is concerned primarily with the Amer
ican role at the Hague Conference and only cursorily men
tions Brazil or Rui Barbosa, the Brazilian delegate.

Wil

liam I. Hull makes some reference to Brazil and her delegate
t
in The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions to In
ternational Law, but his primary concern is a comparative
study of the two Hague peace conferences, with emphasis on
international law and the role of the United States delega
tion.

The Two Hague Conferences by Joseph H. Choate, leader

of the American delegation to the second conference, should
also be mentioned.

Choate emphasizes the proceedings of the

conference, with primary reference to the American role,
hardly making mention of Brazil.
Brazil's conference role is best covered by E. Brad
ford Burns in his study, The Unwritten Alliance, Rio-Branco
and Brazilian-American Relations.

Burns devotes sixteen

pages to the Hague Conference, providing an excellent sum
mary of the issues addressed and emphasizing the impact of
the deliberations on Brazilian-American relations.

In deal-

^Complete citations of sources discussed in the in
troduction may be found in the footnotes of the main body
of the paper and in the Selected Bibliography, pp. 221-30.

ing with individuals, Professor Burns' primary interest is
in Rio-Branco and thus he does not treat in depth the com
plex interrelationships among Baron Rio-Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, and Rui Barbosa.

Burns does not mention the extensive

Brazilian international public relations effort nor does he
acknowledge Nabuco's secret mission to aid the Hague delega
tion.
Luiz Viana, A Vida de Rui Barbosa, the standard bi
ography of Rui, has one chapter dealing with Rui's role as
Brazilian delegate to the Second Hague Conference and with
the events in which Rui was involved preceding and follow
ing the conference.

The major emphasis of Viana's work is

biographical and he deals sympathetically (and not impar
tially) with Rui and Brazil concerning this episode in his
country's history.
Curiously, Carolina Nabuco does not mention in The
Life of Joaquim Nabuco, that Nabuco went to Europe for four
months during the summer of 1907 and that she and the rest
of the family accompanied him.

She only devotes two pages

to the Hague Conference, most of the space dealing with the
controversy surrounding the selection of the Brazilian con
ference delegate.
Raymundo Magalhaes in Rui, o Homem e o Mito deals
with portions of Brazil's Hague episode in some detail, but
as a revisionist, his primary objective is to debunk the
"myth" or legend which he says overshadows the life of Rui,
and to expose the "intrigue and maneuvering" of Rui and Rio-

Branco during the conference.

Magalhaes is particularly in

terested in bringing to light part of the details surround
ing the publication of an illustrated magazine supplement
which praised Rui highly.

He makes much of the fact that

this article was paid for by the Brazilian government and
was later translated into Portuguese as a "book" purportedly
by an "impartial witness" to Rui's magnificent "victories"
before the assembled nations of the world.

Magalhaes iso

lates this incident and does not put it into the larger con
text as part of a campaign for publicizing Brazil.
None of these, nor other published material provides
comprehensive treatment of the complex interrelations among
all three of the Brazilians who together were responsible
for Brazilian foreign policy during the Second Hague Confer
ence, although the individuals are treated separately.

Na

buco 's role during the conference has been virtually ignored
by earlier studies, as has the extensive international pub
lic relations campaign conducted by Brazil during this meet
ing.
The essence of Brazil’s traditional foreign policy
has been succinctly stated by Brady B. Tyson.
four "pillars" of this policy as:

He lists the

expansion then stabiliza

tion of her frontiers, maintenance of a balance of power in
the Rio de la Plata area, gaining recognition as an impor
tant member of the community of nations, and friendship with
2
the United States.
2
Brady B. Tyson, "The Drive for Great Power Status:

By 1907 Brazil had stabilized her frontiers, but the
second objective kept her in a continuing rivalry with Ar
gentina.

Brazil used her attendance at the Hague Conference

to enhance her international prestige, but this threatened
to undermine the fourth objective by causing difficulties
with the United States.
This study traces the third and fourth "pillars" of
Brazil's foreign policy objectives during the period from
1905 to 1908.

The themes of securing recognition for Brazil

as an important member of the international community and
Brazilian friendship with the United States are interwoven
with the personal animosities, jealousies, concerns, poli
tical styles, and the interpersonal diplomatic relationships
that developed on the occasion of the Second Hague Confer
ence.
Concern for status and prestige is seen throughout
this study at the personal, national, and international
levels.

The behavior, personal idiosyncracies, personal

goals and interests of Rui Barbosa, Joaquim Nabuco, and
Baron Rio-Branco, gave form and substance to Brazil's for
eign policy objectives during this period.

New Problems for Brazilian Foreign Policy," in Harold E.
Davis, et al., Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pp. 226
27.

CHAPTER I
THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS
Rui Barbosa at The Hague, Joaquim Nabuco in Washing
ton and in Europe, and Baron Rio-Branco in Rio were the
principal Brazilian actors in their nation's debut on the
world stage at the Second Hague Peace Conference.

They col

laborated closely in making the conference a worthwhile ven
ture for Brazil in spite of disagreements, personality
clashes among themselves, and Brazilian and international
political realities.

A better understanding of these men

and their actions during the conference can be obtained if
the life of each prior to the conference is sketched, with
particular attention to demonstrating his position and stan
ding in Brazilian life and culture of that period.
*

*

*

Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos, Junior (Baron RioBranco) , was born in 1845 and was thus slightly older than
Rui and Nabuco.^- His father was in the diplomatic service
^The best biography of Rio-Branco is Luiz Viana,
Filho, A Vida do Barao do Rio Branco (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jose Olympio EditSra, 1959)7 another good biography
is Alvaro Lins, Rio-Branco; Biografia Pessoal e Historia
Politica, 2nd ed. (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional,
1965). For other materials on Rio-Branco see the excellent
bibliographical essay in E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten
Alliance, Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations (New
-6-

and rose to the postiion of prime minister in 1871.

The

elder Paranhos, whose ministry was the longest of the reign,
was given the title of Viscount of Rio-Branco by Dorn
Pedro II.
Baron Rio-Branco was a student of Brazilian history
from his school days, but he also led the life of a bohe
mian.

After six years in Parliament (1869-1875), Rio-Branco

sought a diplomatic appointment, and finally in 1876 was ap
pointed Brazilian consul in Liverpool, where he remained
until 1891.2
While assigned to Paris as director of the Brazilian
Immigration Service (1891-1901), Rio-Branco went to Washing
ton to represent his country in the Missions territory dis
pute with Argentina.
Brazil.

He gained a resounding victory for

After thus successfully defending Brazil's claims

to Amapa in a dispute with French Guiana, Rio-Branco went
briefly to Berlin (1901-1902).

In 1902, after living in Eu

rope for twenty-six years, he accepted the post of foreign
minister, which he would occupy until his death in 1912.
Rio-Branco was wildly cheered as a national hero upon his
return to Brazil, where he joined the administration of the
3
newly-elected president, Rodrigues Alves.
Rio-Branco's years of diplomatic service prepared
York:

Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 265-74.
2
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 22-27; and Viana,
Vida do Rio Branco, pp. 70, 73, 57-62.
3
Viana, Vida do Rio Branco, pp. 183-91; and Burns,
Unwritten Alliance, pp. 30-32.

him well for the post of foreign minister:
Those years in Europe gave Rio-Branco practical exper
ience in diplomacy, introduced him to the sources of
Western culture, required him to perfect his knowledge
of foreign languages, expanded his personal acquaint
anceships in diplomatic and social circles, permitted
him to visit European libraries and archives, and pro
vided the historian with leisure hours which he could
devote to the study of history.4
During the years (1902-1912) that he served as for
eign minister, Rio-Branco's foreign policy was based on
gaining international prestige for Brazil, settling the re
mainder of Brazil's disputed Boundaries, and achieving leadership for Brazil in South America.

5

He also modernized

the antiquated foreign policy organization of Brazil, in
order to implement his new policy.

Continuing the tradition

of boundary claim settlements, Rio-Branco arbitrated dis
puted boundaries with British Guiana, Colombia, Peru, and
Bolivia.

Greatly aided by Nabuco, the Baron also strengthg

ened Brazilian-American friendship during his tenure.
Rio-Branco served as Brazilian foreign minister for
over nine years, under four presidents.

He ran the ministry

as he wished, considering himself accountable only to the
4
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 29.
5
Ibid., pp. 37-38; and E. Bradford Burns, A His
tory of Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970),
pp. 234-38.
g

Frederic W. Ganzert, "The Baron do Rio-Branco,
Joaquim Nabuco, and the growth of Brazilian-American Friend
ship, 1900-1910," Hispanic American Historical Review XXII
(August 1944), p. 442; Richard Graham, Britain and the Onset
of Modernization in Brazil, 1850-1914 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1968), p. 311; and Lins, Rio-Branco,
pp. 336-37.

president and to public opinion.

His greatest service to

Brazil during his long tenure was the settlement of Brazil's
extensive boundaries.

7

*

*

*

According to his biographers and other observers,
Rui Barbosa was probably the most important Brazilian libO

eral of the nineteenth century.

He was deeply committed to

liberal ideals, was an expert on law, had a brilliant mind,
and was a great public speaker.
7

A.M. Gibson, a New York

Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 37, 49, 56.

O

The best biography is probably Luiz Viana Filho,
A Vida de Rui Barbosa (7th ed., Sao Paulo: Livraria Mar
tins Editora, 1965); hereinafter cited as Vida de Rui.
The only biography in English is Charles W. Turner, Ruy
Barbosa: Brazilian Crusader for the Essential Freedoms
(New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945). This latter
book is not comprehensive, has a strong pro-Barbosa bias,
and the documentation is incomplete. Other representative
biographies in Portuguese are: Carlos Viana Bandeira, Lado a Lado de Rui, 1876 a 1923 (Rio de Janeiro: Ministerio
Da Educagao E Cultura, Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1960); Maurilio
de Gouveia, Rui— O Apostolo do Direito (2nd ed., Rio de >
Janeiro: Grafica Tupy Limitada Editora, 1952); Mario de
Lima Barbosa, Ruy Barbosa na Politica e na Historia, 18491914 (Rio de Janeiro: F. Briguiet, 1916); Rubem Nogueira,
Historia de Ruy Barbosa (2nd ed., Salvador: Livraria Progresso Editora, 1957); Americo Palha, HistSria da Vida de
Rui Barbosa (2nd ed., Rio de Janeiro: Casa de Rui Barbosa,
1954); and Pireira Reis Junior, A Vida de Rui Barbosa (Rio
de Janeiro, 1949). Raymundo Magalhaes Junior, Rui# o Homem e o Mito (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilizagao Brasileira, 1965) is the major revisionist biography which first
appeared in 1964 and prompted several rebuttals, notably
Osvaldo Orico, Rui, o Mito e o Mico (Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1965). For other materials in English
see the excellent summary of the life and accomplishments
of Rui in Graham, Britain and the Onset of Modernization in
Brazil, pp. 267-76? and Jose Maria Bello, A History of Mod
ern Brazil, 1889-1964, trans. by James L. Taylor (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 59-61; hereinafter ci
ted as Modern Brazil. In the text, Rui's name will be spel
led with an "i," following current Brazilian orthography,
but a "y" will be used if it appears thus in citations.

Times correspondent, reported the following after an 1889
interview:
A perfect master of English, French, German, Italian,
and Spanish, as well as his own language, Conselheiro
Barbosa is thoroughly read in the legal, political, and
economic literature of those countries. He is the first
orator and writer of Brazil.9
Rui's inauspicious background hardly seemed to prepare him
for such a future.
Rui Caetano Barbosa de Oliveira (Rui Barbosa) was
born in 1849 in Salvador, Bahia and his early years were
spent in that northeastern part of Brazil, in the sugar
plantation and slaveholding area.

Rui came from a finan

cially insecure middle class family.

To offset this hin

drance to his political ambitions, he cultivated members of
the traditional ruling elite, especially Sousa Dantas, the
leader of the Liberal Party in Bahia, a member of the Im
perial Parliament, and briefly prime minister (1884-1885).
Dantas subsequently aided him in rising to political promi
nence .
Rui began the study of law at the age of sixteen and
during his latter student days became an ardent abolition
ist.

He attended both Brazilian law schools, matriculating

at Recife in 1866 and after two years transferring to Sao
Paulo to complete the five-year course.

After graduation he

became editor of the Liberal Party newspaper in Salvador and

g

New York Times, January 20, 1890, p. 5.

11
worked in the law office of Sousa Dantas.'*'0

His reward was

legislative seats, first in the provincial assembly, and
later in the Imperial Parliament,

As a member of the Imper

ial Parliament from 1877 to 1884, he concerned himself with
problems of abolition, direct election, religious liberty,
and the spread of education.

He was defeated for reelec

tion in 1884, primarily because of his abolitionist stance.
After his defeat he continued the abolitionist campaign
through speeches and the press.'*'’*'
Slavery was abolished in 1888 and Rui then turned
his attention to governmental reform in the interest of more
representative government.

He at first preferred to support

the monarchial structure, but accepted a cabinet post in the
1889 Provisional Government which was formed by republicans
with the support of the military.

12

As minister of finance

and acting minister of justice, Rui soon became the leading
figure of the new government.

13

As a lawyer he drafted many

Rubem Nogueira, 0 Advogado Rui Barbosa, (2nd ed.,
Salvador: Edigoes GRD, 1967), pp. 52-56; and Fernando Nery,
Rui Barbosa: Ensaio Biografico (Rio de Janeiro: Casa de
Rui Barbosa, 1955), p. 15.
■^Viana, Vida de Rui, pp. 86, 132-35; Magalhaes,
Rui, o Homem e o Mito, p. 112; Luiz Viana, Filho, Rui &
Nabuco: Ensaios (Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympia, 1949, p. 39;
and Nery, Rui Barbosa: Ensaio Biografico, p. 25.
12

Magalhaes, Rui, o Homem e o Mito, pp. 420-21; and
Bello, Modern Brazil, pp. 38, 48.
13

Rui was a member of the government from November
15, 1889 to January 21, 1891; he was minister of finance
during this entire period and vice-president from December
31, 1889 to August 19, 1890. He was appointed acting minis
ter of justice on November 15, 1889 and served until Campos
Sales, the appointed minister, arrived in Rio to assume the

important decrees and was largely responsible for writing
the final draft of the 1891 Constitution.

14

Rui devised an

elaborate scheme to rescue Brazil from inflation and other
economic difficulties of the period.

By the time he re

signed the financial post on January 21, 1891 after fourteen
months, he had extensively modified this theoretical plan in
an attempt to make it workable.

For almost a decade the

country's finances remained in a disastrous state and Rui
received the blame, although his plan was completely altered
by his successors before it had received a fair test.

15

After the republican constitution went into effect,
Rui attempted to interpret this document and to protect it
from the dictatorial tendencies of the president.

His op

position made him unpopular with the administration and he
had to flee into exile.

During the time abroad and upon his

return he opposed all acts he considered to be illegal or
unconstitutional.

16

post.

Bello, Modern Brazil, pp. 69, 81-82, 92.
14
Viana, Vida de Rui, pp. 201-02; Charles W. Simmons,
Marshal Deodoro and the Fall of Dorn Pedro II (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1966), p. 141; Americo Jacobina Lacombe, Rui Barbosa e a Primeira Constitugao da Republica
(Rio de Janeiro: Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1949), pp. 7-9.
^Viana, Vida de Rui, pp. 196-98, 203-04; Humberto
Bastos, Rui Barbosa, Ministro da Independencia Economica do
Brasil (2nd ed., Sao Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora,
1951), p. 85; and Pedro Calmon, HistSria da Civilizacao Brasileira (4th ed., Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional,
1940), pp. 336-37.
"^June E. Hahner, Civilian-Military Relations in Bra
zil, 1889-1898 (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Caro
lina Press, 1969), pp. 45-51; Rui Barbosa, Rui Barbosa e o
Exercito (Rio de Janeiro: Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1949),

Rui was chosen as the Brazilian delegate to the
Second Hague Peace Conference (June 15-0ctober 15, 1907)
because of his cosmopolitan image and brilliant oratorical
ability.

Joaquim Nabuco was Rio-Branco's first choice, but

disagreements between the two led to Rui's appointment.

As

leader of the Hague delegation Rui made a name for himself
and his country by opposing the United States and by vigor
ously supporting the demands of smaller nations for equality
with the larger nations in international disputes.

This

Brazilian antipathy toward the United States and support of
the equality of sovereign states was very popular with the
other Latin American countries and all of the smaller na
tions, but apparently ran counter to the long-range strategy
of Rio-Branco, who was attempting to forge an informal alliance with the United States.

17

Back at home, he became a perennial candidate for
the presidency, seeking to revise the constitution in such a
manner as to permit more representative government.

In

three successive campaigns he stumped the country in an un
precedented effort to take the issues to the people.

Know

ing that he had little chance of success against the en
trenched politicians, he still campaigned vigorously for the
presidency in 1910, 1914, and 1919.

When Rui died in 1923,

pp. 113-23, 128; Bello, Modern Brazil, p. 97; Rui Barbosa,
Cartas de Inplaterra (2nd ed., Sao Paulo: Livraria Academica, SARAIVA & C.-^Editores, 1929); and Lacombe, Rui e a
Primeira Constitugao, pp. 20-27.
17

See Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 116-31.

at the age of seventy-three, he still occupied his seat in
the Brazilian Senate and on the World Court (since 1921) and
was considered one of the outstanding citizens of his coun-

*

*

*

Joaquin Aurelio Nabuco de Araujo (Joaquim Nabuco)
another important Brazilian liberal, was born in Recife in
1849, the same year as Rui Barbosa.

19

Nabuco's father was

a member of the Parliament during Nabuco's earliest years.
Nabuco attended law school in Sao Paulo, and two of his
class mates were Rui Barbosa and Afonso Pena, who was later
to be president of Brazil (1906-1909).

20

After law school

he entered law practice in his father's firm, then took up
18

Homero Pires, Anglo-American Influences on Rui
Barbosa, translated by Silvia Medrado Clinton (Rio de Jan
eiro: Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1949), pp. 28-29, 50; Burns, A
History of Brazil, pp. 222, 247-49; Bello, Modern Brazil,
p. 206, 236-38; Orico, Rui, o Mito e o Mico, p. 170; Rui
Barbosa, "Manifesto A Nagao," in his Ruinas de urn Governo
(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Guanabara, 1931), pp. 255-261;
and Rui Barbosa, Campanha Presidencial, 1919 (Bahia: Liv
raria Catilina, 1919).
19

The best biography of Nabuco is Luiz Viana, Pilho,
A Vida de Joaquim Nabuco, (2nd ed., Sao Paulo: Livraria
Martino Editora, 1973). Nabuco's daughter wrote the only
other biography of consequence: Carolina Nabuco, A Vida de
Joaquim Nabuco (4th ed., Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jose
Olympia Editora, 1958) and it has been translated into Eng
lish as Carolina Nabuco, The Life of Joaquim Nabuco, trans
lated and edited by Ronald Hilton (Stanford: Stanford Uni
versity Press, 1950).
Several dual biographies have also
appeared; among them are: Levi Carneiro, Dois Arautos da
Democracia: Rui Barbosa e Joaquim Nabuco (Rio de Janeiro:
Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1954); Osvaldo Orico, Rui e Nabuco:
Duas Vidas num Confronto (Lisbon: Ottosgrafica, Ltda.,
1950); and Viana, Rui & Nabuco.
20

Viana, Rui & Nabuco, pp. 30-31.

journalism.

From 1876 to 1878 Nabuco held minor positions

in the Brazilian legations in Washington and London.

He was

elected to Parliament in 1878 and became a crusader for abo
lition of slavery, direct election, and religious liberty.
Nabuco was a born orator and his eloquence was put to good
use in the anti-slavery campaign.

21

There was a rapid turn

over in ministers and governments during the last years of
the Brazilian monarchy, with frequent elections.

Rui and

Nabuco both often had difficulty being reelected to Parlia
ment because of their abolitionist sympathies and only once
were they both elected at the same time.

22

Nabuco was intensely loyal to the monarchy and, as
he feared, the abolition campaign did help to destroy it.

23

After the overthrow of the monarchy in 1889, Nabuco remained
loyal to that form of government; but as the years passed,
the hopes of a monarchist restoration gradually faded.

Dur

ing that period he withdrew from politics and public life,
and for ten years his main interests were literary.

24

In 1899 Nabuco finally accepted an offer to serve
the republican government as Brazil's representative in a
dispute with Britain over the Guiana frontier.

He accepted

21

Graham, Britain and Modernization in Brazil, pp.
177-81; C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 1-20.
22

Viana, Rui & Nabuco, pp. 36-37.

23

Graham, Britain and Modernization in Brazil, p.
267; C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 31-32; and Viana, Rui &
Nabuco, pp. 24-25.
24

C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 196-97; and Viana,
Rui & Nabuco, pp. 13, 44.

the assignment because he felt it was not a political one.
Nabuco worked very closely with the Brazilian minister in
London, who was deeply involved in the negotiations.

Upon

the sudden death of the minister, Nabuco temporarily assumed
his duties.

He was asked to accept the post as a permanent

appointment, and finally agreed to do so in December of
25
1900.
At the turn of the century, Washington was becoming
increasingly important to Brazil.

In 1905 the Americans and

Brazilians agreed to raise the status of their diplomatic
delegations to embassy status, and Nabuco was appointed as
Brazil's very first ambassador.

Shortly after Nabuco pre

sented his credentials, Elihu Root was appointed as secre
tary of state.

He and Nabuco had many interests in common

and became good friends,

26

Nabuco was considered the dean of the Latin American
ambassadors in Washington because of his prestige and active
leadership in promoting better understanding between the
United States and Latin America.

Nabuco was strongly pro-

American and travelled widely in the United States in an at
tempt to dispel some of the American ignorance of Bra2^Viana, Vida do Rio Branco, pp. 74-84, 182-95?
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 21, 27-33? and C. Nabuco,
Life of Nabuco, pp. 245, 247, 249.
26
C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 301, 313, 306-07?
Ganzert, "The Baron do Rio-Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, and the
Growth of Brazilian-American Friendship, 1900-1910," pp.
432-51? and Graham, Britain and Modernization in Brazil,
pp. 311-13.

zil.

27

Both Nabuco and Root strongly supported Pan Ameri

canism and were intimately involved in planning the Third
Pan American Conference which was held in Rio in 1906.

Na

buco persuaded Root to make a personal appearance at the
conference, the first official foreign visit by a secretary
of state while in office.

Nabuco was a delegate to the Rio

Conference and was elected president.

28

Nabuco assisted in Brazilian preparations for the
Second Hague Peace Conference.

Through his friendship with

Root he had access to the instructions to the American dele
gation, and he succeeded in obtaining American support for
an honorary position for Brazil at The Hague.

During most

of the conference proceedings, Nabuco was in Europe, osten
sibly on leave for a health cure.

In connection with this

trip he was on an official, secret mission to aid the Brazilian Hague delegation.

29

He was very upset because of

strong differences between the Brazilian and American dele
gations at the Hague Conference.

He did all he could to

27

Ganzert, "The Baron do Rio-Branco, Joaquim Nabuco,
and the Growth of Brazilian-American Friendship, 1900-1910,"
pp. 440-41, 450.
28

C.
Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 317; and Graham,
Britain and Modernization in Brazil, p. 312.
29

Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, April 23, 1907, Arquivo
Historico de Itamarati, archive 235, mago 3, pasta 15, telegramas expedidas; hereinafter cited as AHI, 235/3/15 tel.
exp.; Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 22, 1907, AHI,
235/3/IB telegramas recebidas; and Nabuco to Root, Washing
ton, May 25, 1907, United States, National Archives, Record
Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Case
Number 40, document 290; hereinafter cited as DS, 40/290;
and Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, May 9, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15
tel. exp.

prevent these incidents from affecting the BrazilianAmerican friendship.

Nabuco died at his post in 1910 and

Secretary Root eulogized him at the dedication of the PanAmerican Union building.

30
*

*

*

The talents of these three eminent Brazilians com
bined to produce the desired results from Brazil's atten
dance at the Hague Conference.

They cooperated, and at

times clashed with each other, but for the most part kept in
mind the national interests of their country.
The following chapter will examine the interpersonal
relationships of these three men, highlighting the status of
each in relation to the other during the period preceding
the conference.

The pre-conference policy of Brazil toward

the United States will also be discussed.

30

Ganzert, "The Baron do Rio-Branco, Joaquim Nabuco,
and the Growth of Brazilian-American Friendship, 1900-1910,"
p. 442; and C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 361-63.

CHAPTER II
FRIENDSHIPS, PERSONAL STATUS, AND POLICY TOWARD
THE UNITED STATES
During the year preceding the Second Hague Confer
ence, maneuvering related to the selection of the Brazilian
delegate became increasingly intense.

Varying loyalties

were involved and Joaguim Nabuco, Rui Barbosa, and Baron
Rio-Branco were all concerned with their own status and the
personal status of the other two individuals.

Nabuco and

Rui generally supported each other and both came to dis
trust Rio-Branco.

Rio-Branco, for his part, played Nabuco

and Rui against each other in order to gain his own politi
cal ends.

Foreign Minister Rio-Branco was committed to a

pro-American policy but was jealous of Nabuco, who as am
bassador to the United States, had become a close friend of
American Secretary of State Elihu Root and threatened to
pre-empt Rio-Branco*s initiative in Washington.
*

*

*

Nabuco had been a personal friend of Rui since law
school and he was pleased to see Rui's prestige increase—
this presented no threat to him.

Nabuco was willing to

support and increase the status of Rio-Branco as foreign
minister as long as it did not conflict with Nabuco*s own
-19-

pro-American ideas.

He was not interested in becoming for

eign minister, but was dedicated to promoting United StatesBrazilian friendship.
When the Brazilian monarchy was overthrown in 1889
Joaquim Nabuco, a confirmed monarchist, severed his ties
with the government, preferring to remain loyal to the de
posed emperor .^

Rui Barbosa, on the other hand, supported

the republican government, serving as vice-president, finance minister, and acting minister of justice.

2

He also

rendered additional service by drafting the republican con
stitution, drawing heavily from the United States Constitu
tion. ^
These differing political persuasions caused the
two boyhood friends to drift apart.

However, after ten

years of retirement from political life, Nabuco finally
agreed to serve as Brazilian representative in the dispute
with Great Britain over the Guiana frontier.

He left for

Europe on May 3, 1899 to take up this assignment.

4

On the

eve of his departure, Nabuco wrote Rui a friendly note, rec
onciling their differences:
^C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 208; and Victor L.
Tapie, Joaquim Nabuco, 1844-1910, trans. by Jacob Bean
(Paris: UNESCO, 1949), p. 33.
^Bello, Modern Brazil, pp, 38, 48.
O

JViana, Vida de Rui, pp. 201-02; Simmons, Marshal
Deodoro and the Fall of Dorn Pedro II; and Lacombe, Rui Bar
bosa e a Primeira Constitugao da Republica, pp. 7-9.
^C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 240-44.

21
My dear Ruy,
On parting I wish you the best of everything and
hope that you will always remember me with the friend
ship which bound us in the time of our youth, certain
that you do not have any greater desire than I to see
the perfecting of your talent, the universality of your
name, and the immortality of your work.
I am more de
sirous than you yourself to see it enter into its true
and superior sphere, and it is sincere satisfaction that
accompanies the fullness of your intellectual orb.
Always yours
Joaquim Nabuco
This flattering note was evidence of the effort at reconcil
iation between the two.
In the selection of the Brazilian representative
for the Third Pan American Conference, both Rui and Nabuco
were considered for the post.

This situation did not cause

further friction between them, but rather presented an op
portunity for renewal of their friendship.
In May of 1906, the Brazilian foreign minister,
Baron Rio-Branco, wrote to Rui Barbosa requesting an ap
pointment to talk with him for a few minutes, in the name of
g

the president, about the Third Pan American Conference.
Rio-Branco asked Rui to accept the position of Brazilian
representative to the conference, which was to meet in Rio
5

Joaquim_Nabuco to Rui Barbosa, Rio, May 22, 1899,
Arquivo da Fundagao Casa de Rui Barbosa, Pasta J. Nabuco;
(hereinafter the archive will be cited as CRB). Rui had been
one of the first to applaud the acceptance of the position
by Nabuco, in "A Missao Nabuco," A Imprensa, March 13, 1889.
On that occasion Nabuco replied, "Thank you for your article
of yesterday.
It is most gratifying to me, that after so
long a separation, we return to the old comradeship of our
youth when we were both part of the liberal group in law
school." Nabuco to Rui, March 14, 1889, quoted in Viana,
Rui & Nabuco, pp. 58-59.
g

Baron Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 8 , 1906, CRB,
Pasta Rio-Branco (Acre).

de Janeiro later that year.

Rui, complaining of poor health

at the moment, was not disposed to accept the assignment and
asked for time to consider it.

7

After deliberating for fif

teen days he refused to accept, stating his reasons in a
O

letter on May 25th.
Joaquim Nabuco, now Brazilian ambassador to the
United States, arrived in Rio on July 17, 1906 for the Third
Pan American Conference.

Soon after his arrival he wrote to

Rui, thanking him for his visit and asking to be allowed a
few more

days before repaying it because he wanted to see

Rui when

they would have time to talk.

He went on to say

that he would like to have seen Rui accept the position of
g
Brazilian representative at the conference.
Nabuco asked
Rui if a

joint session of Congress, or at least a session of

the Senate, could be arranged to honor Secretary of State
Elihu Root and the United States.

He said Rui's eloquence

at such a session would certainly further the politics of
approximation between the two countries.^

Rui granted Na-

buco's request on the social call, saying that old compan7
Rui to Rio-Branco, Rio, May 25, 1906, Arquivo do
Barao do Rio-Branco, Mago 18, pasta 8; hereinafter cited as
ABR-B, 18/8.
Q

Ibid. Rui here protests that he is in ill health
from overwork and consequently is taking treatment requiring
relative rest and is thus unable to accept the position.
^Nabuco to Rui, Rio, July 21, 1906, CRB, Pasta
J. Nabuco. See also Nabuco to Evalina Nabuco, aboard the
Thames, July 16, 1906, cited in Viana, Vida de Nabuco,
p.376.
■^Nabuco to Rui, Rio, July 21, 1906, CRB, Pasta
J. Nabuco.

ions did not have to stand on ceremony.

He did not reject

the idea of a special congressional session, but declined to
be the orator, pleading that
I am too old, sick, and . . . no longer assume initia
tives, nor expose myself to reckless actions. The years
and the attrition of hostile things . . . have devel
oped in me a distrust which is only overcome when some
irresistable desire commands my blind obedience.H
Rui went on to tell Nabuco, confidentially, that this was
the reason he excused himself from the Pan American Confer
ence.^^
In reply, Nabuco asked Rui to serve as Brazilian
spokesman at the reception for Mr. Root.

He begged Rui to

accept this role, for Rui's own sake and for the sake of
Brazil.

He then gave detailed suggestions on what topics to

cover at the reception and again implored Rui to do it.

13

Rui, after some reluctance, agreed to welcome Root in the
Senate.
Rui to Nabuco, Rio, July 22, 1906, CRB, Pasta
J. Nabuco. Viana, Vida de Rui, p. 295, says Rui accepted the
role of orator, citing this letter. However, the letter
reads, "Nao seria, com efeito, sem analogias na historia dos
parliamentos a sua lembranca de uma manifestagao ao secretario de estado americano pelas camaras de Congresso. Mas
no que nao convenho, e no papel, que Voce me designa." In
the same letter Rui later says, "Mas a postura de porta-voz
do Congresso, que Voce me quer dar, a outrem deve cair."
On June 26th, Nabuco paid the promised visit to Rui. At
that time Nabuco persuaded Rui to change his mind about
being orator for the Root banquet on August 2nd. Viana, Rui
& Nabuco, p. 70.
12
J. Nabuco.
13
J . Nabuco.
14

Rui to Nabuco, Rio, July 22, 1906, CRB, Pasta
Nabuco to Rui, Rio, July 23, 1906, CRB, Pasta

Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 380.

The relationship from their youth seems now to have
been renewed.

Nabuco sent some gifts and Rui responded by

saying, "I thank you very much for these souvenirs, which
will be a reminder of the renewal of our good relationship,
which I value greatly."

15
*

*

*

Rio-Branco was wary of increasing the status of Na
buco.

He knew that Nabuco was being considered as a pos

sible replacement for himself, and he felt that Nabuco had
become too pro-American and was independently pursuing that
policy without regard to the desires of the Foreign Minis
ter.

He believed that Nabuco had seized Rio-Branco's own

iniative of Brazilian-American friendship and had wrested
it from him.
Nabuco was welcomed as a hero in Brazil on his way
to the Third Pan American Conference (Rio Conference) and he
attributed that fact to the popularity of his "American Policy."

16

Rodrigues Alves, the Brazilian president, as well

as Afonso Pena, the president-elect, had been law school
classmates of Nabuco and Rui.

17

In organizing the govern

ment for 1906-1910 there was speculation about whether or
not Pena would replace Baron Rio-Branco as foreign minister.
15

Rui to Nabuco, Rio, July 30, 1906, Arquivo Par
ticular de Joaquim Nabuco? hereinafter cited as AJN.
■^Nabuco to Evalina Nabuco, aboard the Thames, July
16, 1906, quoted in C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 322? let
ter also cited in Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 376.
17

Ronald Hilton, translator and editor, in preface
to C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. xxii.

It was said that Pena favored Joaquim Nabuco, but public
opinion leaned toward Rio-Branco.

18

Rio-Branco had long been an intimate friend of Nabu
co and had sought his advice on whether or not to accept the
Foreign Ministry post in the new government of Rodrigues Alves in 1902.

19

After deciding to accept, Rio-Branco had

written of his decision to Nabuco indicating that he only
intended to retain the post for two years, saying,
It is resolved, then that in 1904 I shall try to hand
you my staff of office in Rio; if you want nothing of
this, then return to London. . . .
I shall occupy my
self with the Foreign Ministry only until you are freed
by a victory in Rome.20
Later events were to prove that Rio-Branco changed his mind
in regard to this matter.
At the time Rio-Branco sought his advice, Nabuco had
been the Brazilian representative on the commission for ar
bitration of the boundary dispute between Brazil and British
Guiana.

King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy was the arbitra

tor and thus Nabuco, who was assigned to London, was spend
ing much of his time in Rome.

Raul, the son of Rio-Branco,

was secretary to this special mission in Rome.
18

21

Lins, Rio-Branco, p. 369.

19

Rio-Branco to Nabuco, telegram, Berlin, August 7,
1902, quoted in C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 260; and Vi
ana, Vida do Rio Branco, p. 315.
20

Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Berlin, August 30, 1902,
quoted in C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 261.
21

Ronald Hilton, trans. and ed., in C. Nabuco, Life
of Nabuco, p. 260. Nabuco and the Brazilian minister in
London, Arthur de Souza Correa, were jointly working on the
arbitration. Upon the sudden death of Souza Correa, Nabuco

During his stay in Rio for the Third Pan American
Conference, Nabuco learned that he was to be invited to take
over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

22

However, Rio-Branco

changed his mind about leaving the position and wished to
continue under Afonso Pena.

Since Riq-Branco wished to re

main, Nabuco felt it was not difficult for him to refuse the
position.

However, he also was convinced that his health

could not stand the hard work, and he believed he could not
be adequately replaced in Washington, which he considered a
crucial post for Brazil.

23

By the end of September everyone

believed that Rio-Branco would remain as foreign minister
after the inauguration of the new administration, and Nabuco
was relieved that he did not have to refuse an invitation to
the post by his boyhood friend, Afonso Pena.

24

The highlight of the Rio Conference was the visit by
Elihu Root, American Secretary of State.

His presence at

the conference was primarily due to the persuasion of Joatook complete charge of the negotiations and also virtually
ran the London ministry, although declining an official ap
pointment.
However, he finally was forced to make a deci
sion whether or not to join the government; in December of
1900 he accepted appointment as Brazilian minister to Lon
don. C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 245, 247, 249.
22
Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 383.
23
C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 329-30.
24
Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 384. While assembling
a cabinet Afonso Pena, perhaps sensing Nabuco's predicament,
wrote him, "For whatever motive, you can bestow your cooper
ation during my presidency in the post which you judge to be
better able to serve our Country." Pena to Nabuco, August
30, 1906, quoted in C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 437.

quim Nabuco.

25

In 1905 Nabuco had been appointed as the

first Brazilian ambassador to Washington when the two countries agreed to elevate their legations to embassy status.

26

One of Nabuco's first official acts in Washington was to attend the funeral of Secretary of State John Hay.

27

Root,

then Secretary of War, succeeded Hay on July 1, 1905.

Nabu

co and Root soon became good friends and both recognized the
desirability of closer relations between their two countries.

28

Nabuco helped Root a great deal on many Latin

American matters, but he proved to be a handicap in some re
spects because the other Latin American countries resented
Brazil's self-assigned role of second great power in the
25

Theodore Roosevelt informed Nabuco that the ambas
sador was responsible for Root's going to the Rio Confer
ence. C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 317. Burns says that
persuading Root to attend the conference was one of the four
greatest achievements of Nabuco as Brazilian ambassador.
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 141. The visit was especially
notable because it was the first foreign trip by an American
secretary of state while in office.
26
Rio-Branco's first telegram to the new ambassador
read:
"Nabuco, Brazilian Ambassador, Washin£ton. Affec
tionate regards / to the_7 new ambassador /_ who is_7 cer
tain to remain there many years, ever developing closer re
lations with the influential so that in this post you may
apply your knowledge and patriotism. Rio Branco." RioBranco to Nabuco, Petropolis, May 23, 1905, AHI, 235/3/15
tel. exp.

27
28

C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 312.

Root to Nabuco, Washington, November 28, 1905,
quoted in Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, 2 vols. (New York:
Dodd, Mead, and Company, Inc., 1938), I, pp. 472-73; Nabuco
speech at the Casino Pluminense, July 20, 1906, quoted in
C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 325; Viana, Rui & Nabuco,
p. 65; and Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 356.

Americas.

29

Secretary Root left for Rio on July 4th in a new
Navy cruiser and, at the suggestion of Nabuco, called at
three Brazilian ports enroute.

30

At Recife, Nabuco's home,

a large crowd turned out to hear a speech by Root in which
he praised the Brazilian ambassador highly.

31

When the

American secretary of state and his family arrived in Rio,
the enthusiastic reception accorded them presaged the festivities meticulously arranged for this visit.

32

Nabuco

strongly supported Rio-Branco's policy of aligning Brazil
with the United States and Root's visit signified the success of this policy.

33

The Third Pan American Conference convened on July
23rd in the newly constructed Monroe Palace.

Naming of the

edifice for President Monroe was another of the moves by the
Brazilian government calculated to arouse Brazilian public
opinion in favor of the United States.

34

Rio-Branco deliv-

29

Jessup, Root, I, pp. 471-72.
30 , .,
Ibid.
31
Nabuco to Rui, Rio, July 23, 1906, CRB, Pasta
J. Nabuco? and Root speech, Recife, July 22, 1906, in Robert
Bacon and James B. Scott, Latin America and the United
States: Addresses by Elihu Root (Cambridge: Harvard Uni
versity Press, 1917), pp. 47-48.
32
Lloyd Griscom to Root, July 16, 1907, DS, 1113/2.
33
34

Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 114.

For a summary of Brazilian efforts to influence
public opinion in that direction see a long memorandum by
Lloyd Griscom, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil. The memorandum,
destined as a background paper for Mr. Root's visit, also
supplies good, informed, contemporary opinion on political

ered the opening address of the conference, and its first
act was to elect Nabuco president and Root and Rio-Branco
honorary presidents.

35

The Root family arrived in Rio early on July 27th
and they were soon involved as spectators or participants in
numerous parades, receptions, banquets, and speeches during
their week-long stay.

On July 31st Secretary Root addressed

a special session of the Conference and Nabuco introduced
him as the one largely responsible for the meeting and for
its program.

36

The Rio Conference helped to determine the course of
the Second Hague Peace Conference and also Brazil's course
in that later conference.

Root tried to impress upon the

delegates the importance of the upcoming Hague conference.
In his first speech to the conference he reminded the assem
bled delegates that, for the first time, all of the American
nations would be represented at The Hague, and he hoped that
their equal rights as sovereign states would be recognized.
He saw this representation as formal acceptance by the
world that no part of the American continents was subject to
conditions in Brazil.
1906, DS, 1113/2.
35
36

Griscom to Root, PetrSpolis, July 16,

Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 110.

Jessup, Root, I, pp. 478-79. In preparation for
the Rio Conference three major items for the agenda had the
potential for substantial conflict among the countries rep
resented. However, the commission preparing the agenda left
these three items to be decided at the Hague Conference.
The commission was chaired by Root and was composed of am
bassadors of the major Latin American countries in Washing
ton. Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 371-72.

colonization. 37
In the discussions of the arbitration committee, the
close connection between the Rio and Hague conferences was
emphasized.

Some members wanted the committee report to de

clare compulsory arbitration as a necessary part of any ar
bitration agreement.

Despite much sympathy for this posi

tion, it was agreed that such a declaration would unduly
complicate the Hague negotiations.

Instead of such a decla

ration, the committee drew up a strong resolution on arbitration, which the conference adopted.

38

Discussion of the Dr ago Doctrine (.named for the Ar
gentine foreign minister) was perhaps the most exciting
topic at the Rio Conference and was the second item deferred
to the Hague Conference.

39

*
In December 1902, Luis M. Drago,

foreign minister of Argentina, had formulated a principle
stating that no public debt should serve as the excuse for
armed intervention or occupation of territory in the Western
Hemisphere.

40

Root's instructions to the American delegates

approved of the Drago Doctrine, but instructed them to rec
37

Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and the
Second Hague Peace Conference; American Diplomacy and In
ternational Organization, 1899-1914 (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1975), pp. 133-34; and Elihu Root, speech,
July 31, 1906, in 59th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, Docu
ment No. 365, Report of the Delegates of the United States
to the Third International Conference of the American States
Washington, 1907).
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"Resolutions of the 1906 International Conference
of the American States,11 in Report of Delegates of the U.S.
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Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 134.
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 170.

ommend that the conference refrain from taking action on the
matter, since by such action it would appear that the deb
tors were attempting to dictate the actions of their credi
tors.

Root recommended that the topic be reserved for con-

sideration at The Hague.

41

However, after much debate a

strong resolution was approved, recommending that the Second
Hague Peace Conference examine the issue with a view toward
diminishing conflicts exclusively pecuniary in origin.

42

In his speech at the closing session of the Third
Pan American Conference, Joaquim Nabuco recognized the ac
complishments, but he emphasized the importance of

the Sec

ond Hague Conference and the relationship of the Rio confer
ence to the forthcoming one at The Hague:
Although we confirmed thus the existence of an American
political system, yet by reserving to The Hague the so
lution of two important questions, we have shown that we
do not recognize the existence of a private system of
international law for ourselves and that we do not form
a separate community from world civilization. . . . You
ratified the adhesion of the American republics to the
principle of arbitration, and you made an appeal to the
coming Hague Conference to perpetuate this principle in
a treaty worthy of the approbation of the entire civi
lized world . . . .
You recommended that our govern
ments consider the advisability of asking the Hague Con
ference to study the question of the collection of pub
lic debts by force and more generally to investigate
methods for diminishing the possibility for conflicts
exclusively pecuniary in o r i g i n . 43
41

Root's "Instructions to the American Delegation,"
June 18, 1906, pp. 41-42, cited in Davis, U.S and the Sec
ond Conference, p. 134.
42

"Resolutions of the 1906 Conference," in Report of
Delegates of the U.S., p. 116; and Davis, U.S. and the Sec
ond Conference, p. 134.
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Joaquim Nabuco, speech, August 27, 1906, quoted in
C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 327-28.

Thus the American nations assembled at Rio referred for dis
cussion at The Hague several topics of importance to them.
*

*

*

Since Rio-Branco's policy of Brazilian-American
friendship was being pre-empted by Nabuco, the Baron began
seeking ways to counteract the Ambassador's influence with
the Americans.

Thus, while the friendship of Rui and Nabuco

was growing closer, the relationship between Rio-Branco and
Nabuco was becoming increasingly strained.

This situation

was to have an effect on the makeup of the Brazilian delega
tion to the Hague Conference and cause a delay in the ap
pointment of the Brazilian representative.
Nabuco remained in Rio after the close of the Third
Pan American Conference because of the terminal illness of
his father-in-law.

While in Rio he had hoped to spend some

time with Rui, but this did not prove to be possible.

Two

dsys before his departure for the United States, he wrote to
Rui lamenting the fact that, because of the death in the
family, he had been unable to accept Rui's invitation to
spend a night at the home of "my old comrade and friend."
He asked Rui to send word if he could help him in any way in
Washington where he was "serving as the agent of the approximation between Brazil and the United States."

44

Nabuco also wrote to Rio-Branco, praising the Baron
for his service to Brazil then saying,
44
J. Nabuco.

Nabuco to Rui, Rio, October 15, 1906, CRB, Pasta

for my part, I congratulate myself on the role that is
right for me, because you will not disavow me and will
give me liberty of action, without which I can do noth
ing for our friendship with America.45
Nabuco was serving notice that he intended to pursue his
pro-American policy and hoped Rio-Branco would not order a
change.
Ambassador Nabuco sailed for the United States, go
ing to New York via London where he took the opportunity to
visit his old friends at the Brazilian legation.

46

Upon ar

rival in New York, there occurred an incident which gave
ample opportunity for Nabuco's enemies in Rio to poke fun at
him and his American policy.

The American immigration au

thorities, in enforcing a new law, reportedly subjected the
ambassador to "humiliating" questions such as whether or not
he was a polygamist or anarchist, if he had ever been in
prison, if he had been in an insane asylum or poor house,
and where he got the money to pay his passage.

47

Evidently

45

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Rio, October 12, 1906,
ABR-B, 18/1. Since presenting his credentials in Washing
ton, Nabuco had deliberately exceeded his instructions in
seeking approximation with the U.S. He later threatened to
resign on several occasions if Rio-Branco would not support
his position. Nabuco to Evelina Nabuco, Washington, May 28,
1905, quoted in Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 354; Nabuco to
Rio-Branco, Washington, January 18, 1908, ABR-B, 74/1, rec.
See also Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907,
AJN; Nabuco to Pena, Washington, January 23, 1908, AJN; Pena
to Nabuco, PetrSpolis, February 10, 1908, AJN; and Nabuco to
Gomes Feirerra, Washington, February 18, 1908, AJN.
46

Regis de Oliveira to Nabuco, London, November 1,

1906, AJN.
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Griscom to Root, Petropolis, November 23, 1906,
DS, 3464/1; and Jornal do Brasil, November 18, 1908.

34
the incident was blown out of proportion because over a
month later Root sent the following telegram in code:
Griscom, Rio de Janeiro. Your number 57, Nov. 23rd.
Ambassador Nabuco positively denies that any such inci
dent as you refer to ever occurred.
Immediately upon
reading the story in American newspapers I called upon
him personally and was informed by him that the story
was entirely false. Please have false statements cor
rected in Rio. R o o t . 4 8
Since Griscom's original report on November 23rd,
Rio-Branco had made reference on several occasions, with
obvious irritation, to the alleged incident in New York involving the Brazilian ambassador.

49

The American ambassador

followed Root's instructions and soon smoothed over the
"incident." The case was closed after Rio-Branco published
in a newspaper a letter from Nabuco denying that a confron
tation had taken place and satisfactorily explaining the
incident.

50

Until Griscom called on him, Rio-Branco made no

effort to correct the negative impression conveyed by the
incident as it was reported in the press. He told Griscom
that he had no more authoritative information on the inci
dent than what he read in the press until he received Nabuco's letter of November 28th.

51

Rio-Branco's explanation

was considered satisfactory and the matter was dropped, but
48

Root to Griscom, Washington, December 28, 1906,
DS, 3464/2.
49

Griscom to Root, Petropolis, December 31, 1906,
DS, 3464/4.
50

Note from Nabuco to Rio-Branco, published in the
Jornal do Commercio, December 30, 1906.
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Griscom to Root, Petropolis, December 31, 1906,
DS, 3464/4.

Griscom foresaw that adverse consequences would be felt for
a long time.

52

Rio-Branco was apparently beginning to re

treat from the position of blind adulation of the United
States which he had adopted at the Rio Conference.

The Bar

on was also envious of Nabuco's popularity and he perceived
the ambassador's growing independence of action as threaten
ing to undermine his authority.
Upon his return to Washington Nabuco received a dis
quieting letter from Jose Pereira da Costa Mota, a diploma
tic colleague now in Petersburg.

This sixteen-page letter

marked "confidential," severely attacked Rio-Branco, who had
just exiled the author to Russia, to make a place for one of
his favorites.

Costa Mota quoted Jose Carlos Rodrigues as

saying, truthfully, "Rio Branco is the world's greatest ego
tist and his friends are only for his own ends; and one
deputy told me he is a vain drunkard, and another:
conceited!"

53

he is

He went on to tell Nabuco that the ambassador

would be disillusioned when he recognized the situation, and
advised him to avoid it as much as he could.

Costa Mota

said Rio-Branco wanted to be the only one:
52

Ibid. Nabuco confirmed that Root came to his
residence early the next morning to present the apologies of
the American government for the reported incident. Nabuco
said he told Root there was no discourtesy, and considered
the matter settled. Nabuco to Rio-Branco, November 28,
1906, published in the Jornal do Commercio, December 30,
1906.
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Quoted in Costa Mota to Nabuco, November, n.d.,
1906, AJN. Jose C. Rodrigues was owner and editor of the
Jornal do Commercio at this time. Ambassador Griscom de
scribed him as "one of the principal factors in moulding of
public opinion in Brazil." Griscom to Root, Petropolis,
July 16, 1906, DS, 1113/2.

How he has thought of your triumphal march in America
and your popularity; everything not of his own making
causes him to be envious, and jealous. You will be
bowled over to read this; It is the truth. . . . RioBranco is now a hard man, who has entrails of steel and
a heart of b r o n z e . 54
This attack on the foreign minister could perhaps be passed
off as that of a bitter man striking back at his supposed
tormentor, if Nabuco would not soon come to hold and privately express similar views.

55

Rio-Branco hoped to have Nabuco lead the Hague dele
gation, where Nabuco would be obliged to follow Rio-Branco's
direct orders and would surely come into conflict with the
Americans, thus decreasing his stature and standing in Wash
ington and bringing him back under Rio-Branco's control.
Meanwhile, regardless of his private opinions, Rio-Branco
continued publicly to praise Nabuco.

For example, on Novem

ber 10th, he spoke to a delegation of Brazilian army offi
cers, responding to their presentation to him of bound cop
ies of speeches delivered by himself and Root at the Rio
Conference.

After congratulating outgoing president Rodri

gues Alves for his American policy, he continued,
I only deserve the merit of having proposed the creation
of an Embassy in Washington and the appointment to it of
Joaquim Nabuco, who occupies it with such distinction
and has known how to do so much there to make Brazil
better known and esteemed. The sympathetic movement
which has so greatly increased in the United States of
America in favor of Brazil is due, without doubt to the
rare qualities of our worthy Ambassador, to the perfec54
55

Costa Mota to Nabuco, November, n.d., 1906, AJN.

See Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, February
25, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March
4, 1907, AJN.
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tion with which he knows how to translate the__ideas of
the Government of his country and the charm /_ with_7
which he inspires all those who come closely in contact
with him.56
Ambassador Griscom about this time took the opportu
nity, on the occasion of a diplomatic reception, to congrat
ulate the outgoing Brazilian president for the "consistent
friendly attitude" which he had maintained throughout the
four years of his term of office towards Americans and American interests.

57

Griscom mentioned three incidents that

had been of particular importance in furthering BrazilianAmerican friendship to this point:

the Pan American Con

gress in Rio, the visit of Secretary Root to Brazil, and
the elevation of the diplomatic missions to embassy status.

58
On November 15th, Afonso Pena assumed the presidency

and the only cabinet member to retain his post was Foreign
Minister Rio-Branco.

There had been considerable doubt as; to

whether or not Pena would continue the trend of approximation
with the United States advocated by his predecessor.

The

retention of Rio-Branco seemed to portend little change in
Brazil's foreign policy, and the American ambassador was
5^Rio-Branco, speech, quoted in Griscom to Root,
Petropolis, November, s.d., 1906, DS, 1113/4.
57

Griscom to Root, PetrSpolis, November 28, 1906,
DS, 2372/3.
58

Ibid. Rio-Branco and Nabuco had both been inti
mately involved with, and primarily responsible for, these
three noted achievements of President Rodrigues Alves.

delighted with Pena's inaugural address.

59

The United

States was the only foreign nation mentioned in the message
and the new Brazilian leader left no doubt that he intended
that the closer relations between the two countries should
60
continue.
At Griscom's insistence a telegram was sent from
Root, which was delivered personally to Pena, expressing the
thanks of the American government for the remarks in his inaugural address.

61

Pena was very pleased with the message

from Root and assured the ambassador that it would be the
policy of his government to bring their two nations ever
closer together.

Griscom reported, "I received a most fa

vorable impression from the conversation I had with the
President.

He appeared forceful and alert and his method of
62
dealing with business was simple and direct."
The ambassador concluded his dispatch by thus sum
marizing his appraisal of the Pena government:
You may feel confident that the personnel and the dis
position of the new Government is in every way favorable
to the ideas entertained by President Roosevelt and
yourself, as propounded by you during your recent tour
of South America, concerning the relations which should
exist between the United States and the Republics of
59

Ibid.

60
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Griscom to Root, Petropolis, November 16, 1906,
DS, 2372/1.
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Root to Griscom, Washington, November 17, 1906,
DS, 2372/2? and Griscom to Root, Petropolis, November 28,
1906, DS, 2372/3.
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Griscom to Root, Petropolis, November 28, 1906,
DS, 2372/3.

South America.

g3

Thus the stage was set for continuing cooperation between
the two countries.
*

*

*

Nabuco was mentally and physically exhausted from
his trip to Rio, as he told his long-time friend, Richard C.
Shannon, who was concerned about Nabuco's health.

Shannon

recognized that Nabuco had been over-worked that year and
gave him the following advice:

"You will have to go to some

good watering place next Summer and have a good long rest;
taking Madam Nabuco with you, this time, and all the child,,64
ren."
Nabuco recognized the veracity and value of this ad
vice, immediately writing to Rio-Branco that his health was
not good and that he needed a year for a complete cure.

He

further said this cure could only be taken in Europe and
that only after he were completely well could the question
of whether or not he would continue in his post be resolved.

65

The request, coming at this particular time, may

63, . .
Ibid.
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Shannon to Nabuco, Brockport, N.Y., December 10,
1906, AJN. Richard Cutts Shannon served as a U.S. Congress
man, 1895-99. He had spent twelve years in Brazil as secre
tary to the U.S. Legation to Brazil, 1871-75, and as an ad
ministrator of the Botanical Garden Railroad Company, an
American enterprise, 1876-83. Shannon developed a friend
ship with Nabuco shortly after his arrival in Brazil. Shan
non to Nabuco, Brockport, N.Y., December 21, 1906, AJN; and
Who Was Who in America, Vol. I, 1897-1942 (Chicago: A.N.
Marquis Company, 1943), p. 1109.
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1906, AJN.

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December 12,

have been due at least in part to Rio-Branco's delay in correcting the impressions of the New York incident.

66

The am

bassador, however, apparently considered himself to be RioBranco' s "dedicated old friend," as he admonished the Baron
to care for his own health.

He also was deeply sympathetic

to his long-time colleague in his lonely position of foreign
minister saying, "I very well understand the horror of that
solitary prison of Itamarati."

67

It is important to determine the state of Nabuco's
health during this period, for he was later to cite ill
health as a reason for declining nomination as a delegate to
the Hague Peace Conference.

The veracity of his claim of

ill health would also be questioned by many at that time.

S8

In reply to a letter from a Mr. Sours, Nabuco apolo
gized for a tardy response, saying, "I have not been in very
good health & that obstructed all my correspondence."

69

However, the Brazilian ambassador continued to honor as many
speaking engagements as possible.

70

The day after he wrote

Sours, Nabuco wrote Shannon:
66

See pp. 33 and 34, above, for details of the inci

dent.
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Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December 12,

1906, AJN.
68

Hilario de Gouvea to Nabuco, Petropolis, March 24,
1907, AJN? and Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Petropolis, April 1,
1907, AJN.
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Nabuco to Sours, Washington, February 18, 1907,

AJN.
70
AJN:

Nabuco to Root, Washington, February 18, 1907,

It is a true sacrifice for me to leave tonight for Buf
falo. I had to speak the other night at the University
Club Dinner and to remain seating / sic 7 from 7 1/2 to
12 1/2 in a room vitiated by the smoke of 400 cigars.
And my poor digestive power did not allow me to touch
any of the dishes. As I had already a cold, with the
effort I made to stand on trembling legs, like my Fa
ther, I came home very tired by one o'clock and had to
keep in bed next day until dinner time, when we had a
party of friends. My chest is painful and the Doctor,
who has been here twice since, says I must be very care
ful. 71
This illness was due to the continued hard work and busy
schedule of the ambassador and to the strain of preparation
for and attendance at the Rio Conference, combined with the
death of his father-in-law.

On doctor's orders Nabuco took

a month of relative rest, which caused his health to improve
quite a bit, but he would be ill again the following year.

72

During Nabuco's stay in Rio, Rio-Branco evidently
had asked him to represent Brazil at the Second Hague Peace
Conference.

In any event, Nabuco was convinced that he

would lead the Brazilian delegation to the conference and
had discussed it with Shannon.

73

In an effort to prod Nabu

co into officially accepting, Rio-Branco evidently prompted
a report in a Brazilian paper in Paris, which then appeared
71

Nabuco to Shannon, Washington, February 19, 1907,
AJN. Leao Zagury, of the Brazilian ministry in London, ac
companied Nabuco from Rio to London in November, 1906. He
now wrote to Nabuco, "I hope that these last months have
given you opportunity for complete rest after your long trip
and great labors during the last year." Zagury to Nabuco,
March 15, 1907, AJN.
72
Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907,
AJN.
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Shannon to Nabuco, Brockport, N.Y., December 21,

in the Rio press.

The following announcement appeared in

the December 27, 1906 issue of the Courier du Bresil:

"Our

envoy to The Hague will be the diplomat who has represented
us in Washington for over a year with great prestige, Mr.
Joaquim Nabuco."

74

In January the Correio da Manha quoted

that announcement with approval, saying, "It appears that
the choice of our government could not have been better."

75

However, just two days later the same paper proposed Rui
Barbosa as Brazil's representative to the conference.

76

Rui's candidacy soon caught the public imagination,
and as other papers got on the bandwagon, Rio-Branco real
ized Rui's popular support.

The Baron had not yet made pub

lic his selection of Nabuco, so instead he recommended to
President Pena that Rui receive the nomination.

77

Until

about the end of February 1907, Nabuco was commonly accepted
as the Brazilian representative and several persons had approached him for a position in the delegation.

78

Rio-Branco

74
Courier du Bresil, December 27, 1906, quoted in
"0 Brasil Na Haya," Correio da Manha, January 14, 1907, p.l.
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Correxo da Manha, January 14, 1907, p. 1.

Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Gramier,
uary 16, 1907, AJN.
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(Cabo Frio), Jan
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Oscar Lopes to Nabuco, Rio, January 23, 1907, AJN;
and Jose Verissimo to Nabuco, Rio, February 26, 1907, AJN.
However, as early as March 1st, Rui began to receive similar

invited Rui to go to the Second Hague Conference without
withdrawing the invitation to Nabuco.

A delicate situation

ensued, which took some time to resolve.

79

Thus, before Nabuco officially agreed to head the
Hague delegation, Rio-Branco conceived the idea of sending
Rui instead, or both Rui and Nabuco.

He perceived Nabuco's

reluctance to jeopardize his position in Washington by going
to The Hague.

Rio-Branco had the idea of advancing Rui's

name in the press in order to gauge public reaction and at
the same time to prod Nabuco toward acceptance.

Rui's can

didacy got a surprisingly good reception and Rio-Branco then
used a different tactic to undermine Nabuco's position.

He

offered Rui the position and insisted that both Nabuco and
Rui go.

Rio-Branco believed that the presence of both would

be a big boost for the status of Brazil and would somewhat
modify Nabuco's independent pro-American bent.

Rio-Branco

was convinced that a Hague delegation led by Nabuco, Rui, or
both Rui and Nabuco would accomplish his three-fold purpose
of increasing Brazil's international status, modifying Bra
zil's extremely pro-American foreign policy, and decreasing
Nabuco's personal influence in Washington.

Rio-Branco

requests. J.G. de Sousa Bandeiral, Rio, March_l, 1907, CRB,
Haia, Pasta XVII; and Magalhaes Castro to Augusto Preital,
telegram, Bahia, March 2, 1907, CRB, Haia, Pasta XVII, which
reads, "Please obtain Ruy's nomination of my son Leopoldo
as his secretary."
79

Hilario de Gouvea to Nabuco, Rio, March 6, 1907,
AJN; and Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Rio, March 7, 1907, See
also Lins, Rio-Branco, p. 373; and Lacombe, Rio-Branco e
Rui, pp. 71-72.

finally convinced Rui to accept the nomination, but failed
to get Nabuco to accompany him, even after the foreign min
ister persuaded the president to exert pressure on Nabuco.
As the relationship between Nabuco and Rio-Branco
became more strained, Nabuco felt isolated from the politi
cal situation in Rio.

He maintained official correspondence

with the foreign minister, but he' relied on personal corres
pondence with two friends to feel the Brazilian political
pulse.

The two friends, with whom he maintained frank, reg

ular correspondence, were Hilario de Gouveia and Graga
Aranha.
Hilario de Gouveia, a physician, was Nabuco's
brother-in-law and faithful confidant.

He was evidently one

of the better Brazilian medical doctors, as he had been one
of the six specialists called to treat the fatal illness of
Viscount Rio-Branco, father of Baron Rio-Branco, who died in
1880.

Hilario, a boyhood friend of the Baron, was his per

sonal physician and had also treated the terminal illness of
80
the Baron's wife in Paris in 1898.
Graga Aranha is best known for his novel, Canaan,
which was published in 1902.

He was a functionary in the

diplomatic service and was serving in Rio at the time.

Gra

ga and Nabuco had been together in diplomatic service and
Nabuco regarded him as his favorite disciple.
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Graga was
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C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 343; and Viana, Vida
de Rio Branco, pp. 104, 221, 238-39.
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Ronald Hilton, trans. and ed., in preface to C.
Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. xxiv.

with Nabuco on the British Guiana boundary commission in
Rome; after Nabuco took over the Brazilian ministry in Lon
don, Mrs. Nabuco remained in Paris for a few days and he
and Graga had dinner together every day.

82

When Rio-Branco

offered Nabuco the post of ambassador in Washington, he advised him to talk it over with Graga Aranha.

83

In 1906 Gra

ga and Domicio da Gama (who was later to succeed Nabuco as
ambassador in Washington) organized the demonstrations wel
coming Nabuco to Rio for the Third Pan American Conference,
and Griscom reported to Root,
The same men /~Graga and Domicio_7 have arranged that a
motion will be made in both chambers of Congress to wel
come you to Brazil, and here again the matter has been
carefully organized and the eloquence prepared and se
lected in advance.
I mention this to show you that
these young men have power and are making active use of
it.84
This influential confidant was an important contact for Na
buco because his distance from the Brazilian political cen
ter in Rio made it difficult for him to learn of political
maneuverings there.

Nabuco felt it imperative to have this

intelligence so as to protect his own interests and position
in that political arena.

Graga proved his value to the am

bassador when he wrote a sixteen-page letter to Nabuco on
Christmas Day, 1906, saying that Rio-Branco had been very
82

Nabuco to Evalina Nabuco, Rome, April 24, 1904;
and Nabuco to Evalina, London, August 1, 1900, quoted in
C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 280.
83
84
1113/2.

C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 305.
Griscom to Root, Petropolis, July 16, 1906, DS,

deceptive and citing several examples.

He also told Nabuco
OC

that Afonso Pena was being misled by his foreign minister.
Toward the end of February Rio-Branco notified Nabu
co by telegram that Jose Rodrigues Alves, Brazilian consul
in Washington was to be transferred to The Hague, "Where you
will encounter him."
Gurgel de Amaral.

86

Nominated to be the new consul was
Nabuco was furious over the change in

embassy personnel, and wrote to Graga,
I don't know who has been nominated here in place of
Rodrigues Alves, that is, I know, but am not acquainted
with him. I am completely disgusted with Rio-Branco.
He no longer has any friendship for me; he is one of
those men whose intimacy (whose intimate sentiment) can
be suspended or cut off at will. He ceased being my
friend automatically upon being made Minister. The
least little thing causes our friendship to become as
icy as the north p o l e . 87
The same day a concerned Nabuco cabled Rio-Branco,
"Request you cable me as quickly as possible the composition
of the Hague delegation.
Nabuco."

88

Authorize me to take Velloso.

Two days later came the partially encoded reply:

"You, Eduardo Lisboa, Ruy invited /"and
85

7I

believe will

Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Rio, December 25, 1906,

AJN.
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Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, February 22, 1907, A H I ,
235/3/15 tel. exp. This was less than a week before RioBranco was to invite Rui to serve as Hague delegate.
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Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, February 25,

1907, AJN.
88
Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, February 25,
1907, AHI, 235/3/IB tel. rec. Velloso was Nabuco's long
time secretary. See Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March
1, 1907, AHI, 235/3/IB tel. rec., partially encoded, trans
lation supplied.

accept."

89

This was a bombshell, to which Nabuco replied,

Thanks very much. A great pleasure to represent Brazil
with Ruy. I will agree should we have the opportunity
to improve ourselves in Europe. First name / on the_/
list having precedence and ambassador not able to be
second, don't hesitate to scratch me if needed to help
Ruy decide. Argentina is working for the vice-presidency of a commission.
I will need to take Velloso as
Secretary. You will not refuse me this aide of many
years. Nabuco.90
Rio-Branco was stung by Nabuco's reply and immedi
ately cabled the following:
Request you decipher personally.
I consider your tele
gram on the case of Rui and the question of precedence to
be unofficial and as sent friend to friend. Also this
reply is from your old friend Rio-Branco. You two have
been friends since law school and ought to well under
stand the division of labor. You will complement each
other. Chile has here various delegates of different
parties and everything goes well. You are indispensable
at The Hague, being acquainted with all the antecedents.
Presence of Rui also considered necessary in the opinion
of the Government.
Superior men such as yourselves must
put aside questions of precedence when the glory of our
country is involved. At The Hague there will not be am
bassadors, all are delegates.
Rio-Branco then cited several examples relating to preced
ence.

In one example, he said that the previous month at a

banquet where Rui was also in attendance, he was given the
place of honor.

However, if the order of precedence had

been followed, Rui (as vice-president of the Senate and
third in line of succession for the presidency) would have
89

Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, February 27, 1907, AHI,
235/3/15 tel. exp., partially marked for encoding.
90
Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March 1, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/IB tel. rec., partially encoded, translation sup
plied.
91

Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, March 2, 1907, AHI,
235/3/15 tel. exp., partially marked for encoding.
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had the place of honor.

The Baron closed with this appeal:

Having explained the situation, I expect the two of you
to be together at The Hague, as it is advantageous. You
well know that I am interested in maintaining the dig
nity of the office of ambassador, since I only obtained
creation of it through great effort, overcoming much re
sistance. Rio B r a n c o . 92
Nabuco's response was not long in coming,
I am not disputing precedence. Between Rui and me there
is no doubt. Even ignoring the fact that, at The Hague,
he remains the Vice-President of the Senate, I always
understood that Rui has to be the leader which all dele
gations h a v e . 93
Nabuco argued that Rio-Branco's cited examples were not
analogous, then put forth his reasons for not accepting:
(1) Ambassadors must not attend as second delegate.

He said

that not one nation sent an ambassador to the First Hague
Peace Conference, except as first delegate.

Some did send

a minister in second place, but this lowers the prestige of
the office.

"We have only one ambassador.

an exception."

We can not make

(2) Having been president of the Third Pan

American Conference, serving as second delegate to the Hague
Conference would diminish the prestige of the former.
(3) Going to The Hague could cause him to lose Washington if
Brazil's attitude there were to displease Roosevelt.

(4) He

needed six months rest and his poor health required treat
ment in Europe.

C5J He could help Rui by.,collecting and

sending information to him from Washington.

94
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* Ibid.
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Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March 5, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/lB tel. rec., mostly encoded, translation supplied.
94
3 Ibid.

Nabuco's contacts in Rio were hard pressed to keep
him abreast of the developments in Brazil.

Hilario wrote

that he was pleased with Nabuco's resolve not to accept the
secondary post at the Hague Conference.

After Rui was invi

ted, Hilario strongly protested to Rio-Branco, telling him
that it appeared he was being pressured into inviting Rui,
since the invitation was proffered just after the appearance
of an article in the Correio da Manha attacking Nabuco and
praising Rui as the only Brazilian of the caliber to repre
sent Brazil at The Hague.

Dr. Gouveia also rebutted Rio-

Branco 's examples dealing with precedence, with a few exam
ples of his own.

Rio-Branco had asked the physician to ap

peal to Nabuco's patriotism to accept the position.

Gouveia

closed by saying, "Rio-Branco told me today that he sent my
telegrams and yours to Pena, and that Pena promised him to
cable you asking you to reconsider.

I doubt that he will do

it.-95
Graga Aranha observed that Rui's nomination was gen
erally well received.

He attributed this reception to the

fact that Rui was recognized to be an excellent delegate to
a conference such as this, where the principal discussion
would revolve around juridical questions.

He also ventured

the opinion that the salary was very low for Rui, who had
the habit of spending much more.

Graga reported that Rui

had not yet accepted, in spite of many appeals by his
95
AJN.

Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, Rio, March 6, 1907,

friends, and he still might refuse to go.

96

Rui was a friend of Nabuco and was happy to see Nabuco's status increase.

He could not directly increase Na-

buco's status, but hesitated to accept the offer to lead the
delegation for fear of offending Nabuco and lowering the
status of his friend.

Rui distrusted Rio-Branco and detest

ed the idea of being in the position of carrying out someone
else's orders.

He coveted the honor of the position and

hoped that it would overcome the negative political .influen
ces remaining from the encilhamento nearly twenty years ear
lier and would give a boost to his political career.
Once the president had agreed to invite Rui to at
tend the Hague Conference, Rio-Branco had set about to ob
tain his consent:
Once the idea was embraced by the president and by RioBranco, his minister, the latter came in person to my
house in the Largo Dorn Afonso, Petropolis, to invite me,
in the name of the Chief of State, to this high post.9?
Rui said that Rio-Branco came back to his house more than
once to get him to agree.

The foreign minister also sent

many others to beg him to accept the nomination.

98

At the time of Rui's nomination, and since, it has
been commonly accepted that Rio-Branco invited Rui because
96

Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Petropolis, March 7, 1907,
AJN. Rui said his friends, without exception, urged him to
accept. Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 31, 1907,
ABR-B, 18/8 receibidas.
97

Rui, speech, quoted in Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui,

pp. 71-72.
98

Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui, p. 72.
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of the pressure of public opinion, as expressed in Rio newspapers of the period.

99

However, it is not beyond the realm

of possibility that Rio-Branco authored the original news
paper article.100

It is even more probable that he wrote,

or caused to be written, subsequent articles in the cam
paign.101

The Baron wrote extensive propaganda for the

press, most of which was published in the Jornal do Commer
cio, whose proprietor and editor was Jose Carlos Rodrigues.

102

Rodrigues, "one of the pillars of Rio-Branco," was
99

See Viana, Rui & Nabuco, p. 71; Viana, Vida de Rio
Branco, p. 380; Lins, Rio-Branco, p. 373; C. Nabuco, Life of
Nabuco, pp. 342-43; Osvaldo Orico, Momentos Estrelares de
Rui Barbosa, (Rio de Janeiro: Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1954),
pp. 84-85; Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 116; and Accioly,
"O Barao do Rio Branco e a 2a Conferencia," p. 64.
100Rio-Branco1s experience as a journalist dated
from as early as March of 1873 when he became one of the
principal editors of A Nagao. During his many years in Eu
ropean diplomatic posts, he wrote the historical section for
the Jornal do Brasil. Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, p. 62;
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 29, 34; "O Barao do Rio Bran
co e o Jornal do Commercio," Jornal do Commercio, April 21,
1957, p. 2; and Elmano Cardim, "A Imprensa na Vida e na Obra
de Rio Branco," Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico
Brasileiro, CLXXXVIII (July-September, 1945), 123-37.
101Graga Aranha stated that, "the nomination of Ruy
was the idea and the initiative of Rio Branco. . . . "
Graga
to Nabuco, PetrSpolis, April 1, 1907, AJN. Rio-Branco, in a
speech to some students, later said,"I confess, however,
that the indication of Rui for such an important mission was
not accomplished solely by me, but also by many of our au
thorized organs of public opinion." Quoted in "Ruy Bar
bosa," A Imprensa, December 30, 1907, p. 1. Accioly states
that during the conference Rio-Branco spent much time in the
editorial offices of the Jornal do Commercio where he often
"inspired or furnished notes or articles." Accioly, "0
Barao do Rio Branco e a 2a Conferencia," pp. 95-96.
102
Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, pp. 380, 383. In re
lation to this point Griscom says, "In fact Baron do Rio
Branco is in the habit of himself writing announcements and
denials which, although published anonymously in certain of

initially displeased by Rui's nomination.

However, in spite

of the fact that Rodrigues was opposed to Rui, the Jornal
later published most of the notices about the Hague Confer-

There has been debate as to the actual date on which
the invitation was first extended to Rui.

In his letter of

acceptance, Rui remembered the date as February 26th.
However, others set the date as February 25th.

105

104

It is

certain that it was prior to February 27th, because on that
date Rio-Branco officially informed Nabuco of the fact.

106

The invitation to Rui complicated the selection of
the Brazilian delegation to the Hague Conference.

Rui and

Nabuco were both reluctant to rupture their recently renewed
friendship.

107

While Nabuco deferred to Rui, Rui wavered,

the daily papers, are well known to be written by him and
published at his request." Griscom to Root, October 13,
1906, DS, 1070/5. Ganzert says, "It was Rio-Branco's prac
tice to use the press to defend his opinions whenever occa
sion warranted." Ganzert, "The Baron Rio-Branco, Joaquim
Nabuco, and the Growth of Brazilian-American Friendship,
1900-1910," p. 436.
103

Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, p. 382. See also Gra
ga Aranha to Nabuco, Petropolis, April 1, 1907, AJN.
■^^Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 31, 1907,
ABR-B, 18/8 receibidas.
105

Hildebrando Accioly, "Rui Barbosa na Segunda Con
ferencia da Haia," Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro, CCXXXVII (October-December, 1957), p. 65.
106
Rio-Branco to Nabuco, February 27, 1907, AHI,
235/3/15 tel. exp.
107

See Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 31,
1907, ABR-B, 18/8 receibidas; Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Petro
polis, April 1, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to Rui, Washington,
telegram, April 2, 1907, AJN.

in spite of strong governmental pressure to accept.

There

were many rumors about whether or not Rui would accept the
nomination.

On one occasion Rui sent the following note to

the Jornal do Brasil:

"My declaration was not that I would

accept, but rather that I had not yet decided."

108

On March

13th, the following notice appeared in the Jornal do Commer
cio;
We hear it said that Senator Ruy Barbosa declined the
invitation made to him by Baron Rio Branco, Minister of
Foreign Relations, to be a part of the commission which
shall represent our country at the Conference at The
Hague.10*
Rui quickly notified the newspaper that the notice was in
error.

He also cabled to Rio-Branco that the paper had no

authorization from him to make such a statement.

On the

contrary, he was inclined to accept, but first had to re
solve some difficult personal problems.1'1'0

Rio-Branco re

sponded in the following terms, "I quickly perceived that
the notice had not been authorized by you.

I am convinced

that the difficulties to which you refer are not invinci
ble."111
Just when it seemed as if Rui were about to accept,
108

Rui to Oscar Rosas, Jornal do Brasil, note, Rio,
n.d., CRB, Pasta Rio Branco.
109

"Varias Noticias," Jornal do Commercio, March 13,
1907, CRB, Haia, Pasta IV-A.
110Rui to Rio-Branco, telegram, Petropolis, 10:00
A.M., March 13, 1907, CRB, Haia, Pasta IV-A.
Ill
Rio-Branco to Rui, telegram, Petropolis, 11:50
A.M., March 13, 1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco; draft of same,
AHI, 273/2/1.

an article appeared in the March 22nd issue of the Jornal do
Commercio, which cast doubt on Rui's loyalty to the govern
ment.

The article, by J.J. Seabra, almost caused Rui to

decline the invitation at that time.

112

Because of the accusations in Seabra's article, Rui
felt compelled to decline the offer of the Hague appointment
and wrote to Rio-Branco saying,
Today,_in the same paper, I responded to this despicable
plot l
_of Seabra_/. As for myself, I consider the case
closed. My conscience is clear. Not everyone, however,
knows me well enough to give me a fair hearing. . . . In
view of this deplorable situation, I request that you
ask the President to allow me to decline the high post
/ of Hague delegate_7f and to accept my gratitude for
this distinction with which he so spontaneously honored
me.113
Rio-Branco replied that the incident would not alter his ad
miration, affection, and respect for Rui.

He appealed to

Rui's patriotism and vanity, saying,
112

Rui to Rio-Branco, PetrSpolis, March 23, 1907,
ABR-B, 18/3/34; draft of same in CRB, Pasta Rio Branco.
See also Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, PetrSpolis, March 24,
1907, AJN. Seabra, a native of the same state as Rui, had
served as a federal deputy and was a good friend of Rui's .
Seabra was Minister of Justice under Rodrigues Alves (19021906) and served in the cabinet with Rio-Branco (Foreign
Minister) during that period.
In 1903 Rui served with RioBranco on the boundary commission for Acre. Rui resigned
from that commission over a difference of opinion with the
foreign minister. The resignation of Rui did not affect his
friendship with Rio-Branco, and they remained on friendly
terms.
Seabra, whose motive was unclear, in the March 1907
newspaper article attempted to cause a break between Rui and
the government by attributing to Rui clandestine and dis
loyal motives against Rio-Branco and Rodrigues Alves in the
1903 incident.
See Lins, Rio-Branco, pp. 289-92; Viana,
Vida de Rio-Branco, pp. 342-43; Jornal do Commercio, March
22, 1907; and Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 23, 1907,
ABR-B, 18/8/34.
113

Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 23, 1907,
ABR-B, 18/8/34.

Now we are discussing a service which the President asks
of you in the interest of greater glory for our country
in a great international conference.
I respect your
opinion very much, but I think that an incident of this
nature must not cause you to refuse the service which
the nation expects of your patriotism and exceptional
competence. You can be certain of the confidence of the
President and myself in the complete and brilliant out
come of your m i s s i o n . 114
In the meantime Nabuco had written to Graga Aranha
giving a complete explanation of why he was unable to accompany Rui on the Hague Conference delegation.

115

Graga felt

it was preferable to wait until after Rui accepted to show
him Nabuco's letters.

Graga had talked with Rui, but did

not intend to divulge Nabuco's reasons until after Rui's ac
ceptance because he did not want to impede Rui's deci-

Privately, Nabuco had expressed the dilemma in which
he found himself:
Rio Branco wants to send me to The Hague with Ruy, and
as much as I wish to give to Ruy this proof of friend
ship and confidence, as much as I will lose by not being
with him in Europe, and to renew our relationship inter
rupted for so many years by Revolutions, in a word I
Rio-Branco to Rui, PetrSpolis, March 24, 1907,
CRB, Pasta Rio Branco; draft of same in AHI, 273/2/1, 35.
Afonso Pena cabled Rio-Branqo, "Completely in accord with
your thinking about the delegate to the Hague Conference."
Pena to Rio-Branco, telegram, Rio, March 25, 1907, ABR-B,
1/2/81. To Rui, Pena wrote, "My dear Ruy Barbosa, I wish
you and all of your family very good health. Once more I
stated to you that I will not cease demanding your services
and advice.
I already claimed your services at The Hague,
and now I claim your legal opinion on the following ques
tion." Pena to Rui, Rio, March 27, CRB, Pasta Afonso Pena.
115

Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4,

1907, AJN.
116
1907, AJN.

Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Petropolis, April 1,

covet a chance for intimacy with him under conditions in
which intimacy can become more intimate, you well know
as my bosom friend: I can not go to The Hague as second
delegate and he can only go as the first.
Nabuco then expounded on the reasons he gave Rio-Branco for
not attending the conference.

118

He was also disturbed by

the fact that all of the Latin American ministers, his col
leagues in Washington, were going to The Hague as first
delegates.

He professed to be more satisfied than anyone

else with Rui's selection and would be honored to serve un
der him.

However, with his deafness and poor health, he

would not be the second that Rui would need.
*

*

119

*

Rio-Branco and Nabuco had been good friends at least
as early as 1871, when both were in their twenties.

120

How

ever, the old, intimate friendship began to break down in
1902 shortly after Rio-Branco accepted the post of foreign
minister.

Rio-Branco was Brazilian minister in Berlin at

the time of the invitation to join the cabinet of Rodrigues
Alves.

He had, however, already accepted the post of Bra117

Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4,
1907, AJN. Nabuco said he sent this letter, "very confiden
tially," to be used for his defense in Rio, and most of all
for Rui. He said that his only regret was that Rui did not
understand his motives and that Rio-Branco would use this to
drive a wedge between them.
1X8

See Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March 5,
1907, AHI, 235/3/IB tel. rec., summarized above on page
48.
119
1907, AJN.
120

Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4,
Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, p. 50.

zilian minister in Rome.

On the way to Rio to assume the

post of foreign minister, he met with Nabuco in London.

He

asked Nabuco to accept the legation in Rome, but Nabuco re
fused.

Apparently Rio-Branco had the idea that Nabuco would

hold the post for a couple of years, then they would exchange positions.

121

The post of minister in London was the

highest step in the Brazilian diplomatic corps at that time
and Nabuco did not wish to relinquish it, even though he was
spending much time in Rome on the British Guiana boundary
122
arbitration.
Nabuco's refusal to accept Rio-Branco's offer pro
voked a heated discussion.
Branco 's insistence.

Nabuco could not understand Rio-

To him, the idea was preposterous, but

apparently Rio-Branco was enchanted with the prospect of
being minister in Rome.

Rio-Branco had tried his best to

avoid accepting the position of foreign minister, and was
already perturbed because he had not been able to persuade
Nabuco to accept in his stead.

123
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Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4,
1907, AJN; Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Berlin, August 30, 1902,
quoted in C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 261; Viana, Vida de
Rio Branco, pp. 321-22; and Viana, Vida de Nabuco, 316, 344.
122

123

C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 255.

Nabuco to Evelina Nabuco, quoted in Viana, Vida
de Rio Branco, p. 322; Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 344; Viana,
Vida de Rio Branco, pp. 311, 315, 321-22; and C. Nabuco,
Life of Nabuco, pp. 260-61. Rio-Branco's first post in the
diplomatic corps had been that of consul in Liverpool.
While there and in Paris he had served on several Brazilian
boundary commissions with spectacular success. Then he evi
dently coveted the London post and was chagrined that it
went to Nabuco instead. Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, pp. 7484, 182-195; and Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 21, 27-33.

Nabuco now felt that he was being persecuted by RioBranco in the matter of the formation of the Brazilian dele
gation to the Second Hague Peace Conference.

He wrote to

Graga,
What did I ever do to this man? I had the misfortune to
be nominated Minister in London by Dr. Campos Salles
without the position being offered to him. While / Foreign_7 Minister, his first idea was to take me from my
Legation, offering me the one in Rome. Solely to remove
me from London, he created this Embassy. Now he does
not even want me to occupy it tranquilly. He is trying
to place me in a false position from which I can perhaps
escape only by relinquishing this post.124
The relationship between the foreign minister and his ambas
sador in Washington was at a low ebb.

Rio-Branco told Hi

lario that Nabuco was doing him an injustice, always attributing to him "egotistical visions."

125

Nabuco felt that

a month of relative rest had done him a lot of good and the
requested leave should allow him to recover his health.
"However," he said, "my major rest shall be to feel that I
am free from the official relations with Rio-Branco."

126

Nabuco had reached the point where he felt that a break with
Rio-Branco was inevitable.

127

Nabuco, concerned about his image being tarnished by
the political intrigues of Rio, bared his soul in a letter
124

Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4,

1907, AJN.
125

Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, Petropolis, March
24, 1907, AJN.
126
1907, AJN.
127

Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4,
Ibid.

to Graga Aranha, asking him to show parts of it to their
mutual friends.

Hilario de Gouveia, from whom he kept no

secrets, would be permitted to read it all.
ga, "Do not allow Dr.

He begged Gra

Afonso_7 Pena to turn against me be

cause of the intrigues which Oliveira Lima, Correio da Man
h a , and others may make with my refusal to go to The Hague
in second place."'*'2®
Graga responded that he had talked with Rio-Branco,
and that Jose Carlos Rodrigues, in the Jornal do Commercio,
defended Nabuco because Rio-Branco had not mentioned that he
refused to serve because of ill health.

Rodrigues, at Gra

ga 's request, was going to explain everything to Pena.

Rio-

Branco persuaded the president to draft a cable to Nabuco
insisting that Nabuco accept the position and questioning
the basic motives of his excuse.
Nabuco must write to Pena.

Graga also said he thought

129

Nabuco had already drafted a letter to President
Pena further explaining his position:
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Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Petropolis, April 1,
1907, AJN. Graga said he did not see the terms of the tele
gram, which was not sent. The following unsigned note ap
pears on the president's letterhead; at the top is written,
in Rio-Branco's hand, "Sent, 2 April." The note, in an uni
dentified hand, reads, "(Copy.)
Draft of a telegram to be
transmitted to Dr. Joaquim Nabuco:
'Reasons for refusal to
accept Hague Delegation do not appear to be of consequence.
I expect you to go with Rui and render new, brilliant Ser
vice to the Country in the Conference of Worldwide impor
tance. Regards.'" ABR-B, 4/1/74 expedidas. Apparently the
cable was not sent in that form, but was incorporated into
Rio-Branco to Nabuco, telegram, Rio, April 1, 1907, AHI,
235/3/15 tel. exp.

The political question has now arisen which has a grea
ter scope. It does not appear advantageous for me to go
to The Hague, being Ambassador here. The instructions
of our government could oblige me to displease this gov
ernment. You know I oppose the Drago Doctrine. . . .
Knowing their interest in this question, as Ambassador
in Washington, I could not weaken the North American po
sition at The Hague without sustaining resentment here,
where I would be labeled as dishonest. Baron Rio-Branco
also must have communicated to you the question of
leave.^30
Before this letter was sent, Nabuco received a cable from
Pena, to which he replied,
Thank you for your telegram. The motives which I gave
were inspired by the reasons which determined the crea
tion of this post. The state of my health does not
allow me, at this moment, to undertake new labors, for
this reason I am obliged to request that you relieve me
of the Hague mission. Respectful salutations. Na
buco. 131
Nabuco had tired of Rio-Branco's maneuvering and his own
poor health gave him a pretext to request a leave of absence
from his post in order to avoid being directly associated
with the inevitable Brazilian-American clash at The Hague.
Rio-Branco finally agreed to grant the leave to the ambas
sador, but only agreed to supply extra funds on the condi
tion that Nabuco undertake a secret mission to aid Rui while
in Europe.

132

1 30

_

Nabuco to /_ Afonso Pena_7/ Washington, n.d., AJN.
Handwritten note at the top in Nabuco's hand, "Not sent."
No addressee appears, but internal evidence shows it was
meant for Pena. See also Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washing
ton, March 4, 1907, AJN, in which Nabuco says he can not
agree to go to The Hague because in Rio he would be sus
pected of being "too American," and in Washington he would
be considered disagreeable.
131

Nabuco to Pena, telegram, Washington, April 2,

1907, AJN.
132

See below, pages 70-72.

Rui, meanwhile, continued to vacillate between ac
ceptance and refusal until the last possible moment.

He

drafted a letter of acceptance on March 28th, made a smooth
copy, but failed to send it until later, at which time he
changed the date to March 31st.

133

In this letter Rui gave

his motives for accepting and his reasons for delaying his
response:
Dearest Friend Baron Rio-Branco
The terms of your important letter of the 24th,
which- rebutted the basis of mine of the day before, and
the more than a month which has elapsed in waiting for a
final solution will not permit me to continue to delay
the response to the invitation to represent Brazil at
the Hague Conference.
I was honored when, on February
26, you personally came to invite me in the name of the
President of the Republic.
I hesitated a long time, and continued to resist:
for fear that I completely lacked the competence for
this mission, of such a special and extraordinarily ele
vated nature; because I believed that other Brazilians
could be found who much more merit the selection; fi
nally, because I understood that the appointment would
be best confided entirely to the talents and singular
gifts of Joaquim Nabuco.
I felt restrained from quickly refusing, which was
what my feeling of insufficiency and the fear of my
weakness dictated that I should do, since in your visit
you insistently invoked my patriotism. You reminded me
that I had already refused the invitation for the Pan
American Conference, and expressed the hope that, "this
time," I would not again refuse my services.
Inclined to accept the invitation because of the
desire to be useful to the country, but impressed with
the solemnity of the situation, and restrained by diffi
culties of a personal character, I appealed for time,
waiting for prudence, or circumstances to bring the con
fidence to accept, or the energy to resist.
To my sorrow, in appealing for the opinion of all
who had helped and counseled me, I did not encounter a
133

Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 31, 1907,
ABR-B, 18/8 receibidas; date obviously changed from 28 to
31; written across the top in Rio-Branco*s hand, "From Sena
tor Ruy Barbosa,^Received 1 April 1907." See also Rui to
Rio-Branco, PetrSpolis, March 28, 1907, CRB, Pasta Haia IVA;
draft of above, text unaltered.

single voice which would approve of my refusal.
I
probed, as much as I could, the judgement of our coun
trymen as to what I should do, and found out that even
my adversaries felt that 1 was obliged to accept. When
my vacillations were communicated to the President of
the Republic by a mutual friend, I found that he would
reject my reasons for refusal as inadmissible.
Not finding anyone to defend me, and fearing that a
negative reply would be attributed to hatred of our be
loved country, and always doubtful of my abilities, with
great trepidation I accede to this irresistible pres
sure.
Please do me the favor of transmitting my assent to
the President of the Republic.
It is understood, of
course, that after the nomination the Senate must give
its permission, under terms of the Constitution, article
23, paragraph 2.
Invested with this honor for which I am far from
qualified, I ask God to help me so that my efforts will
be sustained wherever my resourses are limited, aiding
me to do the job, under your instructions, at least
without dishonor to the country and without disappoint
ment to the government, to whose esteem I owe this hon
or.
Always with sincere and personal affection of Your
Excellency, friend, admirer, and most obliging servant,
Rui Barbosa134
The night Rui drafted this letter he had received a
letter from President Pena, reaffirming his support of Rui
and urging his acceptance of the invitation.

135

The next

day, Good Friday, was a soul-searching ordeal for Rui.

On

Saturday he wrote Pena he had not yet decided to accept the
mission, saying in part,
Night before last I received your letter of the 27th, to
which I did not respond yesterday because it was Good
Friday. However, with satisfaction, I am writing today
at dawn. . . . In reference to the Hague mission, I have
not yet decided. Truthfully, I did not accept immedi
134

Rui to Rio-Branco, PetrSpolis, March 31, 1907,
ABR-B, 18/8 receibidas.
135

Pena to Rui, March 27, 1907, copy not found;
referred to in Rui to Pena, PetrSpolis, March 30, 1907,
Arquivo Particular de Afonso Pena? hereinafter cited as AAP.

ately because of the fear I have of finding the job to
be greater than my capacity. You can not imagine how
much this vacillation has troubled m e . 136
At this point, Rui had not yet sent the March 28th
letter of acceptance to Rio-Branco.

Between the writing and

the sending of that letter, Rui drafted another letter to
Rio-Branco, declining the appointment in the following
terms:
Having caused you to wait so long for my reply to
the invitation with which the President of the Republic
honored me in such a spontaneous and unexpected manner;
it is with the most sincere and profound regret that I
am, finally, obliged to decline this distinction.
If I delayed too long, it was because I was torn be
tween the ardent desire to serve the country and a re
straining, tenacious fear that I would not be able to
perform with dignity because of my lack of the necessary
aptitude.
As God knows, this fear, the dread of conscience,
finally won, but only with the sadness of my soul. I
know that this negative reply will be displeasing to you
and to the President of the Republic. But I believe
that ultimately you will do me justice, not condemning
me for these scruples of a man whose own abilities and
the abilities of others have caused to have less and
less confidence in himself.
Meanwhile, in the short time remaining of my life, I
shall remain at the disposition of you and the President
of the Republic, whose government I support with the
greatest confidence in the patriotism of both of you.
Despite the disclosure of this refusal, which I once
again must present, I expect that you shall continue to
consider me your servant, admirer and true friend, -37
Rui Barbosa
The next day, Sunday, Rui altered the date on his letter of
136

Rui to Pena, Petropolis, March 30, 1907, AAP.
The remainder of the seven-page letter deals with a legal
opinion with respect to a law judged unconstitutional by the
Supremo Tribunal Federal.
^■^Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 30, 1907,
CRB, Pasta Rio Branco. This letter, filed separately from
the above letter, has "not sent" scrawled across the top in
Rui's hand.

March 28th and sent it to Rio-Branco.

The foreign minister

immediately informed the president, who was writing a letter
to Rui at that moment.

Pena closed the letter:

"I just

found out by letter from Rio-Branco, that you accepted the
Mission to The Hague.

I am content.

This confirms the

telegram which I sent you immediately.
from your colleague and old friend.

Accept an abrago
138
Afonso Pena."

Rui's acceptance caused a flurry of activity in Rio
and PetrSpolis.

When Nabuco's friends learned of it, they

agreed that Hilario should go apprise Rui of the situation.
He went to the Rio station at 7 A.M. the next morning and
waited for Rui to arrive from PetrSpolis.

At the station he

completely explained Nabuco's position to him.

The friends

felt it was necessary to see Rui early, before he had a
chance to see the newspapers, because they feared the papers
would make it appear that Nabuco resented Rui for accepting
139
the post.
Rio-Branco rushed off a coded telegram to Nabuco in
Washington:
Personal. Rui accepted. The President thinks your rea
sons are without foundation and that you will not deny
your services at The Hague. There is already a ministry
of eagles, and we shall have there a delegation of ea
gles if you wish. Since the principal work will be on
the commissions, division of labor and reciprocal good
138

Pena to Rui, Rio, April 1, 1907, CRB, Pasta Afon
so Pena. In the first part of the letter Pena thanks Rui
for his "magnificent opinion," on the legal question submit
ted to him earlier.
139

Graca Aranha to Nabuco, Petropolis, April 1,
1907, AJN; Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, Rio, April 2, 1907,
AJN; and Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, Petropolis, April
/ 4 7f 1907, AJN.

will would prevent misunderstandings. The delegation
will not have a chief . .. but in the arrangement of
names we must observe the rules of precedence which are
established by internal politics.140
Rio Branco then cited examples in which he said no prestige
was lost by delegates assuming a secondary position at a
conference or meeting.

However, none of his examples was

entirely analogous to Nabuco's situation.

He continued,

But I do not wish to discuss nor contradict you on that
which I desire, namely to make a last attempt to per
suade you not to miss the opportunity to also serve
brilliantly for our Country at The Hague on this occa
sion which will not happen again in our lifetime. ' How
ever, be sure that no one shall respect your resolution
in opposition more than I if you assure me that it is
definite; and for the public I shall only give as a rea
son that which constitutes the last part of your tele
gram, that is, some months of rest and treatment are
necessary after eight years of incessant work. We wish
to make the nominations on the 5th. R i o - B r a n c o . 141
After learning of Rui's acceptance, Nabuco first
cabled Rui, "Health obliges me to decline, but I shall be at
your side in spirit, proud to see Brazil thus represented
among nations.

Many, many congratulations.

Nabuco."

142

The next day he sent this reply to Rio-Branco:
Since you and the President do not judge my reasons ac
ceptable, there was nothing left for me to do but recon
140

Rio-Branco to Nabuco, telegram, Rio, April 1,
1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.; Rio-Branco's hand and signa
ture, partially marked for encoding.
141

Ibid. The nomination apparently did not wait,
however, because two "registered" / i.e., notarized_7 copies
of the decree nominating Rui exist with the date of April 1,
1907. CRB, Haia Pasta Decretos; on back of the copies ap
pears this inscription, "Registered on page 4 of Book 1 of
Leis, Decretos, e Portarias, April 1, 1907."
142

Nabuco to Rui, telegram, Washington, April 2,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII; draft copy (typescript) in AJN.

sider whether or not I could now undertake new labors of
such great responsibility. Unfortunately, the state of
my health obliges me to ask to decline it in the terms
of the telegram. N a b u c o . 143
Nabuco was both disappointed, and relieved at the turn of
events.

He was disappointed that he would not be leading

the Brazilian delegates to The Hague.

However, he was also

relieved that his frail health would not again be put in
jeopardy by attendance at the conference, and that he would
not be in the untenable position of defending Brazil against
the United States.
Finally the weeks and months of turmoil, contro
versy, and indecision ended.

Brazil was at a disadvantage

for having waited so long to designate her representative to
the Hague Peace Conference.

Rui had barely six weeks be

tween his appointment and his departure in which to assemble
the Brazilian delegation and make other preparations for the
conference.

To make up for lost time, there would have to

be much cooperation among Pena, Rio-Branco, Nabuco, and Rui.
However, such close cooperation appeared unlikely, because
of the divisive circumstances surrounding the selection of
the conference delegate.

144
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Nabuco to Rio-Branco, telegram, Washington, April
3, 1907, AJN.
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As late as May 1, Nabuco still felt it necessary
to defend his position to the president:
"I never disputed
precedence with Ruy. I well knew that I rank after him. If
in my first telegram I admitted the possibility of our going
on the same plane, placing my name (as Ambassador), in first
place, it was because Rio Branco thus casually placed it
there as well in his telegram. Also I overlooked the fact
that, even absent from the country on a Mission, Ruy would
maintain his position of Vice-President of the Senate. . . .

Chapter III will examine Brazilian diplomatic maneu
vering and intrigue in her successful attempt to gain pres
tige at the Hague Peace Conference at the expense of the
other Latin American nations.

I took my stance purely to preserve the dignity of Ambas
sador, based on the unanimous precedence of other nations
. . . . Here is my explanation, my dear Friend, Mr. Presi
dent. You and Rio Branco are not able to feel the official
and diplomatic atmosphere of Washington as I am. . .
Nabuco to Afonso Pena, Washington, May 1, 1907, AJN.

CHAPTER III
THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL STATUS AT THE CONFERENCE
In this her first world-wide conference, it was im
portant for Brazil to persuade the other delegations at the
Second Hague Peace Conference of the culture and intelli
gence of her delegates, and thus make a favorable impres
sion.

Rui, with his broad knowledge, command of the French

language, and brilliant oratory, was a definite asset in the
Brazilian effort.

However, the attempt to project an image

on the international stage challenged the status quo.

The

great powers became irritated at the impertinence of Brazil
in taking frequent part in discussions of matters which they
considered to be their sole province.^

Nabuco said, how

ever,
. . . if, Ruy had not done this he would not have thus
revealed the intellectual culture of Brazil. Look, in
a conference such as this, it is essential for us to
give the impression of great culture. As I said to
Azeredo Castro, political errors can always be forgi
ven, attitudes corrected, but mediocrity is inexcus
able .2
Nabuco to Azeredo Castro, Frankfort,
gust, n.d., 1907, AJN; and letter fragment in
and signature, evidently written from Germany
Rio about August, 1907 (contains reference to
ter) , AJN.
2

—

Germany, Au
Nabuco's hand
to someone in
the above let

Nabuco letter fragment / Germany, August, 1907_7/

AJN.
-68-

A Hamburg newspaper, after criticizing Rui for speaking too
often and too long, conceded that he had become one of the
notable figures of the conference.

3

Nabuco told Graga

Aranha,
There is no doubt that he / Rui_7 has forced all at the
conference to recognize the intellectual force that he
is. The important thing for Nations such as us is to
appear, to take part, to reveal our high culture. Poli
tical errors can be corrected; mediocrity and intellec
tual nullity have no remedy.4
Nabuco correctly recognized, however, that the political
effects of Brazil's participation could only be judged after
the close of the conference.
*

5

*

*

Having prevailed in his effort to avoid attendance
at the Hague conference in second place, Nabuco now made
plans for a leave of absence to rest and seek the curative
waters of European spas.

After his lonesome five-month trip

to Brazil during the previous year, he was determined that
his family should accompany him this time if at all pos-

£
sible.

Nabuco still had no official approval of leave from

Rio-Branco and he informed the foreign minister of the
3

Ibid.;
August 5, 1907,
4
Nabuco
1907, AJN.
5
Nabuco
AJN.

and Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Wiesbasen,
AJN.
to Graga Aranha, Baden-Baden, July 25-26,
to Graga Aranha, Wiesbaden, August 5, 1907,

0
See Shannon to Nabuco, Brockport, N.Y., December
10, 1906, AJN; Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December
12, 1906, AJNr Leao Zagury, London, March 15, 1907, AJN; and
Azerado Castro to Nabuco, London, March 17, 1907, AJN.

urgency of the matter.

7

Now that the question of Brazil's representative to
the Hague Conference was settled, Rio-Branco devised a plan
to assign Nabuco a special mission in conjunction with his
leave in Europe.

He then cabled his proposal to Nabuco.

Personal. According to information from our compensa
tion division, your payment while on leave will be fif
teen contos. The President agrees that this would be
insufficient. However, since you agree to provide pre
paratory information to Rui we are able to pay, for this
special mission of service, two contos, gold, per month
and also six contos, gold, to help with expenses.
If
you agree, we will expedite the necessary orders by of
ficial telegram. Rio Branco.8
Nabuco, in this telegram, had finally received ap
proval for the leave of absence for treatment, but had not
gotten permission to take his secretary, despite several
g
requests to that end.
Nabuco then cabled his reply to RioBranco:
I do
rope
ment
with

not know how long I will be able to remain in Eu
on the amount allotted.
I expect extensive treat
and therefore request that you reconsider helping
the cost. Just the round-trip passage for my fam
7

"In case you intend to concede my leave, I request
that you do so in time for me to depart in May, since the
price of summer passage is prohibitive." Nabuco to RioBranco, Washington, April 18, 1907, AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec.
O

Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, April 23, 1907, AHI,
235/3/15, tel. exp., partially marked for encoding. Al
though Nabuco had repeatedly requested leave, Rio-Branco
had continued to ignore the request and to insist that Na
buco be a member of the Hague delegation. This was RioBranco' s first official concession of leave for Nabuco.
g
See for example Nabuco's requests of February 25th
and March 1st. Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, February
25, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1B, tel. rec.; and Nabuco to RioBranco, Washington, March 1, 1907, AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec.,
partly encoded, translation supplied.

ily raises the price by six contos, gold.
I am taking
them because it is impossible to reduce by one-half
their expenses here. Velloso wishes to accompany me,
- and, even while travelling, I always need the services
of a secretary.
I request you give these items favor
able consideration.10
Before receiving a reply, Nabuco informed Rio-Branco that he
had already sent Rui all the information available and that
he had doubts about using leave for an official mission.

11

Nabuco still insisted on official leave for his health
treatment, without any official duties.
Finally Rio-Branco acceded to Nabuco's request for
additional compensation, provided Nabuco accepted official
duties of aiding the Hague delegation.

Just three weeks

before Nabuco's departure for Europe, Rio-Branco sarcasti
cally cabled Washington,
If it is convenient for you to enlighten the Brazilian
Hague delegation about activities of prior peace confer
ences, the government proposes for you to spend four or
five months in Europe with payment of 24 / contos_/,
gold, and also 12 /contos_7* gold, to help with expenses
of passage.
Say whether or not your state of health
will permit you to accept this commission, which will
not require a great expenditure of e n e r g y . 1 2
Rio-Branco had still ignored the plea of Nabuco that Velloso
be allowed to accompany him.

Nabuco reminded him of the

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, April 24, 1907,
AJN.
A year earlier Nabuco had already complained to RioBranco that his expenditures were great and that it was dif
ficult for an ambassador to live on his salary, especially
one like himself with a large family. Nabuco to Rio-Branco,
Colorado Springs, April 29, 1906, ABR-B, 74/1 rec.
11
Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, April 27, 1907,
AHI,235/3/IB, tel.
rec., partly encoded, translation sup
plied.
12

Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, May 9, 1907, AHI,
235/3/15, tel. exp., partially marked for encoding.

oversight and the Baron finally wired that the secretary was
authorized to go.

13

Since his return from Brazil the previous year,
Nabuco had supplied information to Rio-Branco on the up
coming conference, and as the convening date approached he
devoted an increasing amount of time to this effort.

He

talked with Elihu Root, who confidentially showed him the
instructions he planned to issue to the American delegation
relative to the Drago Doctrine.

The two had a long, friend

ly visit and the Secretary of State granted Nabuco's request
that he be allowed to communicate the purport of the instructions to Rio.

14

Brazil was not, however, the only nation seeking
status at the conference.

In late February, the Argentine

representative had approached the British Prime Minister,
Sir Edward Grey, with a proposal that one of the vicepresidents at the Hague Conference be from South America,
and that Argentina receive that honor.

Grey instructed the

British Ambassador in Washington to ascertain the American
position on the subject.

15

However, Argentina had not yet

broached the subject in Washington and the Americans did not
13

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 11, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec.; and Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio,
May 11, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15, tel. exp.
14
Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 9, 1907, AHI,
235/3/IB, tel. rec., partially encoded, translation sup
plied; and Root to Nabuco, Washington, May 10, 1907, AJN.
15

James Bryce to Root, Washington, February 26,
1907, DS, 40/89.

expect the conference to elect a South American vicepresident, assuming the Second Conference would be organized
much as the First, where only one vice-president was elec16
ted.
After learning of Argentina's renewed efforts to
secure a vice-presidency at the Hague Conference, Nabuco
attempted to contact Elihu Root, who was out of Washington.

17

Nabuco prepared a memorandum for the secretary of

state, and immediately upon his return (May 25th) he re
quested a meeting for Monday, May 27th.

Root already had an

engagement for Monday, but since Mrs. Root was out of town,
he suggested that Nabuco drop by his house that afternoon
1O

(Saturday, May 25th) about five o'clock for a little talk.
Nabuco accepted the invitation, and had a long conference
with Root and delivered his confidential memorandum.

At

this time he learned that the Argentine representative had
already spoken to Root about American support for his country's delegate at the conference.

19

In the seven-page memorandum, Nabuco pointed out
■Ig

Robert Bacon (Acting Secretary of State) to James
Bryce, Washington, March 16, 1907, DS, 40/90.
17
Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, May 20, 1907, AHI,
235/3/15, tel. exp., marked for encoding; Nabuco to RioBranco, Washington, May 22, 1907, AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec.;
and Rio Branco to Nabuco, Rio, May 20, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15.
Nabuco had first learned of the initial Argentine efforts on
March 1st. Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March 1, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/IB, tel.rec., partially encoded, trans. supplied.
18
Root to Nabuco, Washington, May 25, 1907, AJN.
19
Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 26, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec., partially encoded, translation
supplied.

that the Russian and Dutch delegates dominated the First
Hague Peace Conference, which had a president (Russian), an
honorary president (Dutch), and one vice-president
20
(Dutch).

He went on to say,

We hear that there is an intention of appointing
three Vice-Presidents of the Conference this time in
stead of one and I wish you to be good enough to ascer
tain privately, through your Diplomatic Agents, from
Holland and Russia, as between them the two Countries
organized the last Conference, if there is such inten
tion and what Nations they have in view for the VicePresidencies; also, as much as could be known now, how
it is intended to divide the other honours of the Con
ference, which are the (a) Honorary Presidencies,
(b) Presidencies, (c) Vice-Presidencies, of Committees
or of Sub-Committees.
In the last Conference that dis
tribution appears by the proceedings of the Conference
to have been left to Holland, whose first Delegate,
Jonkheer van Karnebeek, was called by the German Ambas
sador Count Munster the main spring, the chevilleouvriere of the Conference.
This time . . . the distribution of honours must be
made on quite a different plan. . . .
If Latin America were to have only one of the hon
ours of the Conference, we think none of its Nations
should take precedence over Brazil, the largest and the
most populated of all of them. . . . But we expect the
Conference will distribute its honours to this Continent
more liberally, and in this case the very least that
could be done for Latin America . . . would be to re
serve for it two of the honours; one for Portuguese
America, that knew how to keep together through all
vicissitudes, and the other for Spanish America, which
less fortunate broke into fragments during the Indepen
dence crisis.
The sincere friendship that binds Brazil and the
United States . . . encourages me to expect that you
will do your best to induce the distributors of the hon
ours of the Conference to give the first Delegate of
Brazil one of its Honours (outside of those which natu
rally in these Conferences appertain to Netherlands and
20

Nabuco to Root, Washington, May 25, 1907, "Private
Memorandum on the Hague Conference left by the Brazilian Am
bassador for the Secretary of State, State Department, Wash
ington, D.C.," hereinafter cited as "Private Memo", DS,
40/290; carbon copy in CRB, Haia, Pasta XXII.

to Russia) second to none that be given to the Chief
Delegate of any other Nation attending the Conference.
The intervention of your Delegation to that effect
would be most welcome to us, but as the combination be
tween Russia and Holland may be in progress now, your
influence needs perhaps be exercised before the meeting
of the Delegates, privately, near the organizers of the
Conference at the Hague and at St. Petersburg for a lib
eral recognition of this Continent in the honours of the
Conference, and in any case for our precedence in them,
among the Republics of Latin America, that recognition
being due to our size, our population, and our history,
your interest in us being justified by our long standing
and steady friendship.21
Root told Nabuco not to worry about the United
States; the chief American concern would be to increase the
respect of Europe for the Latin American nations.

He prom

ised Nabuco he would instruct the American representatives
at St. Petersburg and The Hague to intervene with those gov
ernments for support of Latin American honors.at the confer
ence.

He told Nabuco that Rui should be one of the notable

figures of the conference.

Root also reported that at his

urging Yale University had just decided to invite Rui to
give its annual series of spring lectures in 1908.

22

22

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 26, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec., partially encoded, trans. sup
plied. The invitation to deliver the Dodge lectures was in
deed an honor, as earlier lecturers had been men such as a
Supreme Court Justice, a Secretary of War, and a Secretary
of State. Root himself had delivered the 1907 lecture.
Anson P. Stokes, Jr. (Secretary, Yale University) to Rui,
New Haven, Conn., May 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; Nabuco
to Root, Washington, note, May 29, 1907, AJN; John Barrett
(Director, International Bureau of American Republics) to
Rui, Washington, June 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; John
Barrett to d ’Estournelles de Constant, Washington, June 29,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; Lee McClung to Rui, aboard the
Deutschland, July 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII; John Bar
rett to Rui, Washington, July 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV;

Nabuco's close friendship with Root continued to be
quite fruitful, for on May 29th he allowed Nabuco to read
the complete confidential instructions which were to be
given to the United States delegation to the Hague Confer
ence.

He was allowed to make notes and to cable a resume of

the United States position to Rio-Branco.

23

Root carried

out his promise of support for Brazil and cabled the Ameri
can legation at The Hague to ascertain the situation in ref
erence to the distribution of offices at the upcoming conference.

24

In response to this iniative, the foreign minis

ter of the Netherlands informed the American minister at The
/

Hague that he would consult with the Russian delegate before
drawing up a slate of offices to be presented to the confer
ence, and that he would do all he could to see that the
South American representatives would receive their share of
the honors.

25

Before departing for Europe on June 1st, Nabuco be
gan writing letters to his friends who were delegates to the
Elbert J. Baldwin to Rui, Karlsbad, Germany, August 3, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XV; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, telegram
no. 176, n.d., CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
23

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 30, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec., encoded, translation supplied;
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI,
Reservado No. 1; and Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21,
1907, AJN. These were the final proofs of the instructions;
although not yet approved by President Roosevelt, this was
the most authoritative information available before Nabuco
left for Europe.
24

David J. Hill (American Minister at The Hague) to
Root, The Hague, May 29, 1907, DS, 40/305.

Hague Conference, explaining to them who Rui was.

26

This action was necessary because this was Rui's first dip
lomatic mission beyond the borders of Brazil and he was vir
tually unknown outside his own country despite his strong
involvement in Brazilian politics, government, and society
for over twenty-five years.

After arriving in Europe, Na

buco continued to write letters to the delegates on Rui's
behalf.

27

Upon the Brazilian ambassador's arrival, he asked

Rui for a list of the delegates so that he cound expand this
. . 28
project.
In response to Nabuco's appeal, Count Maurice Prozor
wrote that he wished Nabuco were the Brazilian delegate.
said he had nothing against Rui, "But he is not you."

He

29

Prozor, a Russian delegate, felt that what was important was
that Brazil get the honor and that her representative could
be honored with the honorary presidency of the First Commis26

Nabuco to d'Estournelles de Constant, Washington,
April 10, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to d'Estournelles, Washing
ton, April, 15, 1907, AJN. See also Nabuco to Root, Wash
ington, "Private Memo," May 25, 1907, DS, 40/290.
27
Nabuco to Rui, Paris, June 13, 1907, CRB, Pasta
J. Nabuco; Count Prozor to Nabuco, The Hague, June 16, 1907,
AJN; and Nabuco to Rui, n.d., note on front and back of cal
ling card, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco, "Cartoes."
28

Nabuco to Rui, Paris, June 13, 1907, CRB, Pasta
J. Nabuco. Despite Nabuco's valuable assistance, Rui ap
parently never knew that he had an official mission to
assist him in preparing for the conference.
See Viana, Rui
& Nabuco, p. 74; and Nabuco to Rui, Miami, February 4, 1909,
quoted in Viana, Rui & Nabuco, pp. 99-101.
29
Count Prozor to Nabuco, The Hague, June 16, 1907,
AJN.

sion.

30

In working with the Dutch government to apportion

the honorary positions at the conference, the Russian dele
gate supported Brazil's claim.

Rui attributed the strong

support of Count Prozor in favor of Brazil directly to Nabug o

's

"Private Memorandum" to Root.

31

During May, Rui had been busily occupied with the
final preparations for his European voyage.

Prior to his

departure on May 21st he went by Pena's office, but the
president was out.

He later apologized to Pena for not com

ing to his house for a final "abrago" before departing, but
said he was inundated by a heavy stream of people coming to
accompany him to the ship.

32

Rui sailed aboard the English

packet, Araguaya, which made a port call at Rui's hometown
of Salvador, Bahia.

There he was received with great en33
thusiasm and popular demonstrations.
Meanwhile Rio-Branco had been preparing for the

conference by collecting and sending copies of materials to
Rui.

He sent books, newspaper clippings, confidential in

structions, and memorandum to aid in Rui's preparation and
to be used as references during the conference.

The Baron

also made final appointments to the Brazilian delegation and
worked out the complete details of the order of prece-

31

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, June 19, 1907,
ABR-B, 18/8.
32

Rui to Afonso Pena, Rio, May 22, 1907, AAP; and
Pena to Rui, Rio, May 22, 1907, AAP.
33,,Ruy Barbosa," A Bahia, May 24, 1907, p. 1.

dence.^
In addition to the actions already taken in prepar
ing for Brazil's debut at the Second Hague Peace Conference
Rio-Branco made other careful preparations.

He insisted

that the Brazilian legation at The Hague reserve ample quar
ters for Rui and his family in a good hotel.

35

Arriving at

the Palace Hotel in a resort suburb of The Hague, Rui was .
impressed:
Scheveningen, the celebrated bathing beach where I am
located, is a half hour from the capital by car and 15
or 20 minutes by electric tramway. The quarters, which
the Baron arranged for me, are almost princely.
It is
enough to tell you that Germany has a suite of equal
size in the same hotel & France's accomodations are in
ferior, since they are on the third floor and we are on
the first.36
Even Nabuco, the well-travelled diplomat, was impressed by
the accomodations.

37

Rui was first nominated as a delegate and minister
plenipotentiary, the official designation being, "Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mis34

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 3, 1907, CRB, Pasta
Rio Branco; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 11, 1907, CRB, Haia
Pasta VI; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 21, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta, VI.
35

Rio-Branco to Hague Legation, Rio, April 18, 1907
AHI, 211/1/9, tel. exp. He also arranged for the accomoda
tions for the two delegates (Rui and Eduardo Lisboa) to be
paid for by the government, but food was to be paid from
their monthly stipend. Rio-Branco to Hague Legation, Rio,
April 19, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9, tel. exp.
36

Rui to Carlos Bandeira, Scheveningen, June 16,
1907, CRB, quoted in Viana, Vida de Rui, p. 307.
37

Nabuco to Rui, Paris, n.d., note to Rui on front
and back of calling card, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco, "Cartoes."

sion to Her Majesty Queen of the Low Countries and Delegate
of Brazil to the Second Peace Conference at The Hague."

38

However, Rio-Branco decided to change Rui's status to ambas
sador, and the official credentials presented Rui as, "Sena
tor Ruy Barbosa, Vice-President of the Federal Senate, Am
bassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in special mis
sion to Your Majesty, persuant to the meeting of the 2nd
Conference of Peace, at The Hague."

39

Nabuco felt that it

was fortunate for Brazil that Rio-Branco had changed his
mind, as Rui was the only delegate from Latin America with
the title of ambassador.

40

He felt that Brazil's later

selection to an honorary presidency at the conference was
due primarily to this "diplomatic coup" by Baron RioBranco.

41
Upon arriving in Paris on June 10th, Nabuco sought

out Rui.

42

They had a long meeting at which Nabuco brought

38

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, April 29, 1907, AHI,
273/3/1; and decree of nomination, Rio, April 1, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta Decretos.
39
Pena to Queen Wilhelmina, Rio, May 17, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta IVB.
40

Nabuco to Tobias Monteiro, Vittel, France, July
12, 1907, AJN. See also James Brown Scott, The Proceedings
of the Hague Peace Conferences (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1920, The 1907 Conference, I, pp. 18-35; hereinafter
the proceedings will be cited as Proceedings, C1899) or Pro
ceedings, (1907).
41
42

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21, 1907, AJN.

Rui to Nabuco, "Carta Pneumatique," June 10, 1907,
Paris, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco; Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris,
June 21, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to Rui, n.d., note on back of
old Hotel Regina menu of June 6, 1907, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco,
"Cartoes."

Rui up to date on events in Washington and explained the
steps he himself had taken in relation to the conference.
He also gave Rui the notes he took from the instructions to
the American delegates shown to him by Secretary Root.

43

In

addition he sent two essays by President Nicholas M. Butler
of Columbia University to give Rui a chance to familiarize
himself with American ideas on subjects to be discussed at
the Hague Conference.

44

One of the more interesting items furnished to Rui
by Nabuco was a document containing confidential notes to
aid Rui in the unfamiliar diplomatic environment.

45

Here

Nabuco advised Rui that his best informant on matters per
taining to Hispanic-American countries would be Gonzalo de
Quesada y Arostegui, one of the Cuban delegates.

Quesada

could be relied on as a friend of Brazil, although he was a
good friend of Roque Saenz Pena, an Argentine delegate, whom
he had once served as secretary.

Nabuco said that Quesada

would explain to Rui the value of each of the HispanicAmerican delegates.

Gonzalo Esteva, first delegate of Mexi

co, was a former colleague of Nabuco's who always appeared
"Very polished and formal."

Nabuco explained that Mexico

was a rival of Argentina and cooperated with the United
States.

Her third delegate, Francisco de La Barra, was an
43
44

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21, 1907, AJN.

Nabuco to Rui,
calling card, CRB, Pasta
45
Nabuco to Rui,
denciaes," CRB, Pasta J.

n.d., note on front and back of
J. Nabuco, "Cartoes."
Paris, June 13, 1907, "Notas ConfiNabuco.

admirer of Rui.

Domingo Gana of Chile was an old friend of

Brazil, but might be somewhat cool since he suspected,
wrongly, that Nabuco helped to prevent Chile's establishment
of an embassy in Washington.

Baron de Selir of Portugal had

a brother who was a colleague and good friend of Nabuco in
Washington.

Baron de Selir probably would be the best guide

in respect to Holland and the diplomatic corps at The Hague.
Rui should cultivate the friendship of Guido Pusinato, one
of the Italian delegates, who would be the best guide among
the European diplomats.

46

Nabuco closed with some advice to

Rui on the position of ambassador, which he said is circum
scribed by etiquette and ceremony.

He optimistically ad

vised Rui that, since he was not a career diplomat, he would
be free of the protocol and formalities which encumber the
position.

Nabuco said public opinion was the greatest force

in the politics of diplomacy.

He cited an example of the

Russian delegate on the occasion of negotiation of the Trea
ty of Portsmouth.

On that occasion Count Sergei Y. Witte

directed an appeal to the American press which changed their
attitude from one of hostility to one of general good will
toward Russia.

Nabuco recommended this approach as "good

diplomacy.,|4^
After meeting with Rui and providing him all the
46Ibid.
47

Ibid. Witte, Russian negotiator of the Treaty of
Portsmouth (1905), was awarded the title of count because of
the unexpectedly favorable terms for Russia in the treaty.
The New Columbia Encyclopedia C1975), p. 2996.

information he felt would aid the Brazilian cause et the
conference, Nabuco wrote a long report to Rio-Branco.

He

closed the letter,
I am going to the waters of Vittel, from whence I shall
be able to furnish whatever information may be requested
of me, and after the termination of the Conference, I
shall return to my post as quickly as p o s s i b l e . 48
Nabuco felt he had carried out the bulk

of his mission and

was ready for the

of the European

rest and recuperation

leave he had so earnestly sought.
Rui missed having the experience of a diplomat such
as Nabuco near at

hand.

become completely

absorbed

ence.

Since arriving in Europe Rui had
in preparations

forthe confer

Despite the strenuous pace, when the Second Hague

Peace Conference opened on June 15th, Rui had many misgiv
ings about his ability to handle the task of Brazilian am
bassador:

"Every moment I feel smaller and weaker, in the

face of this event and this position.
49
sion on me."

May God have compas-

In the next chapter the conference deliberations
will be examined, to demonstrate that Brazil, in self in
terest, abandoned her initial support of the United States
in favor of the principle of the equality of nations.

48
49

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21, 1907, AJN.

Rui to Maria Augusta Barbosa, Scheveningen, June
16, 1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco.

CHAPTER IV
THE CONFERENCE
The First Ha^ue Peace Conference was called by Czar
Nicholas II of Russia and met from May 18th to July 29,
1899.^

Twenty-six nations were represented at the confer

ence including the United States and Mexico, the only two
American states which participated.

Brazil, though invi

ted, declined to attend because she felt none of her na
tional interests would be discussed.
The Second Hague Peace Conference was proposed by
President Theodore Roosevelt, but was officially convened by
Nicholas II.

Representatives of forty-four nations met and

deliberated from June 15th to October 18, 1907.

At the in

sistence of the United States all of the Latin American
states were allowed to send delegates to this conference,
although Costa Rica and Honduras chose not to participate.
The two conferences considered problems of the international
community such as:

the limitation of armaments, the laws of

war, and international arbitration.

In regard to the arma-

^ o r details of the origin of the conference see:
E.J. Dillon, "True Story of the Genesis of the Hague Confer
ence," Contemporary Review, XCT C1907), 879-82; and Dan L.
Morrill, "Nicholas II and the Call for the First Hague Con
ference," The Journal of Modern History, XLVI (June, 1974),
296-313.
-84-

ments question the conferences felled to reach any agree
ment, but they did improve the laws of war and codified
them.2
In October of 1904 United States Secretary of State
John Hay sent out a circular calling for a second peace con
ference to meet at The Hague.

There was generally an en

couraging public response, but privately the statesmen were
not so pleased.

Theodore Roosevelt strongly emphasized the

peace theme in his campaign for the November election.

The

main impetus for the issuance of the circular apparently was
a resolution (called the Declaration of St. Louis) by the
Interparliamentary Union.

In the declaration the conference

delegates resolved that the American President should invite
governments to send representatives to a second peace con
ference.

Representatives of the organization presented the

document to Roosevelt in September and he promised to ap3
proach other governments.
Meanwhile, the Russo-Japanese War was raging and it
was thus an inopportune time for a peace conference.

The

2
For detailed accounts of the conferences see:
Calvin D. Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace
Conference (Ithica, N.Y.: American Historical Association
and Cornell University Press, 1962); Davis, The U.S. and the
Second Conference? Joseph H. Choate, The Two Hague Confer
ences (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1913);
and William I. Hull, The Two Hague Conferences and Their
Contributions to International Law (Boston: Ginn & Company,
1908). The text of the deliberations may be found in Scott,
The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, cited as
Proceedings, (1899) or Proceedings, (1907).
3
Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, pp. 91-92,
106-10, 112; and Jessup, Root, II, p. 67.

war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth on
September 5, 1905 and a week later the Russian ambassador
appeared at Roosevelt's door in Oyster Bay, New York with a
letter from the Russian foreign minister.

The letter said

that Russia, "as initiator of the International Peace Con
ference of 1899," felt it was time to call another confer
ence.

The Russians said they would provide a detailed pro

gram for a new conference, and Roosevelt agreed to allow the
4
Czar to assume the initiative.
The conference was first scheduled by Russia and The
Netherlands for the summer of 1906.

However, the Third Pan

American Conference was already scheduled for Rio at that
time.

Most Latin American states had too few experts

in

international law to send delegates simultaneously to con
ferences on different continents and travel was not rapid
enough to allow attendance at both within a few weeks of
each other.

The dilemma presented by this conflict of dates

was resolved by Elihu Root, who persuaded the Russians and
5
Dutch to postpone the conference until 1907.
After some
reluctance the signatory powers of the arbitration conven
tion of 1899 signed a document admitting to the second con
ference the non-signatory powers.

Thus all the Latin Ameri

can states were admitted to the Hague Conference system,
4
Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 123; and
Jessup, Root, II, pp. 67-68.
5
Jessup, Root, II, pp. 68-69; Davis, U.S. and the
Second Conference, p. 129; and Bacon and Scott, eds., Latin
America and the United States: Addresses by Elihu Root,
p. 3.

g

which became an organization of most of the world's states.
Although they agreed to admit the lesser powers into the
system, the eight major powers intended to remain in charge
of the situation as they had been at the first conference.
The second conference met for a total of four months
and its deliberations can be divided into three rough chron
ological divisions:

the first five weeks, which were pri

marily devoted to the making of proposals; the sixth through
seventeenth weeks, during which discussions dealt mostly
with laws of war on land and sea? and the final ten days,
which were devoted to negotiations relative to arbitration
7

and international courts.

The conference was organized

around commissions, subcommissions, and special committees.
Most of the work of the conference took place in these com
mittees, rather than at the relatively infrequent general
(plenary) sessions.

Many conference delegates, including

Rui Barbosa, served on all four commissions and several subQ

commissions, which caused many complications.

"If one can

imagine a group of actors trying to perform in several plays
at the same time he can understand the problems of the
busier delegates."

g

The honors of the conference were greatly expanded
from the first conference so as to please as many delegag

Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 183.
7Ibid., p. 187.
8

Ibid.; and Hull, Two Conferences, pp. 40-44.

g

Davis, U.S and the Second Conference, p. 187.

tions as possible.

There were a total of thirty-eight such

positions distributed among twenty-three of the forty-four
countries represented.

The United States was not repre

sented among the seven active presidents, but was assigned
two of the thirteen honorary presidencies.

Brazil also re

ceived an honorary presidency, the highest honor bestowed on
a Latin American country.

Mexico, Argentina, and Chile were

each awarded one of the sixteen honorary vice-presiden
cies."^
Elihu Root had not sought honors for members of the
American delegation, but had given them instructions to sup
port Latin American aspirations as much as possible:
Of course the United States does not care and I assume
none of your commission cares, about the so-called hon
ors, while they seem to be regarded as important by the
Latin Americans.
I should say that we better give them
the benefit of whatever may be coming to us, so far as
practicable.
If we do this, we will be repaid ten times
over by their appreciation provided they do not think we
are discriminating in favor of one against another.H
At first the deference to the Brazilians seemed to bear
fruit, as Brazil voted with the United States and against
the rest of Latin America on several points.
*

*

*

The deliberations of the conference which had the
most importance for the international status of Brazil were
the discussions relating to:

immunity of private property

"^Proceedings, CL907) , I, p. 18; and Hull, Two Con
ferences, pp. 33-34.
"^Root to Choate, Washington, May 31, 1907, DS,
40/288.

at sea, arbitration of contractual debts (Drago Doctrine),
the International Prize Court, and the International Court
of Arbitral Justice (International Court of Justice).
During the first days of the conference, the Fourth
Commission debated the question of the immunity of private
property at sea.

The importance to Brazil of this discus

sion was that it was the first subject of interest to the
United States on which she took a stand.

Here Rui supported

the American delegation in its proposal, much to the delight
of the Americans and Nabuco, and to the chagrin of some of
the other Latin American nations, who believed that Brazil
was always going to support the United States unconditionally in all matters brought before the conference.

12

How

ever, this apparent accord between the delegations contained
a faint hint of future discord.

It was rumored that Root

did not want the original American proposal passed; and in
fact, the American delegation comtemplated abandoning their
proposal in favor of a very weak Belgian one.

Rui and Rio-

Branco were both upset by this prospect and sought Root's
intervention in the matter.
12

13

On the final vote, Brazil

Hildebrando Accioly, "Rui Barbosa na Segunda Conferencia da Haia," p. 165; Nabuco to Rui, Vittel, France,
June 29, 1907,CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco; Rio-Branco to Amaral,
Rio, July, n.d., 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.; Bacon to
Root, Washington, July 16, 1907, DS, 40/392A; Proceedings,
(1907), III, pp. 748, 770, 795-96, 826-28, 833, 899; and
Rui, speech, October 21, 1908, Rui Barbosa, 0 Brasil e as
Nagoes Latino-Amerlcanas em Haya: Discurso Proferido no
Senado em 21 de Outubro de 1908 pelo Senador Ruy Barbosa
(Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1908), p. 11.
13
Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, July, n.d., 1907, AHI,
235/3/15 tel. exp.

supported the American project, although the proposal was
defeated.

14

The Drago Doctrine, named for the Argentine prime
minister, stated that no public debt would serve as the pre
text for armed intervention or occupation of territory in
the Western Hemisphere.

The Drago Doctrine had occasioned

lively debate at the Third Pan American Conference in Rio in
1906, where the United States had attempted to prevent its
introduction into the deliberations.

However, the Rio Con

ference delegates resolved that the issue be discussed at
the Second Hague Peace Conference in an effort to have the
doctrine accepted world-wide as a method of diminishing the
possibility of conflict over purely monetary issues.

15

In accepting the formal invitation to the Second
Hague Conference, Elihu Root informed the Russians that the
United States reserved the right to introduce the subject of
the Drago Doctrine at the conference.

16

The American posi

tion was that the use of force to collect debts should be
permitted, but only after certain conditions had been met.
These conditions included the seeking of arbitration and the
refusal of the debtor to honor the agreement which resulted
14

Proceedings ,(1907), III, 899; and Davis, U.S. and
the Second Conference, p. 231.
15

Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 134; and
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 170. Also see above, Chapter
II, pp. 30-31.
16
Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 134.

from the arbitration.

17

Rio-Branco, on the other hand, had declared to Na
buco as early as February of 1907 that Brazil had no inter
est in supporting the Drago Doctrine and did not wish for it
to be brought up for debate at the conference.

He said that

Brazil always paid her debts, and besides, was a creditor to
Uruguay and Paraguay.

18

Brazil at that time and in the past

had relied on credit to finance her industrial development,
and after having carefully built up good credit, did not
want to give creditors the impression that Brazil might not
be willing or able to repay.

19

Rui was critical of both the Argentine (Drago) and
American proposals, but on instructions of Rio-Branco, re
jected the Argentine proposal and supported the American
one.

20

Rio-Branco fully expected that the proposal would

eventually be dropped by the Americans because he felt Euro
pean opposition would prevent unanimous agreement by the
21
conference.
Rui took pains to point out that his vote on
the subject was based on Brazilian public opinion, and not
17

~
Accioly, "0 Barao do Rio Branco e a 2a Conferencia
da Haia," p. 73.
18-,. ,
Ibid.
^ Proceedings,
20

(1907), II, p. 310.

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado No. 8, June 18,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IVA; Accioly, "0 Barao do Rio Branco
e a 2a Conferencia da Haia," 75-77; and Davis, U.S. and the
Second Conference, p. 257.
21
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 11, June 19, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VII.

on antagonism toward Argentina.

22

However, at least one

commentator says Brazil was reluctant to support the Drago
Doctrine simply because it was proposed by Argentina, a perennial rival.

23

The conference finally voted to accept the

American version of the proposal to refrain from the use of
armed force for the collection of contractual debts, unless
arbitration of them had failed.

Professor William I. Hull

optimistically called the agreement "one of the most impor
tant achievements of the second conference, and one of the
greatest triumphs in the history of diplomacy."

24

The First Commission was assigned the task of draft
ing a plan for an international court to decide the legality
of captures made during naval warfare.

German and British

plans were submitted and referred to the second subcommission, which was to deal exclusively with this question.

25

Earlier in a plenary session of the conference, the German
delegate had surprised the other delegates by announcing
that his country was in favor of such an international court
and that he was prepared to submit a plan for consideration.
The German suggestion was cordially received by both the

22

Rui Barbosa, 0 Brasil e as Nacoes Latino-Americanas em Haya, pp. 10, 22-23.
23
~
Magalhaes Junior, 0 Homem e o Mito, p. 270.
24

Hull, Two Conferences, p. 491. Hull was a profes
sor of history, international relations, and political econ
omy at Swarthmore College. Who Was Who in America, Vol. I,
1897-1942, p. 605.
25

Hull, Two Conferences, p. 427.

British and American delegates.

26

Brazil was not a member of the committee of exami
nation which was deliberating the draft convention for an
international prize court.
fore the committee.

However, Rui asked to speak be

On August 22nd he appeared before the

committee and strongly opposed the ranking of Brazil below
many of the lesser powers in the selection of judges for the
27
court.
Davis says,
Barbosa's speech was brilliant— one of the best of the
conference. He spoke rapidly, emotionally; yet every
sentence revealed preparation. He analyzed the posi
tions of all nations with navies and merchant marines,
proving that Brazil ranked above several European pow
ers in merchant s h i p p i n g . 28
In hopes of improving Brazil's position, Rui proposed that every country have a seat on the court.

29

The

other delegates, however, felt that such a proposal would
produce an unwieldy court.

They felt that some arrangement

was necessary to limit court membership, and thus were dis
posed to give priority to countries with the greatest political influence.

30

Rio-Branco was disappointed with the conference de
liberations on the Prize Court, and on August 15th cabled
26Ibid.
27
Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 796-98. The method
of the selection of judges would also be a factor in the la
ter deliberations on the International Court of Justice.
28
29
30

Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 226.
Proceedings,

(1907), II, pp. 796-98.

Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 227.

94
Rui,
The organizers of the project worked very hard but com
mitted many injustices, showing a decided preference for
the European countries and no consideration for the
countries of Latin America. . . .31
After giving a list of the classification of the countries
and their shipping tonnage, he concluded,
A simple examination of the list above shows how in
equitable was the work of classification by the organi
zers of the project and we can not but feel that the
American delegation, in discord with the protestations
of esteem which Brazil and generally the countries of
South America have received from their government, are
in league with the great European powers to treat, in
such a fashion, the nations of our c o n t i n e n t . 32
When the project for the International Prize Court
came up before the First Commission for a vote, Brazil,
along with Turkey, opposed it.

At the plenary session of

September 21st, Brazil was the only one to vote against the
project.

33

At the close of the conference a convention for

a prize court was signed, but it failed to come into force
because of the failure of states to ratify it.

34

The project for a court to decide cases arising be
tween or among nations was given various names, but eventu
ally came to be known as the International Court of Justice,
or Court of Arbitration.

This proposed court is not to be

31

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio. no. 80, August 15, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta X.
32
Ibid.
33

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 113, September
21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Davis, U.S. and the Second
Conference, p. 227.
34

Quincy Wright, "Hague Court," Encyclopedia Ameri
cana (1979), XIII, p. 683.

confused with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague
Court), which was originated by the First Hague Conference
and which the new court was planned to supplement or supplant.

35

The projected body was originally designated as

the High Court of International Justice, but eventually was
36
officially called the Court of Arbitral Justice.
The American proposal for a new court was taken as
the basis for discussion.

The Germans, British, French, and

Americans were already working on a framework for the prize
court, and the Americans sought the assistance of the other
three in framing the new project.

The French chose not to

cooperate in the endeavor, so the Americans, British, and
Germans drafted a new project to present to the appropriate
37
committee.
The major problem with the court project was in con
nection with the method of appointing judges.

There was

controversy over the number of judges to be on the court.
The Americans felt that a court with one judge from each of
the forty-four nations would be unwieldy and the leader of
the delegation, Joseph H. Choate, emerged as the champion of
proportional representation, insisting that judges from the
larger and more powerful nations serve for longer periods
35

Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, pp. 264,
269, 271, 274; and Hull, Two Conferences, p. 420.
36
Proceedings, (1907), II, p. 706; and Davis, U.S.
and the Second Conference, pp. 269, 273.
37

Choate and Scott to Root, The Hague, August 7,
1907, DS, 40/410; Choate to Root, The Hague, August 10,
1907, DS, 40/412; Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference,
p. 264; and Hull, Two Conferences, p. 410.

than the others.

38

Rui eventually emerged as the champion

of equal representation, struggling to prevent any solution
except on the basis of absolute equality of sovereign
states.

39

Rui first tried to kill the court project in com

mittee, using a number of tactics, including the contention
that the committee was not competent to take up the subject.

40

In further attempts to block acceptance of the pro

portional method of selecting judges, Rui proposed a new
court scheme and several modifications.

41

Choate reacted

violently to Rui's new proposals, which he considered impractical and impossible of implementation.

42

By the end of August Brazil was unequivocably com
mitted to defending the principle of the equality of sover
eign states in the selection of judges for the International Court of Justice.

43

On August 27th Rui brilliantly

defended this position in a speech which Davis said, "was
38

Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 265;
and Hull, Two Conferences, pp. 412, 423-426.
^^Proceedings,(1907), II, pp. 619, 624-27, 645-53;
Hull, Two Conferences, pp. 423-26; and Davis, U.S. and the
Second Conference, p. 271.
40
Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 624-27. The commit
tee in question was Committee B of the First Subcommission
of the First Commission.
41
Adee to Choate, Washington, August 15, 1907, DS,
40/416A; and Rui to Buchanan, Scheveningen, August 16, 1907
CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.
42

Adee to Choate, Washington, August 15, 1907, DS,
40/416A; and Choate to Root, The Hague, August 16, 1907, DS
40/417.
43
40/430.

Choate to Root, The Hague, August 23, 1907, DS,

probably the greatest speech of the conference.”

44

In the

address Rui eloquently defended the position of the minor
powers:
Can it be said that equal rights are granted to the
different countries in the Permanent Court when to some
of them juridicial function is granted for twelve years,
whilst to others such function is granted for only a
single year?
Hitherto, the States, however diverse because of their
extent of territory, their wealth, their power, had,
nevertheless, among themselves one point of moral commensuration. This was their national sovereignty. Up
on this point their juridical equality could be estab
lished unshakably.
In this fortress of an equal right
for all, and equally inviolable, inalienable, incontro
vertible, each State, large or small, felt that it was
so truly its own master and even as safe with regard to
the rest, as the free citizen feels safe within the
walls of his own house.
Sovereignty is the great for
tress of a country.
It constitutes the basis of the
entire system of its juridical defence within the field
of international law. But what is it we would do? We
would meet, great and small, around a table, each tak
ing part in a concert of a touching international
friendship in order to subscribe to a convention which
would establish a tariff of the practical value of
sovereignties, by distributing among them portions of
authority in proportion to the more or less unjust
estimation of the weak in the balance of justice of the
powerful.
All the difficulties with which this project is be
set come from our losing sight of this fundamental
fact: the equality between sovereign States.45
The American delegation attempted to modify the
court proposal so as to appease Brazil and gain her acqui
escence in the project.

However, by this time Brazil felt

her interests were so intertwined with those of the lesser
powers that she could not abandon her position without
44
45

Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 272.
Proceedings,

(1907), II, pp. 647, 648.

their consent:
In the second place, in view of the ties which con
nect us to other States whose rights we defend on this
question, we would be in a position of underwriting a
different proposal than the one already presented by us
at the conference, without the consent of the majority
of the excluded countries.
If you agree in the modification proposed by us as
to the number of members of the court, and if you ob
tain in advance the support of the excluded States, we
would be able to attempt this solution. But we believe
it to be impossible to obtain this support.
But without it we will not have the liberty to fol
low you because we do not want to be suspected of aban
doning our principle and the nations who support it be
cause of the advantage that you offer in giving us a
seat on the court.46
The situation reached such an impasse that the
delegates feared a court plan would never be approved and
a special committee was appointed to make a last attempt to
solve the problem of the selection of judges.

The members

of the special six-member committee included Choate and
Barbosa.

47

This special committee met several times, but

failed to agree after considering various election
schemes.

48

When the court project came to a final vote, the

delegates adopted a voeu (draft convention), to be appended
to the conference conventions, in which the project was
adopted with the omission of the provisions for appointing
judges.

49

The conference further recommended that the draft

convention be put into effect as soon as an agreement could
46

Rui to James Brown Scott, Scheveningen, August 30,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXII<
^ Proceedings,

(1907), II, 687-89.

48Ibid., II, 689-96.
49

Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, pp. 275-76.

be reached, through diplomatic channels, on the appointment
of judges. 50
*

•

*

Rio-Branco praised Rui for his defense of the prin
ciple of equality:
In reference to arbitration, the principle of equality
of representation of states has now been recognized, as
it already had been without difficulty in 1899. This
time, however, its recognition was due only to the.tal
ent and competence with which you defended it. It is a
victory which Brazil and all the other countries, with
the exception of the eight great powers, owe to you.51
During the conference, the deliberations of most
interest to Brazil were those relative to the immunity of
private property at sea, the Drago Doctrine, the Interna
tional Prize Court, and the International Court of Justice.
In the first two cases, Brazil supported the United States'
position, to the dismay of the Hispanic-American delegates.
However, in the latter two cases, Brazil eventually found
herself on the same side of the issue as the rest of Latin
America, and in opposition to the American position.
The next chapter will describe the continued strain
on the United States-Brazilian relationship as Brazil per
sistently projected the image of an independent, cultured
nation.

50

James Brown Scott, in introduction to Scott, edi
tor, The Hague Court Reports, I CNew York: Oxford UniverPress, 1916), p. xxvi.
51

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 151, September 10,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.

CHAPTER V
BRAZILIAN RELATIONSHIPS AT THE CONFERENCE:

UNITED

STATES, LATIN AMERICA, AND RUSSIA
As the twentieth century began, Brazil was, despite
her huge territorial expanse, a relative bantam weight in
the international arena.

The Second Hague Conference was

an opportunity to make her debut in international politics
and to attempt to improve her international standing.

Bra

zil aspired to assume the position of a major power, but
this was an unrealistic goal.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Brazil's eco
nomic and political focus was in the process of shifting
from London to Washington.

British economic and political

influence was beginning to decline worldwide and American
international influence was increasing.

For Brazil, New

York was becoming a more important financial center than
London.

Brazil, by aligning herself with the United States,

hoped to gain support for her own political and economic
hegemony in South America.

This shift was evidenced by:

the elevation of the American and Brazilian legations to em
bassy status in January of 1905, the cordial visit of Sec
retary of State Root to the Third Pan American Conference
held in Rio in mid-1906, and the unabashedly pro-American
-100-

stance taken by Rio-Branco and Nabuco.^
During the nineteenth century British influence had
been pervasive in many areas of Brazilian life and culture,
2
especially in commerce and economics.
In the first eighty
years following Brazilian independence, London was her most
important diplomatic post.

Beginning in 1900 Joaquim Nabu-

co became first the unofficial, then the official Brazilian
minister in London.

3

After Rio-Branco persuaded the United States that
the two countries should upgrade their legations to the rank
of embassy, he transferred Nabuco to Washington and appoint
ed him as Brazil's first ambassador.

Nabuco occupied a spe

cial position, since he was one of few representatives there
with the rank of ambassador, and he soon became accepted as
the dean of the Latin American diplomatic corps in Washing
ton.^
Nabuco and Elihu Root became good friends, and the
Brazilian ambassador was instrumental in persuading the
■^Graham, Modernization in Brazil, pp. 311-14; Burns,
Unwritten Alliance, pp. 95-116; and E. Bradford Burns, edi
tor, A Documentary History of Brazil (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1966), pp. 306-11.
2
See especially, Graham, Modernization in Brazil.
3
C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 245-55.
4
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 97-100; and Graham,
Modernization in Brazil, p. 311. Mexico was the only other
Latin American country with an ambassador in Washington,
although Argentina was negotiating with the U.S. at that
time. The Argentines were shocked and hurt that Brazil had
an ambassador in Washington before they did. Burns, Unwrit
ten Alliance, p. 188.

American secretary of state to personally attend the Third
Pan American Conference.

5

Rio-Branco and his ambassador in

Washington so closely aligned Brazil with the United States
that the relationship between the two countries during his
tenure as foreign minister can be characterized as an "ing

formal alliance."
Root instructed the American delegates to the Second
Hague Conference to support the Latin American countries as
much as possible.

He informed Nabuco of these instructions

and the ambassador in turn conveyed this information to RioBranco.

Initially it appeared that there would be cordial

relations between the Brazilian and American delegations at
The Hague.

On the first substantive point to be discussed

at the conference, the collection of public debts by mili
tary force, Rio-Branco instructed Rui that it would inpolitic to differ with the United States on the matter.

This

stance would alienate most of Hispanic America, but Rui was
to assure them confidentially that Brazil was going along
with the Americans as far as possible, "only to be agree7

able."

In spite of this Brazilian assurance, the other

^The Argentines, who were bidding for holding the
meeting in Buenos Aires, were again upstaged by the Brazil
ians. To help smooth ruffled feathers, Root visited Argen
tina and other Latin American countries after leaving Rio.
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 188.
g

See Burns, Unwritten Alliance, especially pp. 20109.
7
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado No. 8, June 18,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IVA. See also Rio-Branco to Rui,
Rio, telegram no. 11, June 19, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII,
partially encoded, translation supplied; and Rio-Branco to

Latin American nations felt she was going to vote with the
3
United States throughout the conference.
Brazil also supported the American position on the
question of private property at sea.

Nabuco read newspaper

reports of the early conference deliberations and congratu
lated Rui on the position he took.
In today's Figaro I see that you are already getting
recognition and especially that you have begun to ap
plaud Mr. Choate. Nothing can put us on better terms
in Washington than supporting the American delegates in
their attempts at the Conference to make great strides
for the Rights of Men.
Unless I am mistaken, I heard that Mr. Root spoke of
your support as the greatest proof of the sincerity of
our sympathy for the American people.9
At the beginning of July, William I. Buchanan, a
member of the American delegation, confidentially gave Rui
the new proposals the Americans were going to present on
Rui, Rio, no. 19, July 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII, par
tially encoded, translation supplied.
(Because of the
large number of cited cables between Rio-Branco and Rui,
all such telegrams with numbers will be so identified to
distinguish them from other telegrams of the same date.
A few of the cables do not bear numbers, and a few others
were erroneously numbered at the time of transmission.
Most such errors in the numbering of dispatches were dis
covered by Rui and Rio-Branco and corrected in later ca
bles. )
3
William T. Stead, O Brazil em Haya, edited and
translated by Arthur Bomilcar (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de M.
Piedade & Cia., 1908), p. 22; Rui Barbosa, Campanha Presi
dencial,1919 (Bahia: Livraria Catilian, 1919), p. 275;
and Barbosa, Brasil e as Nacoes Latino-Americanas em Haya,
pp. 24-37.
9
Nabuco to Rui, Vittel, France, June 29, 1907,
CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
See also, "La Conference de La
Haye," Figaro, June 29, 1907; and Lemgruber Knopf, Bra
zilian Legation The Hague, to Rio-Branco, The Hague, June
29, 1907, A H I , 211/1/3 tel. rec.
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the subject of collection of public d e b t s . A l t h o u g h Rui
was becoming skeptical of the tactic of supporting the Uni
ted States, Rio-Branco instructed him to continue to do

Soon, however, the apparent accord between the two
delegations disappeared and was replaced first by subtle,
then by open hostility.

By the latter part of August, the

Brazilians were very upset because the American delegation
was not living up to the fine speech of Elihu Root a year
before when at the Rio Conference he had declared,
We deem the independence and equal rights of the smal
lest and weakest member of the family of nations entit
led to as much respect as those of the greatest empire;
and we deem the observance of that respect the chief
guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the
strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or priv
ileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every
American republic.12
On August 27th, in deliberating formation of the Interna
tional Court of Justice, Rui expressed these sentiments
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 3, July 3,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and "proposition of the Delega
tion of the United States of America concerning the limita
tions of the employment of force in the collection of ordi
nary public debts arising from contracts," no date, CRB,
Haia Pasta XXII. A French translation is filed here also.
■^Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 19, July 4, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VII, partially encoded, translation sup
plied; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 6, July 8, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague,
no. 7, July 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
12

Root, speech, July 31, 1906, Latin American Ad
dresses, p. 10. Rio-Branco, in reference to this speech,
said, "The delegation of the United States at The Hague is
not confirming the beautiful words that Secretary of State
Root spoke in the July 31, 1906 session of the Inter-Ameri
can Conference in Rio de Janeiro." Rio-Branco to Rui, no.
93 / i.e., 92_7, August 20, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X.

in his brilliant defense of the equality of sovereign
states.^
The divergence began when the Americans maintained
complete secrecy about their proposal for a method of
selecting judges for the International Court of Justice
(Court of Arbitration).

Rui, however, through a mutual

friend, learned the details of the proposal which "humiliated" Brazil.

14

Rui considered it essential that some ac

tion be taken to counter the planned proposal and RioBranco instructed the Brazilian charge in Washington to
find Root immediately and inform him of the pending American proposal.

15

Rio-Branco quoted from Root's speech at

the Rio Conference (see above) where he had declared that
the United States supported the independence and equal
rights of all countries, and then he said, "The project of
the delegation as it stands, would be a humiliation for
Brazil and the other Latin Americans and would completely
destroy the effect of Root's trip."

16

Rio-Branco warned

that, unless the project were modified, Brazil would be
■^See above, Chapter IV, pp. 95-98.
14

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 32, August 3,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
15

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 34, August 4,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio,
August 4, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp., partially marked
for encoding.
1g

Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, August 4, 1907, AHI,
235/3/15, partially marked for encoding.
Same wording as
found in Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, / no. 52_7, August 4,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
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obliged to defend the rights of sovereign states.

He then

closed with this appeal:
I hope that these ideas receive a favorable reception
and that we will not have to come to the unpleasant po
sition of demonstrating our disunity before the confer
ence.
If the Latin American countries are going to be
treated the way the U.S. delegation has planned, then
it would have been better if we had not been invited to
The H a g u e . 1 7
Root was on vacation for the summer, attempting to
recover his health in Clinton, New York, and Amaral left
immediately for Clinton to speak with Root personally.

18

Rio-Branco was pessimistic about any positive results from
Amaral's trip and he cabled Rui to be prepared for Brazil
to pursue an independent course in the matter.

19

Amaral

filed a fifteen-page report with the Foreign Ministry by
cable.

The Brazilian was a guest at Root's home in Clin

ton, where the secretary of state said he was not in favor
of all countries having the same representation on the
Court of Arbitration, but declared himself to be definitely
opposed to the project of Choate.

Root reassured Amaral

that he intended for Brazil to have proper representation
and had recommended to Buchanan always to support the in
terests of Latin America.

Root was incredulous that Choate

would be considering such a project and promised to have the

18

Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington, August 5, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/1C, partially encoded,_translation supplied; and
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 154 /i.e., 54_7, August 5, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
19

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 55, August 5, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta IX

State Department immediately cable the American delegation
instructions that Brazil have proper representation.

20

Root sent the wire as promised and the American delegation
responded with its current proposal, which had not yet been
presented.
follows:

21

Root then instructed the State Department as

"Cable Choate proposed plan described for select-

ing members of new court seems excellent.

Root."

22

In seeking a compromise, the delegates at the Hague
convention were constantly modifying proposed plans for the
court.

Choate cabled a new proposal to Washington, which

was rejected by Root as being, "very distasteful to South
America."

23

Root continued,

We must not on any account sacrifice our position of
asserting the national equality of American States with
the other powers of the earth.
It is far more impor
tant to us than the whole court s c h e m e .2 4
In a further effort to get the Americans to modify
their position, Rio-Branco instructed the Brazilian charge
20

Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, August 7, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially encoded, translation
supplied; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, / no. 60_7* August 7,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
21

Root to Acting Secretary of State, Clinton, N.Y.,
August 5, 1907, DS, 40/408; Adee to Choate, Washington,
August 6, 1907, DS, 40/409; and Choate & Scott to Root, The
Hague, August 7, 1907, DS, 40/410.
22
Root to Adee, Clinton, N.Y., August 9, 1907, DS,
40/411. See also Adee to Choate, Washington, August 10,
1907, DS, 40/411.
23
Root to Adee, quoted in Adee to Choate, Washing
ton, August 13, 1907, DS, 40/412.
24
Ibid.
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to contact the government in Washington.

25

Amaral carried

a memorandum to Alvey A. Adee, Acting Secretary of State,
who cabled copies to Root and Roosevelt.

The memorandum

described Brazil's latest proposal for selecting judges for
a permanent court of arbitration.

Since a vote on the pro

posal was scheduled in two days, the Brazilians felt time
was critical.

After setting forth the details of the pro

posal, the memo closed thus:
This course of communicating the views of Brazil to
the American Government, with a desire of their being
transmitted by cable to the American Delegation at the
Hague, is taken because the negotiations between the
same Delegation of the United States and those of
Prance, Germany, Great Britain, Russia and other Euro
pean powers are already greatly a d v a n c e d . 26
Amaral was frustrated in his attempt to get the
American government to act.

Indeed, Roosevelt and Root were

both out of town and he cabled Rio-Branco, "It is difficult
to approach the administration during the summer on terms
favorable for negotiation because they are all out of town
and they do not even know where Root is today."

27

While

25

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 78, August 14, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta X.
26

Amaral to Adee, "Memorandum presented to the De
partment of State by Mr. Sylvino Gurgel do Amaral, Charge
d'Affaires of Brazil," Washington, August 15, 1907, DS,
40/621.
27

Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington, August 15, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially encoded, translation sup
plied. The expedient conduct of American foreign policy was
hampered during the summer of 1907 by the absence of Presi
dent Roosevelt, Secretary of State Root, and Asst. Secretary
of State Bacon. For several weeks during the crucial nego
tiations at The Hague over the method of selecting judges
for the Court of Arbitration, Second Assistant Secretary of
State Alvey A. Adee was acting Secretary.
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awaiting instructions from Root, Adee cabled Choate that a
new Brazilian plan had been presented and asked him to get
the details from Rui so that he would be prepared to intelligently act on any instructions from Root.

28

The Department of State telegram chased Root from
Clinton to Southampton, to New York City, and finally to
White Plains.

29

In the meantime, after a two-day delay,

President Roosevelt had replied that he knew too little of
the details to pass a judgement on the matter, and that he
felt the United States should be largely guided by the delegates on the spot.

30

Choate also responded before Secretary

Root even received his cable.

Choate was adamantly opposed

to the Brazilian proposal:
Brazilian plan of Permanent Court indicated in your
cable absolutely impossible.
If insisted on it will
wreck the whole scheme of a Court. . . . Do not ask an
impossibility.
We are doing our utmost to secure a
Court on terms of substantial equality.3!
28

Adee to Choate, Washington, August 15, 1907, DS,

40/416A.
29

Adee to Root, Washington, August 15, 1907, DS,
40/427A? Adee to Root, Washington, August 16, 1907, DS,
P.W. 40 (i.e., filed with case no. 40). The confusion was
compounded because the latter communication was erroneously
addressed to New Jersey rather than to New York.
30

Roosevelt to Adee, Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 17,
1907, DS, 40/420.
Roosevelt
already had doubts about posi
tive results from the Hague Conference. Davis says, "So
disgusted was he that after the Peace Conference opened at
The Hague he seldom bothered to keep himself informed about
it."
Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 167.
31
Choate to Adee, The Hague, August 16, 1907, DS,
40/417. Elihu Root was in poor health from overwork and
spent some time at his home in Clinton, New York. However,
at the time Adee was frantically attempting to reach him,
he had been called to the bedside of his dying brother in

Root was upset over Choate's cavalier attitude to
ward Brazil, but was unable to pressure him into changing
it because of his illness and absence from Washington, and
because Choate enjoyed the confidence of Roosevelt.

32

Wil

liam I. Buchanan, one of the American delegates, became
somewhat friendly with Rui and eventually told him in con
fidence the story of the selection of the American delega
tion.

When Choate, Porter, and Rose were nominated, Root

had rejected them because of lack of experience.

However,

Root was forced to accept them because of an earlier commitment by Roosevelt.

33

Clinton.
Root evidently was so exhausted that he was un
able to remain with his brother in his last days, and ten
days before his death he left Clinton, stopped briefly at
his mother-in-law's house on Long Island, then went to New
York City enroute to White Plains. At White Plains he en
tered Muldoon's Sanatorium, seeking a cure for his exces
sive fatigue. Root to Adee, White Plains, New York, August
21, 1907; Root to Adee, White Plains, New York, August 21,
1907, DS, 40/445; and Davis, U.S. and the Second Confer
ence, pp. 265-67. Root first went to Clinton to rest in
July but he was bombarded by cables from the State Depart
ment and he was very upset over the fatal illness of his
brother.
By late September he had recovered his health,
but did not immediately return to Washington but went by
private rail car for a visit to Mexico City with his fami
ly, returning to Washington on October 19th. Jessup, Root,
I, pp. 506-07, 515-17; and II, 23-24, 76-77. Elihu's bro
ther, Orem Root, Jr., died on August 27th. See Adee to
Choate, Washington, August 27, 1907,’ DS, 40/435; Amaral to
Rio-Branco, Atlantic City, August 28, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C
tel. rec.; and New York Times, August 23-27, September 26,
and October 20, 1907.
32

Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington, August 17,
1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially encoded, transla
tion supplied; and Amaral to Rio-Branco, Atlantic City,
August 24, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially en
coded, translation supplied.
33

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 112, September
21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

Ill
Rui's friendly relationship with Buchanan differed
sharply from that with the other members of the United
States delegation at the conference.

In fact, Buchanan was

different from most of the other American delegates in that
he was cultured, a diplomat, spoke fluent French, and under
stood Latin America.

Buchanan had quite a bit of experience

in Latin America, having been an American delegate to the
Second and Third Pan American Conferences, minister to Ar
gentina (1894-1900), and having conducted many special missions to Latin America.

34

He was Root's Latin American

"expert" on the Hague delegation; Root wrote the head of the
delegation:
Buchanan, as you know, is charged with the special duty
of doing all he can to help the Latin Americans in this
first appearance on their part as members of the world
family. We have taken a great deal of pains to get
them into the conference, and I think most of them feel
grateful for it and I think it is a good policy to help
them all we c a n . 35
As early as August 4th, Rio-Branco suggested that
Rui approach Buchanan for aid on the arbitration court pro
ject.

He briefly spoke with Buchanan at the Brazilian ban

quet and the American heaped lavish praise on him for the
sumptuous banquet and extravagant floral decorations.

Rui

finally sent a confidential letter, in French to Buchanan,
34

Jessup, Root, I, p. 482; and Who Was Who in Amer
ica, Vol. I, p. 160. See also Harold F. Peterson, Diplomat
of the Americas: A Biography of William I. Buchanan (18521909) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977),
especially pp. 3, 280, 288-89, 292, and 297-300.
35
Root to Choate, May 31, 1907, DS, quoted in Jes
sup, Root, II, pp. 68-69.
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and they had several long discussions concerning the Bra
zilian proposal.

However, it was already too late to head

off a clash between the delegations; and Rui had a heated
exchange with Choate in a commission session on August
17th.36
After Rui's exchange with Choate, Rio-Branco cabled
that it appeared that the American government would be un
able to take the desired initiative because of the absence
of Root and Roosevelt from Washington.

He went on to say,

"Now we can no longer conceal our divergence with the Ameri
can delegation.

We must now frankly take up the defense of

our rights and those of the other American nations."

37

Be

cause Rui had now become so exhausted and discouraged that
he had asked Rio-Branco to relieve him of his position, RioBranco closed with some flattery to help encourage Rui to
continue:

"We are certain that you can do this with firm

ness and moderation and brilliance, attracting to our coun
try the sympathies of the weak peoples and the respect of
the strong."36
Og

_

_

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, / no. 52_/, August 4, 1907
CRB, Haia Pasta IX; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 41,
August 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Buchanan, Scheveningen, Aug. 16, 1907, CRB, untitled collection of bound
mss; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 55, Aug. 18, 1907,CRB
Haia Pasta XX; and Proceedings,(1907), II, pp. 600-03.
3^Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 89, August 18, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta X.
38
Ibid. See also Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague,
no. 52, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Senator
Azeredo, The Hague, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and
Rui to Pinheiro Machado, The Hague, August 16, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX.
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Soon after the conference began, Rui learned that
the Colombian government had instructed her delegation at
The Hague to always vote with Brazil.

39

However, as soon

as it became apparent that Brazil intended to vote with the
United States, the other Latin American delegates became
upset, and disunity began to appear.

40

After Brazil sided

with the United States in the debate over the use of force
to collect public debts, it became necessary for Rui to
assure the Hispanic-American governments that Brazil had no
territorial ambitions, and to assure them Brazil only voted
with the United States in the interest of approximation between the two countries.

41

At one point Rui referred to Gonzalo A. Esteva, the
Mexican delegate, as "the best friend we have here."

42

Mex

ico was a rival of Argentina in Hispanic America and Nabuco
felt they were politically much more important because of
their proximity to the United States.

43

Earlier Mexican

antipathy toward the United States had subsided, and by 1907
39

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 18, July 3, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta VII.
40
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 36, July 20, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VII.
41

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 22, July 23,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
42

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 101, September
9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
43
Nabuco to Rui, Paris, June 13, 1907, "Notas Confidenciaes," CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
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Mexico had become almost a "U.S. agent" to the other
Spanish-speaking nations.

44

Chile had for the most part maintained friendly
relations with Brazil, although since 1902 when she had set
tled her long disagreement with Argentina, she had less rea
son to rely upon Brazilian friendship to escape her earlier
isolation on the continent.

45

The Chileans were not upset

over Brazil's initial support of the United States at the
conference, for they understood the reasons for the approximation.

46

Later, in the debate over the International Court

of Justice, Chile was gratified by Brazil's support of the
principle of equality of sovereign states and her refusal to
accept a seat on the court at the expense of Chile and the

45

In South America, the period from independence
to the late 1860's was characterized by regional power pol
itics. However, continental power politics emerged in the
late 1860's and continued into the first quarter of the
twentieth century.
During this second period, Chile sought
to control the balance of power along the Pacific coast of
South America. When Argentina threatened her hegemony,
Chile at first sought friendship with Brazil as a counter
balance to Argentina.
However, the continued growth of
Argentina and the uncertainty of the Brazilian entente led
Chile to seek an agreement with Argentina. This agreement
was reached by several 1902 treaties which provided for rec
ognition of a Chilean sphere of influence on the Pacific
coast and an Argentine sphere of influence on the Atlantic
coast of the continent.
Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force:
Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 4,
127-28, 145, 168, 186-87, 198-99, and 245-62.
46

Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 192.

other smaller nations.

47

On Rui's voyage to the Hague Conference, the Argen
tine delegation had also been aboard the Araguaya with him.
Rui met all the Argentine delegates and they developed
mutual friendships.

48

During the conference, the social

relations were cordial and the families of the two delegations became quite good friends.

49

The Brazilian minister

in Paris said the relations with all the South American
delegations in Paris had been good, and upon Rui's arrival
in that city he was invited to a dinner by the Argentine
minister.^
Despite the personal friendship of members of the
Brazilian and Argentine delegations, the likelihood of of
ficial cooperation was remote.

Brazil and Argentina had

been in a struggle for supremacy in South America and this
rivalry was evident at the Second Hague Conference.

Close

association with the United States had been sought by each
of the countries in an attempt to gain advantage over the
47

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 82, August 31,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Proceedings,(1907), II, 687-98;
and Rui to James Brown Scott, Scheveningen, August 30, 1907
CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.
48

Barbosa, Brasil e as Nagoes Latino-Americanas em
Haya, pp. 18-19. During the voyage Rui presented Drago a
big box of magnificent Bahian oranges. Rui to Rio-Branco,
The Hague, no. 91, September 6, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 91, September 6
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
50

Piza (Brazilian minister in Paris) to Rui, Paris,
June 5, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXI; and Piza to Rui, Paris,
June 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXI.

other.

51

Argentina had been particularly upset because Bra

zil appeared

to be strengthening herself by closer associ

ation with the United States, especially after the exchange
of ambassadors and the arrival of Nabuco in Washington.
The Argentines had sought to have Buenos Aires des
ignated as the meeting place of the Third Pan American Con
ference, but Nabuco succeeded in having Rio selected in
stead.

The Brazilians had gained a great deal of prestige

by Root's attendance at the Rio Conference, and the secre
tary of state found it expedient to visit Buenos Aires and
other Latin American capitals to assuage injured pride.

52

It was in reaction to Argentine overtures to the United
States that Nabuco wrote his "Private Memorandum" to Root,
asking that he assist Brazil in obtaining a vice-presidency
for her delegate to the Hague Conference.

53

Rio-Branco had little respect for Estanislau
Zeballos, the foreign minister of Argentina.

The two had

had antipathy for each other since they had represented opposing sides in the Missions Territory dispute.

54

In 1893

51

Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 186. As the con
ference opened, Rio-Branco informed Rui that Arabalho, the
Argentine minister in Washington, was trying to supplant
Brazil in U.S. friendship, but luckily without results so
far. Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 11, CRB, Haia Pasta VII,
partially encoded, translation supplied.
52

Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 163, 188; and Jes
sup, Root, I, p. 747.
53Nabuco to Root, Washington, May 25, 1907, "Pri
vate Memo," DS, 40/290.
See above, Chapter III, pp. 73-75.
54

Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 184.
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President Grover Cleveland was chosen as the arbitrator in
this dispute, and Rio-Branco and Zeballos represented their
respective countries in special mission to Washington.
Zeballos felt humiliated when Brazil won an overwhelming
victory in the arbitral award.

55

Rio-Branco had always

felt that Zeballos was mentally unstable, but as a result of
the stance he directed his delegates to take at The Hague,
Rio-Branco became convinced that he was "definitely mad."

56

On instructions of their government, the Argentine
delegates became secretive, guarding their intentions from
the Brazilians.

They also began courting the Americans and

the British journalist, William T. Stead, to whom they presented a silver service.

57

After Rui began to clash with

members of the American delegation, he began to consider
cooperating with Argentina against the United States.

How

ever, Rio-Branco said that Brazil must continue to cultivate
the friendship of the United States, and that voting with
the other Latin American countries against the Americans
would give the appearance of the formation of an anti-United
55

Burns, History of Brazil, pp. 231-32; and Viana,
Vida de Rio-Branco, pp. 183-200.
56

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 122, August 28, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XI; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, October 25,
1908, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco.
57

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 70, August 26,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Stead was an influential jour
nalist of international stature whose influence and sympa
thy would be of value to any individual or country.
See
below, Chapter VI, pp. 129-32.
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States league.

58

Rio-Branco felt that the efforts of Argen

tina to enlist Brazil in such an alliance might have been a
maneuver on their part to discredit Brazil in the eyes of the Americans.

59

As noted above, Brazil was upset by the American
proposal on the method of selecting judges for the Interna
tional Court of Arbitration which placed Brazil in a cate
gory with very small and weak nations.

Brazil then made a

counter-proposal which would give them a favorable position
in a category following the great powers.

However, this

ephemeral Brazilian proposal left Argentina in an inferior
category, and the Argentines were upset by it.

60

The Bra

zilians quickly abandoned this proposal in favor of another
one which solved the problem of the omission of some Latin
American states from the arbitration court by providing that
all sovereign states had an equal right to select judges.

61

However, Rui's revised plan caused new difficulties because
the conference insisted on a court composed of no more than
fifteen members.

Rui did not wish to accept a fifteen-

member court, as it would discriminate against some smaller
states, including Chile and Peru.

He cabled Rio-Branco:
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Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 118, August 26, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
59

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 129, August 28, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
fi0

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 122, August 28, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
^ R u i to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 81, August 30,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. See above, PP- 95-96.
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We are allied with these States. Abandoning them, be
sides disloyalty, would remove them from the advanta
geous position which we occupy. Thus it will be impos
sible to concur.^2
The Argentine delegates continued to maneuver for
a more favorable position for their country on the proposed
court.

This led Rio-Branco to conclude that Argentina would

not cooperate with Brazil, but rather would attempt to se
cure a seat on the court for herself, regardless of what
happened to the other Hispanic-American nations.

63

Rio-

Branco agreed with Rui that Brazil could not abandon those
nations.^
Without a doubt, Argentina attempted to gain the
sympathy of the American delegation at the expense of Bra
zil.

Brazil's stance in the latter part of the conference

was not one to inspire Washington's confidence in her
delegate and thus it was difficult to prevent the success of
the Argentine tactic.

65
*

*

*

Maurice Prozor, a Russian delegate, paid a visit to
62

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 82, August 31,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
63
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 138, September 5,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
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Ibid. Despite the opposition of the Argentine
government to Brazil, there continued to be no personal
rivalry between the conference delegates of the two coun
tries. One Argentine delegate, Carlos Rodrigues Larretta,
even accepted R u i 's invitation for him and his wife to
spend the following summer in Rio. Rui to Rio-Branco, The
Hague, no. 91, September 6, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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Nabuco to Graga Aranha, aboard the R.M.S. Carania,
September 27, 1907, AJN.
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solicit Brazilian support for a resolution providing for a
third peace conference to be also convened by Russia.

Rui

agreed to vote with them and expressed his appreciation for
Russian support of Brazil's position.

Rui said that since

the beginning of the conference the three Russian delegates
had shown sympathy for Brazil.

66

Prozor invited Rui to a

dinner celebrating his wedding anniversary; there were only
twelve invited guests, of whom eight were Russians.

Besides

being one of only four foreigners invited to the dinner, Rui
was given the place of honor.

67

This Brazilian-Russian cooperation continued when
on September 8th another member of the Russian delegation,
Fedor Fedorovich Martens, shared a new proposal for the
Court of Arbitration with Rui.

The proposal had originated

with the French delegation, and Rui was pleasantly sur
prised to learn that the confidential plan had not yet been
revealed to anyone else, not even to the conference president, who was a member of the Russian delegation.

68

The

following day this Russian delegate wrote a confidential
letter to Rui explaining some modifications which had been
66

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 113, September
21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Earlier, in reference to a
new U.S. proposal in which Brazil was excluded, Prozor told
Rui the Americans had said that Brazil did not have the
capacity to be a country of the first order. Rui to RioBranco, The Hague, no. 89, September 5, 1907, CRB, Haia
Pasta XX.
67

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 113, September
21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
68

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 99, September 9,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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made to the plan.

69

Martens was encouraged by Rui's sympa

thetic acceptance of the plan,, but he was not sure of the
American and German reactions:
X fear greatly the national and personal sensiti
vity which unfortunately plays a great role in the
lives of men and of nations.
I do not know what Mr. Choate will say.
Yesterday I had the chance to see the Baron Marschall to whom I spoke about my plan.
He seemed to be
favorable, but appearances are too often deceiving.
I am happy to have found such a sympathetic ear and
I count on your kind and strong support in the future.7 0
Rui then assured Martens that he could count on his support,
unless he received orders to the contrary from the Brazilian
government.^
In her first global conference, Brazil had the un
realistic goal of being accepted as the ninth power of the
world.

She did, however, succeed in making the other coun

tries aware of her existence as a nation and in persuading
them of the culture and intelligence of her representative.
The Argentine-Brazilian rivalry was evident at the confer
ence, despite the personal friendship of the individual
delegates, and Argentina sought to gain advantages for her
self, at the expense of Brazil.

Although Root and Rio-
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Martens to Rui, The Hague, September 9, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.

71

Rui to Martens, Scheveningen, September 9, 1907,
CRB, untitled collection of bound manuscripts.
Rui was
particularly excited about the new intimacy of Martens, who
began to use the familiar form of speech when addressing
him. Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 99, September 9,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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Branco instructed their delegations to cooperate with each
other at the conference, conflict soon arose between them.
The Hispanic-American countries were dismayed by Brazil's
initial support of the United States, but rallied behind her
as her posture changed to opposition, in the name of the
equality of sovereign states.

With Root ill and Nabuco in

Europe, Rio-Branco was unsuccessful in applying pressure in
Washington to modify the stance of the American Hague dele
gation .
Nabuco was dismayed at the apparent damage to
Brazilian-American relations caused by the disagreements at
the Hague Conference, especially the differences over the
Court of Arbitration.

He made every effort to minimize the

long-range effects of the conference on the relationship
between the two countries.

Rio-Branco was privately pleaded

to see Nabuco somewhat discredited, and to be able to dis
play some Brazilian independence vis-a-vis the United
States.

Rio-Branco, however, was committed to a long-term

cooperation with the United States and welcomed the gradual
return to the earlier relationship with that country.

Rui

Barbosa, on the other hand, was not willing to make any con
ciliatory gestures toward the United States.

He had gained

a Brazilian reputation with the aid of the Brazilian press,
prompted by Rio-Branco, and he did not wish to diminish his
political capital.

This topic is treated more fully in the

final chapter.
Chapter VI will examine Brazilian attempts to gain
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further recognition for the country by courting journalists
and by providing lavish entertainment.

That chapter will

show how Rio-Branco sought to use the occasion of the Second
Hague Conference to publicize Brazil, expending large sums
for printed materials and extravagant banquets.

CHAPTER VI
PROJECTING A PUBLIC IMAGE
An important ingredient in projecting the new Bra
zilian image of a country worthy of being accepted as the
ninth power in the world was a campaign in newspapers and
magazines at home and abroad.

During the Second Hague

Peace Conference, Rio-Branco placed special illustrated
articles in two magazines and made wide distribution of
copies of these issues and off-prints of the articles.

La

ter another extensive article was commissioned under the
guise of an impartial piece of reporting by a British jour
nalist.

Rio-Branco was sensitive to reports about Brazil

in the foreign press and, as in the case of the New York
Herald, went to great lengths to halt adverse publicity.

In

addition to commissioned articles, the Brazilian foreign
minister approved expenditures of large sums for lavish en
tertainment— the Brazilian banquets rivalling or exceeding
those of the great powers.
Two weeks after the conference convened, Rio-Branco
took an opportunity to publicize Brazil among the delegates
and the press.

The June 8th issue of The Sphere, an illus

trated magazine, carried a supplement about Brazil, and RioBranco instructed the Brazilian legation at The Hague to
-124-

determine the number of copies that would be needed to dis
tribute to "all delegates and secretaries of the entire dip
lomatic corps, principal correspondents of newspapers (not
forgetting Stead) and for the reading rooms of all the prin
cipal hotels and restaurants."^

The legation was then to

cable to London requesting that the determined number of
copies be sent for distribution as indicated.
After the conference was in session, Rui received a
letter from Elbert F. Baldwin, editor of the American maga
zine, The Outlook.

Baldwin sent a proposed "editorial" on

Brazil for the magazine and asked Rui to look it over.
Rui's reply contained additional information for the arti
cle.

Baldwin thanked Rui for his reply and also sent a

statement from Les Temps which he planned to append to the
earlier piece.

Because of the opportunity of publicity for

Brazil, Rui took time from_his busy schedule to send sev
eral letters to Baldwin correcting erroneous material and
2
supplying additional information for his magazine.
Toward the end of July, Martinho Botelho, editor of
Brazil Magazine, wrote Rui from the Rio monthly's overseas
office in Paris.

Botelho proposed that his next issue car

ry an extensive "descriptive and illustrated" article on
the Brazilian mission to The Hague.

Botelho requested a

^Rio-Branco to Brazilian Legation at The Hague, Rio
July 2, 1907, A H I , 211/1/9 tel. exp.
2
Elbert F. Baldwin to Rui, Scheveningen, July 15,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXITI; Baldwin to Rui, Karlsbad, July
18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII; and Baldwin to Rui, Karls
bad, July 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.
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meeting with Rui at The Hague to discuss such an article,
which "would make an agreeable and interesting impression
throughout Brazil and would document for posterity, through
text and illustrations, one of the most memorable instances
of our International prestige."

3

After meeting with Botelho, Rui gave his permission
for the article and assigned Baptista Pereira, a secretary
of the mission and Rui's future son-in-law, to work with
Botelho on the project.

Upon reflection, Rui decided that

he had best obtain Rio-Branco's permission, since the arti
cle would involve considerable expense.

In making the re

quest to the foreign minister, Rui noted that the Argen
tines, "our incessant rivals," had already made great efforts to influence the European press.

4

Rio-Branco cabled his approval and in mid-September
the issue appeared with the article on the Hague Confer5
ence.
The piece by Botelho was primarily an article
^Martinho Botelho to Rui, Paris, July 29, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XXV.
4
Rui to Lembruber Knopf, The Hague, August 18, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no.
55, August 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
5
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 91, August 19, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta X; Botelho to Rui, Paris, August 20, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XXV; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, un
numbered, September 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII, par
tially encoded, translation supplied. Actually, three
closely related articles appear successively in the issue
with a total of 33 pages, 20 of which are devoted entirely
to illustrations with no text.
See, "A Hollanda e a Conferencia da Paz na Haya;" "0 Brazil na Conferencia da Paz
na Haya;" and "O Brazil e a Segunda Conferencia de Paz na
Haya," Brazil Magazine, II (August, 1907), 1-33.

praising Rio-Branco and the individual members of the Bra
zilian delegation, profusely illustrated with individual
and group portraits, and with scenes of The Hague and the
0
Dutch countryside.
Botelho distributed 1075 copies at
The Hague and throughout Europe, and provided Rio-Branco
with 100 copies for a total cost to the Foreign Ministry
7
of E200.
Rui paid £120 for the article and distribution
in Europe.

A payment of £80 was later made for the addi

tional expenses of distribution and for the copies to be
Q

distributed by the Brazilian government.
The story of another special magazine supplement
began with Rio-Branco authorizing the Brazilian Hague lega
tion to use some funds to buy influence at the conference:
Lemgruber /"”Knopf_7,
Brazilian Legation, The Hague
Withdrawal of £200 may be made against reserved
expenses and entrusted to Baptista Pereira.
I wish

0
Brazil Magazine, II, 1-33.
7
Botelho to Rui, Paris, September 9, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XXV; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 107, Sep
tember 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Receipt signed by Bo
telho, The Hague, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV;
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, unnumbered, September 24, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XIII; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 115,
September 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rio-Branco to Rui,
Reservado No. 1 (4a secgao), September 27, 1907, CRB, Haia
Pasta VI; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 121, September
30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no.
172, October 18, 1907, Haia Pasta XII; and Rui to RioBranco, The Hague, no. 132, October 19, 1907, CRB, Haia
Pasta XX.

Q
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 107, September
18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Receipt signed by Martinho
Botelho, The Hague, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV;
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 115, September 26, 1907,
Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado No. 1
(4a secgao), September 27, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI.

the two men to informally invite two or three or iso
lated principal correspondents: Stead, Mercadier,
Daily Telegraph, Times, Temps, Debats, seeking to ob
tain their sympathies for Brazil and her delegation.
Also, discretely invite some Hispanic American dele
gates. Rio Branco.9
Two days after this telegram, Rui reported that he
had had a long visit with William T. Stead, editor of the
Courrier de la Conference, unofficial journal of the con
ference.

Rui reported:

Today I received a long visit from Stead. We conversed
about subjects relative to the conference. We are on
the way to a good friendship. Yesterday the Courrier
characterized the Brazilian proposal in the conference
as the most notable of a l l .
That same day Lemgruber Knopf filed this report:

"The Am

bassador / Rui_7 and I are on the way to a good friendship
with S t e a d . R i o - B r a n c o was delighted when he learned
of Rui's growing friendship with the British journalist.

12

A day later, on July 23rd, Stead wrote to Rui that
he had arranged for a meeting on Wednesday evening, July
24th.

About six South Americans were to be present and

Stead asked Rui to recommend any other South American dele9
Rio-Branco to Lemgruber Knopf, Rio, July 20,
1907, A H I , 211/1/9 tel. exp., partially marked for encod
ing.
■^Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 21, July 22,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
■^Lemgruber Knopf to Rio-Branco, Brazilian Lega
tion at The Hague, July 22, 1907, AHI, 211/1/3 tel. rec.,
partially encoded, translation supplied.
12

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 39, July 23, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.

gates he should invite.

13

On Friday of that week Stead

invited Rui to his pacifist conference, but this time Rui
declined to attend, pleading pressing business.
*

*

14

*

William T. Stead (1849-1912) was born in the same
year as Rui.

Stead was the son of a Congregational minis

ter, and his remarkable ability as a journalist was recog
nized early when he was appointed a newspaper editor at the
are of twenty-one.

Stead's reputation reached its zenith

between 1883 and 1890, when as editor of the Pall Mall
Gazette, he instituted what Matthew Arnold called the "new
Journalism."

Under Stead's direction the formerly sedate

paper began to initiate many new political and social pro
grams and movements, all in a very dashing and unconven
tional manner.

Stead gave up editing daily

newspapers in

1890 when he founded the Review of Reviews, and added an
American edition of the magazine in 1891.

Stead took part

in the "social gospel" movement, and after an 1894 visit to
Chicago, wrote the book, If Christ Came to Chicago.

As a

social reformer he became one of the strongest supporters
of the peace movement which resurged after the Czar's call
for the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899.

15
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Stead to Rui, Scheveningen, July 23, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XXIV:
14
Rui to Stead, The Hague, July 26, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX.
15

Frederic W. Whyte, "William Thomas Stead," Dic
tionary of National Biography, Supplement 1912-1921,
pp. 507-09; and George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roose-
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Stead

went to St. Petersburg and interviewed Czar

Nicholas II prior to the First Hague Conference.

He did his

best to mobilize American and European public opinion in
support of the proposed conference.

Stead went to The Hague

and, with his family, moved into a villa.

At the first con

ference he attracted much attention, when he published a
daily chronicle using the presses of the leading Hague news
paper.

Stead was something of a nuisance in gathering ma

terial for his paper, and in pursuit of information became
a self-appointed friend of Frederick W. Holls, the secretary
of the American delegation.

However, Stead's persuasive

powers in the press were well recognized and the American
delegation sought his aid in this manner on at least one
occasion.

16

In 1907 Stead again appeared at The Hague for the
peace conference and, with the backing of Baroness von
Suttner and other peace leaders, set up a headquarters for
the peace movement.

The headquarters, called Le Cercle

Internationale, provided a stage where each afternoon conference delegates and peace advocates gathered for debate.

17

velt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912 (New York:
Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 27-28. See also Frederic W. Whyte,
The Life of W.T. Stead, 2 vols. (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1925 and Edith K. Harper, Stead the Man: Personal Rem
iniscences (London: W. Rider & son, ltd., 1914).
16

Davis, U.S. and the First Conference, pp. 23-24,
56-58, 104-05, 154.
17

Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 195.
Davis states that their debates "were often better organ
ized and more interesting than those of the conference,"
p. 195.
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Stead again published and edited a four-page daily newspaper
entitled Le Courrier de la Conference.

Here he attempted to

make a complete record of everything that took place at the
conference.

This daily paper in French proved helpful be

cause it was the only place the diplomats could find a comprehensive view of what they were doing.

18

Stead, through his articles and editorials, wielded
a great influence and later chroniclers of the conference
relied heavily on his contemporary record.

Professor Wil

liam I. Hull, who himself attended the Second Hague Confer
ence, admitted his heavy reliance on Stead's Courrier:
In common with all readers of the Courrier, the author
of this book owes a large debt of gratitude to Mr. Stead
for the enterprise and public spirit shown by him in in
forming the public so fully of the work of the confer
ence, and in stimulating and informing the members of
the conference as well.i9
Stead's influence was even greater on persons not at
The Hague.

In Brazil, for instance, the Courrier was re

ferred to as the official chronicle of the conference and
its articles were accorded as much prestige and credence as
20
the London Times, or Le Figaro.

Also, Stead's paid adver

tisement which appeared as a supplement to the November 1907
issue of the Review of Reviews, was acclaimed as recognition
of the value of Brazil and her delegate by an impartial
18

Whyte, Stead, II, p. 290; and Davis, U.S. and the
Second Conference, p. 195.
19

Hull, Two Conferences, pp. vii-viii.

20
_George R. Chamberlin, American Consul, Pernambuco,
October / i.e., September_7 24, 1907, DS, 1113/5.
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judge.

A Portuguese translation of the supplement appeared

with appended materials and was touted as a "book" by Stead.
This deliberately false impression was allowed to persist in
Brazil for over fifty years.

Only recently was the record

set straignt by Raymundo Magalhaes Junior, a modern critic
of Rui Barbosa.

21
*

*

*

The fact that Brazil had money to spend on public
relations did not escape the notice of Stead, who in his
capacity as owner and editor of the Review of Reviews, wrote
to Rui:
It seems to me that Brazil has been spending a great
deal of money of late in advertising in one way and
another.
If the advertising fund is exhausted, then
you do not need to read further. For this is a pro
posal for what I venture to think would be a most ef
fective advertisement at a price, which,.although high,
is not more than it is worth.22
Stead went on to explain that the Review often pub
lished a special supplement at the end of the magazine.
These supplements were called "Business Write-ups," and one
paid a special rate for the publicity secured through these
special pages.

Stead then continued,

What I am writing to propose to you is that you
should take, on behalf of the Brazilian Government, from
ten to twenty pages of such an illustrated write-up to
appear as a special supplement in the "Review of Re
views" for October, the subject being "Brazil and its
Delegation at the Hague" and the price twenty-five
21

See Stead, 0 Brazil em Haya; and Magalhaes, Rui,
o Homem e o Mito, especially the chapter, "As 'Aguias de
Haia1 e o Falso Livro de William T. Stead," pp. 281-91.
22
William T. Stead to Rui, The Hague, September 6,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV.
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pounds (£25) per page.
In return for this expenditure of from £250 to £500,
according to the number of pages devoted to the supple
ment, you would receive:
1) A specially written sketch of the triumph which Bra
zil has achieved at the Hague, which I would sign.
2) A copiously illustrated popularly presented descrip
tion of Brazil— shorter than the Figaro pamphlet, but
calculated to interest the public in Great Britain.
3) A narrative of the work you have done here, with por
traits of yourself the Delegation etc.23
Stead further explained that, besides the 60,000-copy
worldwide circulation of his magazine, he would distribute
the supplement to "every sovereign, minister of state and
ambassador in the Almanack de Gotha,11 and 5,000 copies to
public libraries, bankers, chambers of commerce, merchants,
news rooms, Members of Parliament and members of Congress.
In an effort to sell his proposal, the British jour
nalist closed with an allusion to Argentina, whose delegates
had been doing their best to outdo Brazil since before the
peace conference convened:
I enclose you a rough sketch of the suggested sup
plement and would beg you the favor of an early reply.
For, if you do not like the idea it may find acceptance
in another quarter. But uhtil I hear that Brazil re
jects it I will not take it elsewhere. Of course no
other supplement would appear in the October "Review of
Reviews" than this, if you accept my o f f e r . 24
In an apparently related action, the same day (Sep
tember 6th) that he wrote to Rui proposing a special supple
ment of Brazil in the Review, Stead published a group por
trait of the Brazilian delegation in the Courrier and pro
posed that one member of the permanent court be a Bra

24Ibid.
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zilian.

25

The photo was made earlier on the orders of Rio-

Branco, and in an apparent bid for publicity, he had also
instructed that a print be sent to Stead.

26

Rui found Stead's proposal for the article entirely
acceptable and cabled Rio-Branco the details, urging his
prompt acceptance, closing thus:
He /~Stead_7 requests a prompt reply "for if you do not
like the idea it may find acceptance in another quar
ter." I believe he is referring to the Argentines who
certainly will not refuse if they are offered an oppor
tunity to appear superior to us in this situation. I
think the proposal is eminently acceptable.27
Rio-Branco immediately responded to

Rui's cable:

I welcome with great pleasure the proposal from the Re
view of Reviews.
I want 500 more copies to be sent to
this ministry for distribution to chambers and libraries
of Brazil.
I shall cable some recent statistical data
which he needs along with some passages of opinion about
Brazil from illustrious travellers^ He will soon re
ceive "Bresil," by Elisee Reclus / volume 19 of his
Geographie Universelle _7 which speaks of the similar
ity between Brazil and the United States.
If with the
requested increase the price is increased, I request you
give me the total so that I may cable the necessary
funds.28
Rui negotiated with Stead as instructed and the
journalist calculated that the addition would bring the
25

Lemgruber Knopf to Rio-Branco, Brazilian Lega
tion at The Hague, September 6, 1907, AHI, 211/1/3 tel. rec.
26

Rio-Branco to Lemgruber Knopf Brazilian Legation
at The Hague, Rio, July 28, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9 tel. exp.
27
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 94, September
7, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Lins says that Rui reported
to Rio-Branco that the Argentines were prepared to spend a
million gold pesos in publicity for their delegation. Lins,
Rio Branco, II, p. 571.
28

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 145, September 7,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
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supplement to a total of thirty-two pages at a cost of
29
£800.
Stead said, "The addition of 32p to the Review
would be unusual but I would rather this was done than to
fail on any point."

30

Rio-Branco accepted the adjusted

price and cabled Rui to accept the proposal.

31

Stead was

very pleased about the expansion of the supplement, but with
his other commitments, it became increasingly apparent that
the copy would not be ready in time for the October issue
of the magazine.

In addition, there was some delay in get

ting the statistics and other materials which Rio-Branco
29

Rui to Stead, The Hague, September 8, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX; Stead to Rui, The Hague, letter, September 9,
1907,CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV; Stead to Rui, The Hague, tele
gram, September 9,1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV; Rui to Stead,
The Hague, September 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Stead
to Rui, The Hague, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV.
30
Stead to Rui, The Hague, September 18, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XXIV. At the Baron's request, Stead eventually
sent Rio-Branco 500 copies of the magazine and 500 separate
reprints of the article.
Stead to Rui, London, December 9,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV; and Rui to Rio-Branco, Paris,
December 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Rui later requested
sixteen specially bound copies of volume 19 of Reclus'
work. He wanted this volume by the eminent geographer for
distribution as a present to the leading delegates of the
conference. Rui to Virgilio Gordilho, The Hague, September
28, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague,
no. 135, October 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Nelidov to
Rui, The Hague, October 15, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII;
and David Jayne Hill to Rui, The Hague, October 15, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.
31

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 108, September
19, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague,
no. 114, September 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to
Stead, The Hague, September 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX;
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, unnumbered, September 24, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XII, partially encoded; Rui to Stead, The
Hague, September 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and RioBranco to Rui, Rio, Reservado No. 1 (4a secgao), September
27, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI.
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wanted included in the article.

32

Stead now diplomatically

requested a delay in publication in the following terms,
I have made some progress with it /""the article_7. But
on reflection I have come to the conclusion that it
would be premature to publish it in the October issue.
The Conference has still 14 days (it may have 21) to run
and in these last days who knows how much may happen
that might materially effect the destiny of Brazil at
the Hague. Therefore I must postpone the publication of
the article till the November number when we shall I
hope be able to have the story as triumphant at its
close as it has been from the beginning.33
Rui concurred with Stead's request, characterizing it as
"eminently reasonable."

34

On October 9th Rui delivered a long speech which
served admirably for the triumphal ending for Mr. Stead's
article.

Stead was ecstatic and dashed off the following

note to Rui:

"Bravo.

Bravo.

lations Finis Coronat opus.
row."

35

Bravo.

A thousand Congratu

Can I have your speech tomor-

The speech, a defense of Brazil's position in op

position to the formation of the Prize Court and the Court
of Arbitration, appeared in the Brazilian press on October
32

Rio-Branco to Rui, PetrSpolis, no. 154, September
18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII; Rui to Rio-Branco, The
Hague, no. 115, September 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 117, September 28, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
33
Stead to Rui, The Hague, September 28, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XXIV.
34

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 119, September
29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
35
Stead to Rui, The Hague, October 9. 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XXIV.
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16th and made a great impression there.

36

However, the

American ambassador in Brazil accurately characterized the
speech as "somewhat bombastic, inaccurate and superfluous."

37

Rui proudly quoted to Rio-Branco Stead's note and

passages from the Courrier praising his speech.

38

On October 2Oth, Rui paid Stead the £800 as pre
viously agreed for the "advertisement" in the Review of Re- 39
views.

The following week Stead sent Rui a rough proof

of the article and asked him to look it over.

In regard to

the extremely flattering section about Rui's and Brazil's
position at The Hague, Stead apparently was attempting to
convince himself when he said, "I would not on any account
overstate anything, as nothing would be more likely to cre
ate a reaction, but I think I have kept myself well within
the facts in emphasizing the importance of the part which
you played there."
36

40

Upon reading an advance copy of the

^
'Conferencia da Haya," Jornal do Commercio, October

17, 1907.
37

Irving B. Dudley (American ambassador in Rio) to
Root, Petropolis, October 17, 1907, DS, 40/617.
38
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 127, October 9,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague,
no. 128, October 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
39
Receipt signed by Stead, October 20, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XV._ See also Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado
No. 1 (4a secgao), September 27, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI;
and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 140, October 20, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
40
Stead to Rui, London, October 20, 1907, CRB, Haia
Pasta XXIV. See also W.T. Stead, "Brazil at the Hague,"
Review of Reviews (London), XXXVI (November, 1907), "Spe
cial Art Supplement," 1-32.
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supplement/ Rui was very pleased and cabled Stead, "Received
kind letter and advance copy. Very well. Thanks for your
—
—
41
benevolent apreciation /_ sic / on my own person and role."
After substantially completing the supplement. Stead
conceived the idea of making an English translation of Rui1s
42
speeches at the Hague Conference.
Rui had already asked
for, and received permission to collect and publish all his
speeches and other relevant documents in the original
43
French.
Rio-Branco at first authorized Stead to make
English translations of Rui's discourse on the Court of Ar
bitration and several other, related documents.

These were

then published in a pamphlet "for distribution in England
and the United States with the object of clarifying our position to the official world and public opinion."

44

As part

of the agreement Stead was to translate, edit, and distrib45
ute the pamphlet worldwide.

Rui's speeches at the Hague

Conference were published in French and Stead made an Eng
lish translation which came to 100 pages and 5,000 copies
41

—
_
Rui to Stead, / Paris_/, November 17, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX.
42
Stead to Rui, London, October 26, 1907, CRB, Haia
Pasta XXIV.
43

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 51, August 15,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 81, August
16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio,
no. 176, November 5, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
44
Rio-Branco to Rui, Petropolis, December 1, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
45
Rui to Stead, Paris, December 12, 1907, CRB, Haia
Pasta XX.

were printed.

The price was about £160, including world-

wide distribution of 4,000 copies.

46

The articles in both the Review of Reviews and the
Brazil Magazine proved to be very popular in Brazil and the
entire editions of both were sold out soon after they appeared in Rio.

47

Joaquim Nabuco read the Review advertising

supplement on Brazil and was quite pleased with it, although
he conceded it exaggerated Rui's role.

Nabuco sent Root a

copy of the article, and it made a favorable topic of con46

Stead to Rui, London, March 11, 1908, CRB, Haia
Pasta XXIV. On orders from Rio-Branco, Amaral had trans
lated, then persuaded the Herald to publish, the complete
transcript of Rui's speech of August 20th. Rio-Branco now
instructed Nabuco to translate Rui's speech of October 9th.,
and to secure publication in its entirety in the Herald.
Rio-Branco requested that the two speeches be put together
in a pamphlet, "for distribution to influential politicians
there." Rio-Branco wanted the pamphlet to have a preface,
"demonstrating that the major points of our project are the
principles of equality of sovereign states and freedom of
selection of the arbitrators by the litigants, thereby
conserving in the makeup of the new permanent court of paid
judges, the organization of 1899." The New York magazine,
The Independent, later published an English translation of
Rui's October 9th discourse, describing it as the most no
table document of the conference. Nabuco requested RioBranco 's authorization to see that the magazine made wide
distribution of the number. Nabuco was forced to stop
distribution of the number after he discovered a long pas
sage in the translation which was not in the published
French version. Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, no. 15,
August 26, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec._partiaily encoded;
Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, no. 26 / i.e., 16_7, Au
gust 26, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; Rio-Branco to Na
buco, Rio, November 4, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.; Na
buco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 11, 1908, AHI,
235/3/2 tel. rec.; and Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington,
January 12,1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec.
47

Rxo-Branco to Rui, Rio, December 7, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XII.

versation among the Washington diplomatic corps.

48

Other publications soon took note of the money spent
by Brazil on advertising and several inquiries were re
ceived, including one from the advertising firm which pub
lished Chamber's Journal.

The editor of Chamber1s was

hoping to reproduce, in whole or in part, the Review article
for E15 per page.

He closed his appeal by saying that the

magazine "is read by the best class of people, and should,
we think, appeal to you for the purpose of the publicity
which you are desiring to obtain."
*

*

49
*

Just as it appeared that Brazil was

making excellent

progress in her relations with the foreign press, a new
threat

emerged. The

sivedispatches

New York Herald began publishing exten

from Aubrey Stanhope, their

pondent at The Hague.

special corres

Stanhope was very derogatory of Bra

zil and the position her delegate was alleged to have taken.
Rio-Branco was furious about what he considered unfair
treatment of Brazil and instructed Rui to cable the complete
text of the Brazilian proposal, including punctuation, to
48

Nabuco to Root, Washington, December 18, 1907,
AJN; and Nabuco to Rui, Washington, December 31, 1907, CRB,
Pasta J. Nabuco.
49
John Haddon to Rui, London, November 22, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XXV. During the conference, Rio-Branco was
always concerned with the mood of the press, at home and
abroad. For selected examples see: Rio-Branco to Rui,
Rio, no. 79, August 15, 1907; no. 80 bis / i.e., 80A_7 t Au
gust 16; no. 103, August 22; no. 105, August 22; no. 123,
August 28; no. 124, August 28; no. 128, August 30; and
Petropolis, no. 155, September 20, 1907,
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Amaral the Brazilian chargS

in Washington.

The Baron then

instructed Amaral to make a careful English translation,
which the Herald agreed to publish.

The complete transcript

and associated comments and portraits of Rui and Rio-Branco
occupied the front two pages of the August 26th issue of the
50
paper.
Rio-Branco also cabled Lemgruber Knopf about Stan
hope and said,
Spe if you can convince him that in Brazil the govern
ment and the people are completely siding with our am
bassador and that now, informed of the situation, all
of the governments of South America and Mexico are sid
ing with us.51
The Brazilians were unable to convince the journalist and
Stanhope, evidently relishing the role of gadfly, wrote Rui
the following letter requesting an interview:
Your Excellency
In view of the attacks being made upon you as
wrecker and general obstructor of the Conference, I
think perhaps you might wish to say Something for pub
lication. Accordingly I place myself at your disposi
tion & beg you will give me a reply "Yes" or "No." If
yes, please let me know at what hour I can see you.52
50

Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington, August 21, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington,
August 22, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.? Amaral to RioBranco, Washington, August 23, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel.
rec.? Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 105, August 23, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XI? Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, no. 15, Au
gust 26, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially encoded?
and Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, no. 26 / i.e., 16_7,
August 26, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.
51

Rio-Branco to Lemgruber Knopf Brazilian Legation
at The Hague, Rio, August 26, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9 tel. exp.
52
Aubrey Stanhope (Special Correspondent of the New_
York Herald) to Rui, The Hague, Wednesday / August 28, 1907/
CRB, Haia Pasta XXV.
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Rui immediately replied to the journalist:
Dear Sir,
I shall be very glad to receive you, and talk with
you on any subject, and whenever you wish, but I will
not defend myself against the gratuitous and injurious
imputation of being the "wrecker and general obstructor
of the Conference."
As a representative of my country I do not care
about anything except doing my duty according to my con
science, the instructions of my government and the opin
ion of my countrymen.
Besides this my behavior is fully
explained & justified in the considerations preceding
my proposal, which have already been published in their
entirety in the New York Herald's United States' edi
tion. 53
Rui considered the matter closed, but much to his surprise,
Stanhope appeared unannounced at his hotel that afternoon
and for almost an hour attempted to intimidate the Brazilian
ambassador with "incredible charges."

54

The correspondent

had already filed a derogatory dispatch to the Herald that
same day before he went to see Rui.

Stanhope was evidently

attempting to gather material to justify the report he had
55
filed. 3
Amaral sent an eleven-page telegram to Rio-Branco
with extensive quotes from the New York Herald of August
28th.

The dispatch from Stanhope at The Hague was very de

rogatory to Rui and to the Brazilian position in opposition
53

Rui to Stanhope, The Hague, August 28, 1907, CRB,
Despachos & Cartas? penciled rough of same in CRB, Haia
Pasta XXV.
54

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 77, August 28,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
55

See Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 127, August 29,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
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to the American proposal for a permanent court.

56

Stan

hope's telegram, published in the Herald, contained numerous
quotes from "South American" and other unidentified dele
gates belittling Rui's conduct at the conference.

Rio-

Branco immediately ordered Amaral to speak with the editorin-chief about the matter in the name of the Brazilian gov57
ernment.
Rui refuted Stanhope's report of an interview with
him, saying he never granted an interview, but limited him
self to a rebuttal, which he had'already sent by letter.
Rui learned from an acquaintance that Stanhope had been sent
to see Rui by Horace Porter, a member of the American dele58
gation.
Rio-Branco felt that Stanhope had "exaggerated
Rui Barbosa and injured Brazil" by his "indelicate comport
ment," and by publishing many lies including one in which
he said Brazil was no more than a country of negroes.

59

The

Brazilian foreign minister also said that Stanhope's in
trigues were very prejudicial to the influence of the United
States in Brazil and to the friendly posture of Roosevelt
56

Amaral to Rio-Branco, Atlantic City, August 28,
1907, A H I , 235/3/1C tel. rec.
57

Ibid.; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 127, August
29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
58
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 84, September 1,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
59

Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, September 1, 1907, AHI,
235/3/15 tel. exp.
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and. Root.**®
*

*

*

Brazil also carried on her public relations campaign
by entertaining lavishly.

Social functions were an indis-

pensible part of diplomacy at the Second Hague Conference
and Brazil accepted the challenge.

The Brazilian delegation

became known for its hospitality, and its banquets were
61
noted as among the most lavish at The Hague.
Even before the work of the conference began, it was
obvious that there was quite a bit of importance attached to
social events and that social life would demand as much of
the delegates as would the conference sessions.

62

The Dutch

queen, government, and aristocracy, as well as the delegates
gave dinners for each other throughout the summer.

One of

the largest receptions was given by the American delegation
on July 4th.
60
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 131, September 1,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no.
128, August 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.

61

Stead said, "The dinners of the Conference were
almost as useful as its proces verbaux. And the Brazilian
dinners were the most magnificent of all. At the Palace
Hotel sixty-six dinners were given by the various delega
tions between June 14th and August 28th. Of these Brazil
gave eight— the same number as France— Germany gave nine,
the United States thirteen. As a host Brazil was among the
greatest of the great Powers in the number of her banquets.
But in the splendor and luxury of her hospitality she was
easily the first of all the nations." Stead, "Brazil at The
Hague," p. 18.
62

Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 198;
and Hull, Two Conferences, p. 18. Rui would later say,
"The terrible weight of banquets is now almost unbearable."
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 31, August 2, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX.
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The South American delegations in particular vied
with each other and with some European delegations in showing hospitality.

63

However, the Brazilians exceeded most of

the others in expenditures and lavish decorations for their
banquets.

"Nothing came up to the Brazilian dinners for the

good taste and magnificence of floral decoration, and the
fascination of the combined effect of music, mirrors, lights,
paintings, flowers, and foliage."

64

Indeed the banquet

given on August 8th in honor of the nations of the New World
was acknowledged to be the most ostentatious of the entire
conference.^
At this most lavish Brazilian banquet, the hall of
the Palace Hotel was decorated in a tropical motif evocative
of Rio de Janeiro.

There was a miniature lagoon surrounded

by palms, ferns, and orchids, all brilliantly illuminated
with various combinations of electric lights.
63

Flowers for

Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 198;
and Hull, Two Conferences, p. 18. Choate, the head of the.
American delegation, said, "The delegates, among them
selves, exchanged civilities not always according to their
wealth and ability, but ever in the same cordial and fra
ternal spirit, and it will not surprise you to hear that
our delegation, although making the utmost of the modest
allowance made to it by the State Department for that pur
pose, was left far in the rear by some of the younger South
American nations, who seemed to place in the hands of their
delegates the means of most rich and brilliant entertain
ments." Choate, The Two Hague Conferences, p. 90.
64
Stead, "Brazil at The Hague," p. 18.
65
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no, 41, August 9,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Courrier de la Conference, Au
gust 9, 1907; Courrier de Scheveningen, August 9, 1907; and
Diario de Noticias, August 12, 1907.
66Ibid.
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decorating the tables and halls cost in excess of £300, and
many of them were specially imported from London and
Paris.

67

The extravaganza made a great impression, espe-

cially on the Americans.

68

The dinner given for the Euro

peans two weeks later was also a big success, with ten am
bassadors present.

In reference to this latter occasion Rui

said, "If nothing else we at least left the extraordinary
impression of cultured good taste."
*

*

69
*

In summary, Rio-Branco sought to use the occasion of
the Hague Conference to publicize Brazil and he expended
large sums for printed materials and extravagant banquets.
r

This public relations campaign began with an attempt to gain
the sympathy of influential correspondents at The Hague.
Rui, at the urging of Rio-Branco, made the acquaintance of
William T. Stead, an influential British journalist and pro
prietor of the Review of Reviews.

Stead, as editor of the

Courrier de la Conference, gave extensive and sympathetic
coverage to the Brazilian delegation, especially after RioBranco had agreed to place an expensive advertising supple67

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 41, August 9,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Stead, "Brazil at The Hague,"
p. 19.
68
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no, 41, August 9,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Rui quotes the Courrier de la
Conference and Courrier de Scheveningen concerning the
"extravagant and incomparable banquet." Rui to RioBranco, The Hague, no. 43, August 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta
XX.

69

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 64, August 23,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

ment in his illustrated magazine.
The Brazilians gained additional exposure by spon
soring publication of other articles and pamphlets, which
were given world-wide distribution.
keenly aware of adverse publicity.

Rio-Branco was also
Upon publication of

anti-Brazilian material in the New York Herald, he immedi
ately sent Amaral for a personal interview with the editor.
Brazil also furthered this public relations campaign by
entertaining lavishly at many extravagant banquets, sparing
no expense to make a favorable impression on the conference
delegates.
Next to be examined is the dilemma posed by the
clash between personal status and national status in the
relationships among the three Brazilian leaders.

The fol

lowing chapter will deal with personal differences and show
how they were overcome in promoting the interests of their
country.

CHAPTER VII
PERSONAL IDIOSYNCRACIES REVEALED
The three Brazilian statesmen most intimately in
volved in the preparations for, and deliberations of the
Second Hague Conference were Baron Rio-Branco, Rui Barbosa,
and Joaquim Nabuco.

These individuals were three of the

leading figures of Brazil at the time and, although they had
disagreements, for the most part they cooperated during the
conference.

The sustained cooperation of Rui was especially

surprising, as it was out of character for him.1

He was a

very independent sort, not disposed to share labors or acco
lades with anyone.

His vacillation in the decision to ac

cept the appointment and his attitude during preparations
for the conference, made Rio-Branco sorry to have nominated
2
him.
Nabuco, for his part, could easily have held a grudge
against both Rui and Rio-Branco because of the manner in
which he was excluded from the conference delegation.

In

deed, some of his friends felt he had been treated unjustly
^acombe, Rio-Branco e Rui Barbosa# pp. 85-86.
2
Graga Arahna to Nabuco, Petropolis, May 28, 1907,
AJN.
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and had every reason to retaliate.

3

Rio-Branco had reason

to be wary of Rui, for as a member of the Brazilian commis
sion negotiating with Bolivia over Acre, he had disagreed so
violently with Rio-Branco and the other member that he had
resigned from the commission.

4

Rio-Branco was in a delicate

position with regard to Rui and Nabuco because, after pri
vately offering to appoint Nabuco as head of the Brazilian
delegation to the peace conference, he chose Rui instead and
withdrew the offer of the leadership from Nabuco.

5

Despite

the potential for conflict, the three men generally ignored
their differences and cooperated in promoting and defending
the interests of Brazil.
Rui worked hard making preparations for the confer
ence after his arrival in Europe.

He continued at a frantic

pace during the first few days of the conference.

Less than

two weeks after the conference began, in his first numbered
telegram to Rio-Branco, he complained that he was already
g

fatigued by the "continuous, exhausting work."

Within a

month of the inauguration of the conference, Rui felt so
overwhelmed by the weight of his responsibilities as dele
gate that he felt they had already exceeded the capacity of
3
Raymundo Bandeira to Nabuco, Rio, April 24, 1907,
AJN.
4
Lins, Rio Branco, pp. 289-93.
5
See above, Chapter II, pp. 41-44.
g

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 1, June 29, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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his weakened health.

7

By July 25th, a week later, Rui told

Rio-Branco that he was so sick that he might have omitted
Q

the number on his last cable.

Rui had now reached the

point where he tendered his resignation:
My telegram in response to the senate alluded to my
poor health-. It is aggravated by fatigue and the ter
rible climate, and now I would like to request to be
relieved of this position which was given me through
the gracious friendship of yourself and the govern
ment. Since the principal work of the conference is
done, Lisboa could perfectly well complete the rest.9
Rio-Branco quickly responded to Rui's request to
leave the conference and come home.

He said President Pena

was very upset with the prospect of his resignation and
wanted him to continue.

Furthermore, if Rui left, Rio-

Branco felt that it would be interpreted as a break with the
government.^

Rui then protested that Rio-Branco had read

more than he intended into his cable.

He went on to say

that he was sincerely dedicated to the Baron, and that if
he and the government considered his continuation necessary,
he would not insist on leaving."^

In reply, Rio-Branco in

structed Rui to avoid fatigue, and, to boost his morale,
praised him highly for a speech he had made nearly a month
7
Rui to President of the Senate (Rio), The Hague,
July 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
g

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 23, July 25,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
^Ibid.
■^Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 43, July 25, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.
■^Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 24 (reservado),
July 26, 1907, Haia Pasta XX.

earlier.^-2
Evidently the actual event that sparked Rui's at
tempted resignation was related to a garbled telegram re
ceived in Rio from The Hague.

Rui had cabled a resume of

the French text of his latest speech and Rio-Branco had then
requested a re-transmission m

Portuguese.

13

Rui reacted as

if he supposed the request was made in order'to reprimand
him.

14

However, Rio-Branco immediately assured Rui that he

had only requested a Portuguese resume because of errors in
transmission and recording of the original cable, that he
was very busy with official correspondence, and that he per
sonally handled the task of giving public notice based on
correct communication from Rui and desired, soon after
looking

over Rui's dispatches, to be able to give them to

15
the wire service of the Jornal do Commercio.
Within two weeks of this incident Rui was again com
plaining about how hard he was working.

He felt that he was

not getting any help from the other delegates, whom he felt
12

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 44, July 27, 1907,
Haia Pasta VIII. Rio-Branco explained his delay in sending
congratulations by saying that only the day before had he
read the June 28th speech of Rui in its entirety.
13
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 41, July 24, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VIII. The text reads in part:
"Resume of
the speech translated here with some errors. . . . Request
you send me a Portuguese resume to be communicated to the
newspapers. Rio Branco"
14
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 23, July 25,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio. no.
41, July 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.
15
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 42, July 25, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.
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were even creating difficulties for him.

Of the secretaries

he observed that the only useful one was Fernando Dobbert,
his nephew. ^
After Amaral's futile attempts in Washington to
persuade the Americans to modify their proposal relative to
the Court of Justice, Rui again submitted his resignation.
In reply, Rio-Branco cabled Rui praising his work and say
ing, "We expect that you will finish the work there and we
are sure that you will complete it with advantage for the
country and the augmentation of your prestige."

17

It is

probable that the subtle references to the president (i.e. ,
"we") did not go unnoticed by Rui.

Rio-Branco also evi

dently organized a "fan club" to further boost Rui's ego,
because 'in the next several days Rui acknowledged numerous
18
telegrams of congratulations.
Although again agreeing to continue, Rui was very
disillusioned with the work of the conference.

19

He ca-

16

Rui .to Senator Azeredo, The Hague, August 12,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX, partially encoded, translation
supplied. Rui reiterated the statement about Dobbert after
the close of the conference. Rui to Azeredo, The Hague,
October 22, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
17

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 86, August 17, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta X.
18

See, for example, Rui to Ministro Industria, The
Hague, August 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Governador Estado Bahia, The Hague, Aug. 22, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta
XX; Rui to Secretario Camara Deputados, Estado Minas, The
Hague, Aug. 22, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Maria
(cable address for Rui's communications with his family in
Rio), The Hague, August 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
19

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 64, August 23,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

bled his son about the frantic pace he was maintaining at
the conference:

"Tell Carlito and all our friends who in

quire about the absence of letters from us.
imagine our lives.

You can not

Despite this, the family has written,

but I shall only be able to do so after the conference."

2Q

Rui continued to complain about the pace he was
forced to maintain and said there simply was not enough
time to do everything, and informed Rio-Branco that he was
always absorbed with work from five o'clock in the morning
until midnight.

21

Just a week before the conference ad

journed, he cabled his family in Rio that he was, "sick,
disanimated, and disgusted and I am seriously thinking of
withdrawing completely."

22

At the close of the conference, Rui felt his health
had suffered from continuous overwork:
Also it is necessary for me to leave on Sunday for
Paris with my family, the more so because of the re
action against four months of continuous work, and be
cause the labors have caused a considerable deteriora
tion in the state of my health.
I have thus concluded
my mission here and am only awaiting your last instruc
tions and orders.23
Rui became very indignant when he did not receive a
cable from Rio-Branco for two days.

He sent a "hot" tele-

20

Rui to Tenente Ruy Barbosa, The Hague, August 25,
1907, Haia Pasta XX.
21

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 96, September 7
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
22Rui to "Maria," The Hague, October 10, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX.
23
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 135, October 16
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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gram to Senator Azeredo saying he was afraid this was an
intentional censure:

"This absurd silence causes fright

here, everyone taking it as an expression of intentional
censure, rather than the gratitude I deserve."

24

Rui also

sent telegrams to his family and to Senator Pinheiro Macha
do, requesting immediate intervention of the latter to bring
25
to an end the "enigmatic" silence of Rio-Branco.
Rui also
sent a telegram to the president, informing him that his
mission would end with the signing of the conventions on the
following Saturday, October 19th.

He attempted to neutral

ize the imagined censure by Rio-Branco in his closing re
marks:

"I did my best to honor our country and I believe

that I left her greater in the eyes of the world.
your orders."

I request

26

What had happened in Rio was that Rio-Branco found
it necessary to leave his post for a trip to Sao Paulo.
The Hague Conference had continued longer than was antici
pated and Rio-Branco felt he must go as planned.
he had Rui's telegrams forwarded to him.

While away

Rio-Branco had in

formed Rui of the trip and of his intention to return to Rio
27
on Sunday, October 6th.
On the same day that he sent the
24

Rui to Azeredo, The Hague, October 17, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX.
25

Rui to Pinheiro Machado, The Hague, October 17,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to "Maria," October 17,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
26
Rui to Pena, The Hague, October 17, 1907, AAP.
27
—
Rio-Branco to Rui, Petropolis, no. 161 / A _ 7 ,
October 2, 1907, CRB, Hague Pasta XIII.

telegrams to Senator Pinheiro Machado, Senator Azeredo, and
President Pena complaining of Rio-Branco's silence, Rui re
ceived two cables from the foreign minister which explained
his lack of correspondence.

28

He explained that he had not

made any transmissions from the 13th to the 16th of October
because of other urgent business and because of great fatigue from his trip to Sao Paulo.

29

In a third telegram he

said that he also had been preoccupied with communicating
to the press about the Hague Conference.

Rio-Branco then

attempted to smooth Rui's ruffled feathers with a bit of
praise:

"Without a representative of your stature, Brazil

could not have attained the position which she won in this
conference."

30

Rui was conciliatory, thanking Rio-Branco

for his praise and in turn praising the foreign minister:
"We never could have gotten the result which we obtained if
I had not been able to count on your solidarity, support,
and the aid of your brilliant zeal and patriotism."
*

*

31

*

Nabuco had never doubted that Rui would make a good
delegate for Brazil at the Hague Conference.

Shortly before

28

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 136, October 17,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
29

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 170, October 17, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XIII; and no. 171, October 17, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XIII.
30
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 173, October 18, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XIII.
31

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 136, October 17,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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the conference opened he wrote the following to a friend:
"I always felt Ruy Barbosa would assume his natural level in
the Conference, rising above all others by intellectual
power and euridition."

32

Nabuco apparently had no animosity

toward Rui because of the events surrounding the selection
of the Brazilian delegate to the Hague Conference.

He ac

cepted a secret mission to Europe, in spite of his poor
health, and provided Rui with useful information and advice,
both before and during the conference.
After meeting with Rui in Paris and delivering to
him the confidential notes on conference delegates, Nabuco
went to take the curative waters of European spas.

He evi

dently followed the conference proceedings in the press, but
had little direct contact with the conference or conference
delegates for almost two months.

By the middle of August

his health was much better and he began to take more inter
est in the conference deliberations, where he took note of
the controversy over the method of selecting judges for the
proposed permanent court of arbitration.

33

Nabuco was strongly opposed to the American formula
for the selection of judges, and declared that he disap
proved the classification of nations into categories of
great and small in a court of justice.

If that were to be

the case, he felt it would have been better if the great
32

Nabuco to Rodrigo Octavio, Vittel, France, July 4,

1907, AJN.
33

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Wiesbaden, August 17, 1907,
ABR-B, 74/2 recibidas.
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powers had not invited the others, but had simply reached an
agreement among themselves.

34

However, despite this opposi

tion, Nabuco was not convinced that support of the equality
of all nations was in Brazil's best long-term interest.

35

He was pleased with Rui's success, and wrote:
My Dear Ruy
You can imagine the satisfaction which your tri
umphs have given me and the pleasure with which I view
the repercussions of them in our country. Your agency
has doubtless sent you numerous newspaper clippings in
which the position you have won at the Conference is
—recognized throughout Europe. Today I received a let
ter from Prozor in which he told me how you commanded
the respect of the Conference and that your Speeches
are no longer measured by length, but by weight.36
Nabuco told Rui that he appreciated the difficult decisions
Rui was forced to make at the conference:
I greatly sympathize with the delicate position in
which you find yourself, forced by national dignity to
combat the accord reached by the great Powers on the
Prize Court, and I hope that a solution will be pos
sible which will satisfy it / i.e., the national dignity_7.
I understand that your opposition on this point
was above all on principle, with the fear, or foresight,
that if the system of rotation were voted for the Prize
Court without change, then it would be inevitable that
it would be applied to the Court of Arbitration.37
Nabuco denounced the system of rotation of judges, and felt
that this issue would determine whether or not the small
34

Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Wiesbaden, August 17,
quoted in Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 145, September 7,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
35

hand.

Undated, unaddressed letter fragment in Nabuco's
(See footnote 41, below.)
36

Nabuco to Rui, Langenschwalbach, August 26, 1907,
CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco. The draft of this letter with the
date of August 27, 1907, is found in AJN.
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nations would leave the conference in a better position than
when they entered.
The Brazilian ambassador to Washington then made
some astute observations about the actions of the American
delegation at the peace conference:
I do not understand the attitude of the American Dele
gation on the point / of rotation_7/ for it appears
they have lost sight of our Continent, preoccupied only
with an accord among the great Powers, who quickly
would involve the United States in the belligerent sys
tems which they represent. The American spirit of magnamity is evident in the organization of the Pan Ameri
can Bureau, in which the vote of the United States with
her 80 million population is equivalent to that of Pan
ama or Honduras. The American delegation at The Hague
is now deviating most surprisingly from that spirit.38
In closing, Nabuco congratulated Rui for the brilliance with
which he defended the equality of sovereign states and their
equal right to permanent representation in any institution
founded by the Hague Conference.

However, Nabuco was evi

dently afraid his remarks would be misconstrued and he ap
pended a postscript to explain that his remarks about equal
ity of sovereign states of different sizes did not apply to
parliaments and tribunals, where the law of proportion must
be respected.

39

As the conference wore on, Nabuco became more and
more concerned about the situation at The Hague.

Rui's

"triumphs" were being proclaimed around the world, and Na
buco felt there would be a reaction and Brazil might be the
loser in the long run:

AiJ4.U t

39

Ibid.

We noisily triumph, with bursts of fireworks end
rockets. Diplomatic victories must be very modest in
order not to disgrace the vanquished. There has al
ready been much shouting about the "defeat" of Drago
by Ruy; now they will shout about that of the United
States! Rui has filled a most brilliant role, but he
would be the first to desire that during the rest of
the Conference not the least resentment arises between
us and the United States. Our grudge might be settled,
but at what cost.40
Nabuco was concerned for the future of Brazilian-American
relations, and the ambiguity of Brazil's stance:
Our interest is a quasi alliance with the United
States, a perfect accord. A Brazil supported by Ameri
can friendship would be a much more secure field. . . .
I sympathize very much with the difficult position of
Ruy, faced with the accord of the great Powers in the
proposal, which he feels forced by national dignity to
combat. But since we would not be able to prevent the
fact of unanimity if it were to be done without us,
protesting the entire project in the name of equality
of sovereign States is tenuous on our part, because we
aspire to be counted among those selected.
I do not
attach as much importance to the composition of the
Prize Court, as to that of the Court of Arbitration.41
It became obvious that the Hague Conference was
going to last much longer than Nabuco had anticipated and
he began to make plans to return to his post in Washington,
even before it ended, if necessary.

However, he felt that

it was absolutely essential that he see Rui before he left
Europe.

He wanted to reassure Rui of the good intentions

of the American government at the conference and to hear
directly from Rui the story of his relations with the Amer40

Nabuco to Gurgel do Amaral, Bad Langenschwalbach,
September 5, 1907, AJN.
41

Undated, unaddressed letter fragment in Nabuco's
hand, with notation, "Not sent," also in Nabuco's hand.
This fragment was very likely originally written as a part
of the above letter to Amaral (see footnote 40}.
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ican delegation
tions.

whiich. apparently contradicted those inten

Nabuco wished to discern whether or not Rui was

satisfied with the attitude of the Americans, or if there
had been any misunderstanding in relation to their attitude.
He wanted to meet Rui in Paris, but said he would come to
The Hague, if necessary, to talk with him.

42

Rui was very busy and apparently did not relish a
meeting with Nabuco, where the seasoned diplomat would cer
tainly pressure Rui to settle his differences with the Uni
ted States delegation.

He did not respond to Nabuco for

eleven days, then sent a cable apologizing for the delay.
Rui gave the excuse that he was very busy and felt that
Brazil's position was becoming more and more tenuous in
relation to the court project.

He reported that the Amer

ican proposaL.had been defeated by the unanimity of the Latin
American nations in opposition to it.

He said there were

new attempts being made to revive the project, but that the
Brazilian government was unalterably opposed to a court
based on inequality of representation.

Rui told Nabuco that

public opinion in Rio was really stirred up over the ques
tion and that Rio-Branco had admirably supported him in the
matter.

He was so busy with daily committees and confer-

ences that he could not go to Paris to meet Nabuco.
42

43

Nabuco to Rui, Langenschwalbach, August 26, 1907,
CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
See also Rui to Rio-Branco, The
Hague, no. 106, September 15, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
43
Rui to Nabuco, The Hague, September 6, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX.

However, before Nabuco received Rui's wire, he ca
bled that he was going to Paris and would be awaiting word
there from Rui.

He also praised Rui's efforts which he said

had caused Brazil to be practically considered one of the
great powers.

44

Nabuco felt that only the strong opposition

of the other Latin

American nations would prevent the Uni

ted States from supporting Brazil for a position in the same
category as the United States.

45

Rui agreed with Nabuco that Brazil needed support
in the stand against the United States and he was pleased
that many nations were siding with Brazil during this deci
sive phase of the conference.

Rui felt that Brazilian pub

lic opinion would take pride in the decisive role of Brazil,
and in a cable to Rio-Branco he proudly referred to Nabuco's
comment that Brazil was being treated as a great power.

46

Despite the crucial point in the conference deliber
ations, Rui finally met with Nabuco in Brussels. Rui..went to
that city on official business, and Nabuco came from Paris
to see him.

Rui was relieved to have a brief respite from

the conference deliberations and gave Nabuco a first-hand
account of events at The Hague to that date.

47

44

Nabuco to Rui, Langenschwalbach, September 7,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII.
45Ibid.
46

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 95, September 7,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
47
Nabuco to Rui, Paris, September 13, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XVII; Nabuco to Virgilio Gordilho, note on back
of calling card, Paris, September 14, 1907, AJN; Nabuco to
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Following his meeting with Rui at Brussels, Nabuco
went to London on September 21st, from whence he departed
for New York on the 24th.

While Nabuco was in London, Rui

sent him a number of documents pertaining to the conference
and brought him up to date on the latest happenings at The
Hague.

48

Nabuco felt that with the materials and the first

hand report from Rui, he better understood the situation and
the reason for Brazil's stance at the conference.

He wrote

Rui that on the basis of these documents, cable traffic at
the embassy, and conversations with his contacts in Washing
ton and with Gurgel do Amaral (Brazilian charge in his ab
sence) ,
I believe the letters of Choate and other American
delegates attempt to make Brazil the scapegoat of the
Conference in the eyes of President Roosevelt and Amer
ican public opinion. With the documents you sent me I
can proceed to demonstrate the spirit which animated
Immediately upon his return to Washington, Nabuco
set about to neutralize the anti-Brazilian feeling there.
He continued to worry about the repercussions of the Hague
Rui, Paris, September 14, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII; Rui
to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 106, September 15, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Nabuco, The Hague, September 14, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Nabuco to Rui, Wimerux, The Netherlands,
September 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII; Nabuco to Rodrigo
Octavio, Wimerux, September 18, 1907, AJN; and Rui to RioBranco, The Hague, no. 107, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia
Pasta XX.
48

Rui to Nabuco, The Hague, September 22, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX; and Nabuco to Rui, London, September 24,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII.
49
Nabuco to Rui, London, September 24, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XVII.
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Peace Conference, and its effect on Brazilian-American rela
tions.

Nabuco feared that Brazil's perceived success had

caused her to temporarily forget her dependence on the Uni
ted States.

At times the Brazilians seemed to think that

Brazil, and not the United States, was the greater power.

50

Nabuco was very disheartened by the Hague Peace Con
ference, and felt that his efforts in Washington were all in
vain and that politically, he had no real reason to remain
as ambassador.

He pessimistically wrote to Graga Aranha:

The Hague undid all of my work, which I never con
sidered permanent anyway.
In international relations,
as with people, friendship depends on a continual ex
change of sympathy and a perfect communion of sentiment.
The press there / Rio_7 has represented the Conference
as a duel between Brazil and the United States, termina
ting in our noisy victory.
It has placed Root in a con
tradictory position. . . .51
Nabuco decried the fact that for a while the impression of
the conference affected Brazilian sympathy for the United
States, but he believed that soon the mood would pass, and
after the planned reception for the American Naval fleet in
Rio, the situation would return to the idyllic one which
existed during Secretary Root's visit.

52

Nabuco felt that

the saga of The Hague was an abberation, a mistake of Mr.
Choate, made while Root was very sick.
50

53

Nabuco to Rodrigues Alves, Washington, January 7,

1908, AJN.
51

Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, December 5,

1907, AJN.
52

Nabuco to Rodrigues, Washington, December 29,
1907, AJN.
53
3 Ibid.
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Nabuco was of the opinion that Rui deserved recogni
tion for the long months at The Hague where he was "always
fresh and ready to fight" for the rights of Brazil.

To Rio-

Branco he wrote a long letter suggesting that a great recep
tion be prepared for Rui upon his return to Brazil.

Nabuco

felt that all Brazilians could take pride in the reputation
of a cultured nation which Rui had created for Brazil.

54

Nabuco also congratulated Rui on his brilliant de
fense of the principle of absolute equality of all states in
international organizations.

On the other hand, the Brazil

ian ambassador to Washington did not personally agree with
that principle because he faced the same situation in the
f

Bureau of American Republics where the island of Santo Domingo, with two-nations, had more value than Brazil.

55

Na

buco felt that Brazil had taken the position she did at The
Hague in self defense, but lest she feel it had really mag
nified her position, it should be remembered that she had
not gained anything more than had Haiti and Santo Domingo.
He was convinced that the only real gain made by Brazil at
the conference was the reputation she had gained of a cultured nation.

56

Although Nabuco was aware that Rio-Branco was
closely orchestrating Rui's performance at The Hague (see
54
Nabuco to Rui, Washington, October 22, 1907, CRB,
Pasta J. Nabuco; draft of the letter in AJN.
55Ibid.
56Ibid.
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below, especially page 166),

he persisted in flattering Rui

and giving him credit for any accomplishments at the confer
ence.

Nabuco was motivated by friendship with Rui, by a de

sire to boost Brazil through her conference delegate, and by
a hope that Rui's new popularity and political ambitions
would somehow distract Rio-Branco from his anti-American
stance.

Thus with this tactic of promoting Rui, Nabuco

hoped to simultaneously boost Brazilian prestige, begin res
toration

of

the special Brazilian-American relationship,

and repay Rio-Branco for his attempt to undermine Nabuco1s
position and influence in Washington.
*

*

*

There has been disagreement over the amount of free
dom that Rui was allowed in the making of decisions relative
to Brazil's posture at the Hague Conference.

57

Opinion has

ranged from the assumption that Rui single-handedly made the
decisions, to the assertion that all decisions were made in
Rio.

58

Graga Aranha, as a functionary of the Foreign Minis57

Contemporary opinion was also divided over the
issue. Hilario de Gouveia reported, "The stance of Rui at
the Hague Conference has made a great impression here, some
attributing everything to Rui, others to Rio Branco, de
pending upon their particular sympathies." Hilario to Na
buco, Rio, September 3, 1907, AJN.
58

See Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui Barbosa, pp. 8990; Freyre, Ordem e Progresso, I, p. 236; Viana, Vida de
Rio Branco, pp. 381-85; and Accioly, "0 Barao do Rio Branco
e a 2a Conferencia da Haia," pp. 64-68. Rio-Branco and Rui
themselves gave different versions at different times and
under various circumstances. For example:
Cl) Rio-Branco
in a speech to a group of students said that the work of the
conference was done by Rui, and he only exchanged ideas with
him and transmitted the ideas of the president on different
questions. Rio-Branco, speech, Rio, December 28, 1907,
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try in Rio, observed that portion of the Hague drama at
close range and offered this opinion of Rui's contributions:
There is nothing original in the stance of Rui at
the Conference.
He has done nothing more than polish
and amplify the orders and ideas of Rio Branco. . . .
He
Rio-Branco_7 has sent to The Hague all of the true
feelings of his antipathy at the Conference, all of his
secret thoughts on the question of arbitration and on
the collection of public debts. The telegrams which are
sent to Rui are decisive, definite, and detailed. . . .
Rui shall have an ostentatious reception for having de
veloped the ideas of Rio-Branco and for being the
"paladin" of the weak and overwhelmed nations at the
Conference. What a c o m e d y ! 59
What is readily apparent is that there was a great
deal of communication between Rio-Branco and Rui as is at
tested by the large volume of telegraphic communications between the two during the conference.

60

Cables were ex

changed on an almost daily basis, often with several sent on
A Imprensa, December 30, 1907, p. 1.
(2) Rio-Branco told
the Chilean minister that at The Hague Rui "acted strictly
under orders." Chilean Minister (Rio) to Minister of For
eign Relations (Santiago), Rio, December 10, 1907, quoted
in Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 239, footnote 13.
(3) Rui
said that the genius of Rio-Branco aided him greatly at The
Hague. Rui, speech, Paris, October 31, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta
XXII.
(4) Rui later proclaimed that he was not acting di
rectly under orders from Rio-Branco at the Second Hague Con
ference. ^Rui, speech, Juiz de Fora, February, 1910, quoted
in Magalhaes, Rui, o Homem e o Mito, p. 294.
59

Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Rio, August 19, 1907,
AJN. Graga can not be considered a completely impartial
observer, since he worked closely with Rio-Branco and he
felt that Rui had taken the appointment which rightfully
belonged to his close friend, Nabuco.
60There are 184 numbered telegrams (numbers 1-176,
with some numbers duplicated) from Rio-Branco and 144 (.num
bers 1-142, with some numbers duplicated) from Rui, with
additional unnumbered cables bringing the total to at least
377. See CRB, Haia Pasta VII through XIII, and XX. Burns,
Unwritten Alliamce, p. 119, erroneously sets the number at
"nearly 175 telegrams exchanged between them."
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the same day.

Rui was so accustomed to daily contact with

Rio-Branco, that when on one occasion he did not receive a
telegram from the foreign minister for three days, he became
extremely agitated and cabled several friends in Rio re
questing their aid in determining the reason for the si
lence. ^
Before his departure from Rio, Rui had received a
great deal of information and instructions on the anticipated subjects of debate at the Second Hague Conference.

62

This, combined with information sent from Washington, and
monographs from Rui's extensive personal collection, provi
ded the Brazilian representative with ample material for
study before the conference and reference material during
the conference.

During the deliberations at The Hague, Rio-

Branco quite often cabled instructions to Rui by referring
to the appropriate page in one of the volumes of works on
international law.

63

From the opening of the conference Rui followed his
instructions, only asking for clarification in certain
^ S e e above, pp. 153-55.
62

See, for example, the following 22-page letter:
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 21, 1907, AHI, 273/3/1; and the
following telegrams from Rio-Branco to Rui: no. 1 (.June 11,
1907), no. 2 (June 11), no. 3 (June 11), and no. 5 (Junel2),
CRB, Haia Pasta VII.
63
See, for example, Rio-Branco to Rui, no. 3 (June
11,
1907), no. 4 (June 12), no. 31 (July 16), CRB, Haia
Pasta VII.

cases.

64

On one occasion during this early part of the con

ference, Rui failed to follow Rio-Branco's instructions.
The foreign minister immediately brought the failure to
Rui's attention, but assumed that Rui had made his speech
before the arrival of the telegram from Rio.

65

Before long,

Rui began to develop a plan of his own, which was submitted
to, and approved by Rio-Branco.

fi

Rui shared his plan with

Buchanan of the American delegation before submitting it to
the conference.
duce the plan.

The Americans requested that he not intro
Rui felt "very isolated" on the question and

requested "an urgent reply" from Rio-Branco as to whether or
not he should present the project.

67

Rio was very upset about the American proposal for
selecting judges for the International Court, which placed
Brazil in a category with the very small nations.

Rio-

Branco shared Rui's concern about the proposal and instruc
ted the Brazilian charge in Washington to see Root in an
attempt to prevent introduction of the American plan.

68

It

gave Rui great satisfaction to know that Rio-Branco was in
64

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June_21, 1907, AJN;_
and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 27, / July 29, 1907_/,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
65

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 35, July 20, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VII.
66
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 11, July 14,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX.

68

Rio Branco to Rui, Rio, /"no. 52_J, August 4,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX. Also, see above, Chapter V,
pp. 105-07.
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complete accord with him in reference to the American proposal.

69

Rio-Branco agreed that Brazil must defend herself,

but tempered his response by instructing Rui to defend the
Brazilian position in such a way that it would not be impos
sible for Brazil to agree to a different proposal if their
own ideas did not win out.

70

Rio-Branco was disposed to retain complete control
of Brazil's position at the Hague Conference.

However, as

early as June 19th he had allowed Rui sufficient discretion
to survey the situation and to proceed in the manner that he
felt was most in the national interest:
You, being the first delegate, are the second in com
mand and all the personnel are under your direction.
The communications of the delegation to the government
are to be made by you. You have ample powers so that,
in view of the situation there and of the advantages,
to always maintain the best relations with the other
governments; above all the United States, Chile, Eng
land, Germany, Italy, Prance; and to proceed as it ap
pears most advantageous to the interests of the na
tion. 71
Rio-Branco also recognized that the delegate on the
scene often had a better grasp of the situation than the
government in Rio.

In reference to one proposal to be pre

sented at the conference, Rio-Branco gave Rui the option of
executing the plan he had proposed, or of remaining silent.
"Whichever of these two decisions you take will be accepted
69

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 35, August 5,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
70

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 65, August 9, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
71
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 12, June 19, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VII, partially encoded, trans. supplied.

by us as the most correct."

72

In the discussions relating to the Court of Arbitra
tion, Rio-Branco reminded Rui of the powers conceded to him
earlier, then gave him three possible courses of action,
leaving it to Rui to adopt what he considered the best
course.

73

Despite this concession Rio-Branco still listed

the choices in the order of preference, intimating that it
would be preferable for Rui to select the course most favored by the Brazilian government.

74

Rui however preferred

Rio-Branco's second choice, which he modified slightly.

Rui

felt that Brazil should maintain the position of supporting
the equality of sovereign states, which he had assumed.

He

requested the government's permission to modify the proposal
and he explained that his reasons for this choice were:

to

maintain the friendship of the Hispanic-American countries,
to satisfy his conscience, and to satisfy public opinion.

75

Rio-Branco's second proposal was to defend the organization
of the Permanent Court as provided by the First Hague Con
ference in 1899.

One of the provisions approved by that

conference was that each of the member nations, regardless
72

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 25, July 14, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VII, partially encoded, translation sup
plied.
73
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 71, August 12, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
74

Ibid.; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 83, August
16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X.
75
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 53, August 17,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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of size or power, had equal rights in appointing judges to
the court.^6
Rui continued to insist that Brazil defend the juridical equality of states in international organizations.

77

Rio-Branco finally agreed to discuss the matter in detail
with President Pena.

After the consultation, the Baron ca

bled the government's permission for Rui to continue to defend the principle of the equality of sovereign states.

78

Rio-Branco then sent two telegrams analyzing Rui's proposal
in detail, and telling him, paragraph by paragraph, what was
acceptable.

79

There continued to be a great deal of discussion, by
cable, between Rui and Rio-Branco on the principle of equal
ity of sovereign states, especially in reference to the se
lection of judges for a permanent court.

The foreign minis

ter allowed Rui to defend the principle for the time being,
but Rio-Branco was prepared to abandon it at the proper
time.

Rui continued to insist that Brazil must defend that
76

—
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, / no.
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX; Rio-Branco to
August 15, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X; and
Rio, no. 83, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia

52_7, August 4,
Rui, Rio, no. 79,
Rio-Branco to Rui,
Pasta X.

77

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 67 (August 24,
1907), no. 68 (August 24), no. 69 (August 25), CRB, Haia
Pasta XX.
78
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 113, August 25, 1907,
CRB,
Haia Pasta XI; and
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 116,
August 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
79

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 118, August 26, 1907,
CRB,
Haia Pasta XI; and
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 119,
August 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
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position to the end, and that they could not lose, even if
the proposal were defeated.

80

Rio-Branco finally instructed

Rui to abondon the principle of equality and to vote for the
American proposal for the permanent court.

81

Rui strongly

protested the order, declaring that Rio-Branco did not un
derstand the actual situation at The Hague.

Rui believed it

was futile to vote for the project, as both Scott and Buchanan had told him the proposal would be abandoned.

82

Rui

said, however, that he would reluctantly comply with the in
structions of the government:
I shall comply with the instructions, but I know it
will be a great error. If the American project were
to be defeated or withdrawn, we would have the victory
because it would disappear from the field of combat,
defeated by our unique principle. That is the unani
mous opinion here.83
Rio-Branco was persuaded by Rui's appeal, and again gave Rui
permission to proceed in the way that he deemed most advantageous to Brazilian interests.

84

Rio-Branco continued to go along with Rui up to a
point, but would not give Rui permission to maintain his
80
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 79, August 30,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no.
80, August 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to
Rui, Rio, no. 130, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
81
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 132, September 3,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
82

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no, 88, September 4,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
83Ibid.
84
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 134, September 4,1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
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position indefinitely.

Rui continued to insist that Brazil

should maintain her stance, saying that they would change
from winners to losers if it were abandoned.

Rui said he

was absolutely sure of his position and he further stated
that only the support of Brazil was saving the principle of
equality of nations.

He also expressed the opinion that the

Americans would be satisfied with the victory of the princi
ple of equality and that there was no support for the other
Brazilian position, which Rio-Branco favored.
*

*

85

*

Rui attracted a certain amount of attention to him
self by his support of the principle of equality of nations
and his refusal to support the United States' stand on the
selection of judges for the court of arbitration.

Rui's

speech in opposition to the American proposal was widely
printed in the international press and drew a letter of
praise from H. Moulin, professor of International Law at the
French University of Dijon.

86

A special correspondent for

several United States newspapers was sent from London for an
interview with Rui.

The reporter declared to Rui that the

general opinion of the American people supported his posi
tion, and that he intended to correct the earlier erroneous
85

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 112, September
21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
86
H. Moulin to Rui, Dijon, France, September 11,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII. There were many requests for
copies of this speech (see Haia Pasta XXV).
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report of the Herald correspondent.

87

In Rui's notable speech of October 9th (see above
Chapter V I , pp. 136-37) he unequivocably supported the prin
ciple of equality of sovereign states, and absolutely rejected any possibility of compromise.

88

However, Rui did not

receive permission from Rio-Branco to assume that inflexible
stance until the eve of the speech.

89

Nabuco, for his part,

disagreed with this Brazilian position because it was in
conflict with his goal of Brazilian-American friendship.
The renewed friendship of Rui and Nabuco continued
in spite of the circumstances surrounding the selection of
Rui as the Brazilian delegate to the Second Hague Peace Con
ference and the conflicts between the Brazilian and American
Hague delegations.

During the conference, out of patriotism

and friendship, they continued to cooperate with each other
and with Rio-Branco for the good of Brazil.

90

Rio-Branco,

despite repeated assurances to Rui of his freedom of choice,
maintained firm control over Brazil's position at The Hague,
including many details.

He made most of the apparent con-

87

—
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 102 / A_7* Sep
tember 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
88
Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 147-56.
89

Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 125, October 8,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no.
163, October 8, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII.
90

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December 30,
1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco, draft located in Pasta J. Na
buco; Nabuco to Rui, Washington, December 31, 1907, XXVI;
and Rui to Nabuco, Rio, November 12, 1908, CRB, Pasta J.
Nabuco.
See also Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui, pp. 86-87.

cessions to Rui in order to prevent the resignation of the
Brazilian delegate.

However, Rio-Branco finally did allow

Rui to defend the principle of equality of states to the end
of the conference.

Despite their differences of opinion

over Brazil's stance at the Second Hague Conference, the
three Brazilian statesmen continued to cooperate in the in
terest of patriotism, and they publicly continued to show a
great respect for each other.
The following chapter will describe Rio-Branco's
efforts to enhance the self-image of Brazil and will show
Nabuco's endeavors to prevent Brazilian national pride from
creating a permanent break with the United States.

CHAPTER VIII
NURTURING A NATIONAL IMAGE
During the Second Hague Peace Conference there had
been an outburst of anti-American sentiment in the Brazilian
press, and the American consul in Pernambuco reported that
it began with the manipulation of news dispatches from The
Hague, but soon broadened into a more general antipathy to
ward the united States.^
In Brazil the subject of the Hague Conference was
greatly exaggerated, especially the role of Rui Barbosa.
The press presented Rui as the dominant intellect of the
conference, and proclaimed recognition of that fact by the
leading newspapers of Europe and the United States.

Stead1s

Courrier de la Conf erence was given the same credence as such
papers as the London Times .and Le Figaro, and was widely
quoted to support an exaggerated role for Rui.

The Brazil

ian press especially played up their delegate's antagonism
to Choate, and used that as a pretext to arouse distinct ill
2
feeling against the United States,
Nabuco, Rui and Rio-Branco all cooperated during the
■^George Chamberlin (American Consul) to Assistant_
Secretary of State, Pernambuco, October / i.e. September /
24, 1907, DS, 1113/5.
2Ibid.
-176-
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conference to increase Brazilian prestige.

Nabuco withdrew

from the limelight diring the conference, happy to see Bra
zil boosted, but fearing an end to the special relationship
with the United States.

By his absence he disassociated

himself from the anti-American stance, in hopes that he
could later repair any damage.

Rui accepted all the credit

for Brazil's position at the conference, although it was
dictated by Rio-Branco.

Rui was entirely willing to cooper

ate with Rio-Branco in order to boost his own prestige at
home and abroad.

Rio-Branco boosted Brazil (and inciden

tally Rui) at the expense of the United States, while at the
same time undercutting Nabuco's position.
The Brazilian populace was convinced that as a re
sult of the conference, Brazil's international status was
increased and their country had become recognized as the
ninth power in the world and as a spokesman for all the
smaller nations.

The credit for this achievement was given

to the Brazilian government, especially Rio-Branco, and to
Rui Barbosa, Brazilian advocate before the world powers.
After the conference Rio-Branco reversed the anti-American
stance of the Brazilian press, protesting that the disagree
ments at the conference had been between the leaders of the
respective delegations and not between the two countries.
Nabuco supported and encouraged this renewal of friendship
and did all he would to minimize the damage from the confer
ence to Brazilian-American relations.

Rui, for his part,

reverted to his independent stance, refusing to cooperate in
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repairing the damage.

He really seemed to believe the Bra

zilian press reports of his exploits and his victories over
the representatives of the great powers.

He felt he had

taken a stand based on principle and refused to compromise.
He believed he had gained national and international recog
nition, and he was not about to do anything he felt would
diminish his prestige at home.
Rio-Branco was the person most responsible for the
Brazilian public opinion toward the conference, as he per
sonally edited the telegrams and commentary from The Hague,
preparing the information for release to the press.

3

An example of the exaggerated importance given to
the role of Brazil and her representative at The Hague can
be seen in the following excerpt from a Rio newspaper:
An occasion of pride to all Brazilians should be
the attitude assumed by the eminent chief of our dele
gation at The Hague in relation to our position in the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, being the Anglo-GermanAmerican project.
Thus at this moment all political attention in the
world is turned to the figure of our glorious Ambas
sador, who took the initiative, in accord with our emi
nent Minister of Foreign Relations, of championing for
the nations of the American continent the respect due
to their independence and sovereignty.
The Brazilian proposal formulated by Mr. Ruy Bar
bosa is a proof of the civilization of our country, of
our high judicial spirit, of the conscience with which
we serve the grandeur of the American name. The Hague
Conference gave us the opportunity to call the atten
tion of the world to our country, whose great political
3

Viana, Vida do Rio Branco, pp. 382-83; Rio-Branco
to Rui, Rio, no. 41, July 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VIII;
and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 42, July 25, 1907, CRB, Haia
Pasta VIII.

179
and moral progress found in the genius of Mr. Ruy Bar
bosa its most admirable exponent.4
Among the great number of exaggerated press comments
published in Rio at this time, there appeared only one paper
with a more balanced view of the situation at The Hague:
The classification of Brazil as a power of the fifth
order, the classification proposed to the Hague Confer
ence, is going to arouse many people from a sleep to
which the majority of our population were being put by
the telegrams from over there.
Evidently with the news items which are coming to us
from The Hague it is happening that a great part of the
public is being misled. . . . To them it appears that
the labors of the Peace Conference consist principally
of listening to what Mr. Ruy Barbosa says. The rest is
secondary.
Now, when one reads the European journals, he is
filled with wonder at the contrast. They speak, it is
true, of the work of our representatives, but speak of
them modestly and only occasionally.
. . . . Those who are unacquainted with the rest of
the labors of the Peace Conference are likewise believ
ing that there the entire world turns to make obeisance
to Brazil. For them the exact representation of that
meeting would be that of a numerous group of the most
eminent men of all countries, listening open-mouthed and
awe-struck, to the interminable discourses of Mr. Ruy
Barbosa. The picture appears to them worthy of being
hung alongside that of the gospel which depicts our Lord
as a child amongst the doctors.
Yet nothing is more u n t r u e . 5
The article then explains that other countries obtained re
sults at the conference by quiet diplomacy, rather than by
noisy speeches.

Then it continues:

And this /“quiet diplomacy_7 is what the unmeasured
pride of our Ambassador would never permit him to do. •
Lulled by the music of his own words, accustomed to be
ing treated as an infallible pontiff, he goes on orating
and perorating indefatigably, while others devote them4

"Tribunal de Arbitragem," A Tribuna, August 23,

1907.
^"Ordem do Dia," A Noticia, August 22, 1907.
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selves to tasks less spectacular but infinitely more
useful and affording more practical results for the
nations whom they represent.
Fortunately, however, the case which is now throwing
us into consternation will perhaps not have bad results.
For while the speeches of Mr. Ruy Barbosa may be noisily
going on, the silent diplomacy of our chancery will,
through the execution of telegraphic instructions, do
all that may be possible to correct the ridiculous clas
sification.
If this should be accomplished the ingenu
ous will believe that all was accomplished for the most
part by some interminable memorial or prolix speech of
our Ambassador.6
In light of the situation in Rio, the American am
bassador cabled the following to Washington:

"Exaggerated

importance role of Brazil at The Hague prevalent, suscepti
bilities hurt, the United States blamed, feeling probably
transient but worth quieting."

7

Dudley reported that Rui

was the theme of seventy-five percent of the telegrams pub
lished in Rio from The Hague, and that A Noticia was the
O

only paper not daily eulogizing his work.
President Boosevelt thought that something should be
said to placate Brazil regarding the United States' position
on the Court of Arbitration.

The Department of State

g
Ibid. A Noticia apparently was the only newspaper
which did not follow the official line of the Ministry of
Foreign Relations. The editor of A Noticia blamed the over
emphasis on the actions of Rui on Rio-Branco's practice of
releasing cables from The Hague directly to his friend at
O Jornal do Comm^rcio. The other papers, aware of 0 Jornal's source, closely echoed the sentiments of that very in
fluential paper.
See A Noticia, August 22, 1907; Griscom to
Root, Petropolis, July 16, 1906, DS, 1113/2; and Griscom to
Root, Petropolis, October 13, 1906, DS, 1070/5. Also see
above Chapter II, pages 50-52.
7
Dudley to Root, Petropolis, August 26, 1907, DS,
40/476; a copy of the same is: DS, 40/480.
g
Dudley to Root, Petropolis, August 26, DS, 40/476.
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drafted a statement to be sent to Rio-Branco on the subject
and submitted it to Root at Muldoon's Sanatorium for his ap
proval.

Root endorsed the statement, after adding a para

graph, and it was cabled to Dudley for delivery to the BraQ

zilian foreign minister.

The final text of the cable to

the American embassy in Rio is as follows:
Tell Minister for foreign affairs emphatically: quote:
From the beginning of the Hague conference the delegates
of the United States have in pursuance of their instruc
tions bent every effort to secure satisfactory represen
tation of all our countries in the desired permanent
court. The influence of the sieter /_ sic _/ republics
of the American hemisphere has all been thrown in this
direction.
It is hardly necessary to say that any plan proposed
which might be justly distasteful to Brazil could not
for that reason be entirely satisfactory to the UnitedStates.
At the same time, although we of the American na
tions can arrange our own conferences exactly as we
wish, stil / sic _7, at the Hague, we must all yield
something to European views when consistent with our
dignity and interests. Unless we did this we should
have to dissociate ourselves entirely from the Hague and
its progressive efforts for world-wide peace and har
mony.
The proposal to require that each country shall name
a permanent member of the court is equivalent to defeat
ing the proposed court in which we are much interested
not for our own special benefit but upon general public
grounds. We hope Brazil will not insist upon such a po
sition but will agree to some plan which involves no
discrimination against American nations and no deroga
tion from the sovereignty of any but proceeds upon some
basis by which the selection of a reasonable number of
judges may be accomplished.
It would be most unfortu
nate if the opposition of American republics were to
9
—
-7
Adee to Root, Washington, / September 1, 1907_/,
DS, 40/no number; Root to Dudley, Washington, September 3,
1907, DS,_40/437; and Adee to Choate, Washington, September
6, 1906 J_ i.e., 1907_7f DS, 40/445. Only the first line of
the above cable was coded.
Since the wire was in plain text
it was easily copied by the Brazilian "Secret Service" and
sent to Rio-Branco. Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 134 bis
/ i.e., 134A_7f September 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII, par
tially encoded, translation supplied.
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prevent a practical result for the good of mankind to
which European nations equal in population consent.10
Rio-Branco gave his reply in an interview with Dud
ley and in a subsequent memorandum.^

Rio-Branco persis

tently argued that the differences were between Brazil and
the American Hague delegation, rather than between the two
governments.

Rio-Branco was evidently distressed primarily

because Brazil was not consulted during the preparation of
the court project and was taken aback by the low rank assigned her.

12

The foreign minister was convinced that

Choate was hostile to Brazil and repeatedly criticized the
attitude of the leading United States delegate at The
Hague.

13

Rio-Branco was against establishment of a court of

arbitration, preferring to submit questions of arbitration
to the head of a government.

14

Apparently Rio-Branco was

■^Root to Dudley, Wash., Sep. 3, 1907, DS, 40/437.
11

Dudley to Root, Petropolis, September 6, 1907,
DS 40/444; and Dudley to Root, Petropolis, September 11,
1907, DS, 40/539.
12

Dudley to Root, Petropolis, September 11, 1907,
DS, 40/539.
13

Ibid. Rio-Branco's conviction seemed to be jus
tified when he received news from The Hague that Choate had
purposely omitted Rui's name from a list of judges he con
sidered qualified to serve as members of the proposed court.
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 89, September 5, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Dudley to Root, Petropolis, September 7,
1907, DS, 40/446; and Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, no. 17,
September 6, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp. Rio-Branco then
instructed Amaral to verbally deliver a protest to Root
over the omission of Rui's name from Choate's list. RioBranco to Amaral, Rio, no. 18, September 6, 1907, AHI,
235/3/15 tel. exp.
■^Dudley to Root, PetrSpolis, September 11, 1907,
DS, 40/539.
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reluctant to depart from the method of arbitration he had
used so effectively in delineating the boundaries of his
country.
Despite the disagreement over organization of the
proposed court, Rio-Branco maintained a "most friendly
spirit" in his conversations with the American ambassador.
Rio-Branco said that Brazil was most anxious to maintain
cordial relations with the United States.

He also expressed

the opinion that they had the common bond of both being sus
pected by the Spanish-American countries of a design to con
quer some of their territory or establish some form of protectorate over them.

15

Ambassador Dudley was convinced that Brazil's sup
port of the equality of sovereign states at The Hague was a
pretext to cover her true opposition to the Court of Arbi
tration based on her unfair classification as a fifth-rate
power:
I had a conversation with Dr. da Cunha, of the PeruBrazilian Mixed Commission, an intimate friend and coun
selor of Baron do Rio Branco. He told me that the sole
explanation of Brazil's opposition to the Tribunal has
been what is considered the unfair classification of
that country, an action which is not attributed to you
or the President, but to our delegation at the Hague
acting under instructions which, it is surmised, did not
specifically cover this detail. He further said that
the violation of the equality of nations charged to be
involved in the classification was an afterthought and a
pretext. That objection, it is admitted, has been met
by the amendment, but there is aversion to accepting it
15

Ibid.; and Rio-Branco to Dudley, memorandum, Sep
tember 5, 1907, DS, 40/542.
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upon other grounds.

16

Despite the message from Root which Dudley carried
to Rio-Branco on September 5th, the press in Rio continued
to keep the controversy alive by publishing articles from
American newspapers sympathetic to R u i 's viewpoint, and by
reprinting the offensive and slurring references to Brazil
17
which had appeared in the New York Herald.
*

*

*

During the conference Nabuco was very concerned
about Brazilian-American relations and he was happy to see
that Rui began by supporting the United States.

18

However,

as the relations cooled between the two delegations he be
came increasingly alarmed.

Because of the length of the

conference, it was necessary for Nabuco to return to Wash
ington before the deliberations ended, but he met personally
with Rui before departing for Europe.

He wanted to hear the

story first-hand to be able, if possible, to help repair any
damage to Brazilian-American friendship.

19

Nabuco was

pleased about the publicity Rui and Brazil had received from
the conference, but he wondered at what cost it had been
16

Postscript, dated September 14, 1907, to Dudley to
Root, Petropolis, September 11, 1907, DS, 40/539.
17
Dudley to Root, PetrSpolis, October 14, 1907, DS,
2098/69.
18
Nabuco to Rui, Vittel, France, June 29, 1907,
CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
19

Nabuco to Rui, Langenschwalbach, August 26,1907,
CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco; Nabuco to Rui, Paris, September 13,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII; and Nabuco to Rui, Wimerux, The
Netherlands, September 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII.
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obtained.

Nabuco resumed his duties as ambassador on October
21
2, 1907.
Rio-Branco was anxious to convince him that Bra
zil had been forced to take the position finally assumed at
the conference, "because the dignity of the nation was in
jeapordy."

22

He urged Nabuco to examine the correspondence

at the embassy to verify that fact.

23

Rio-Branco felt that,

after calm reflection, the United States would recognize
that Brazil was proceeding in good faith at the conference
and that the American representatives at The Hague were damaging the hemispheric policy of Roosevelt and Root.

24

Rio-Branco had concluded that the misunderstanding
was with the American delegation at the conference, and not
with President Roosevelt and Secretary Root, who had both
continued to manifest friendship toward Brazil.

25

The Bra

zilian foreign minister felt that there was no need for the
Brazilian government or people to change their attitude
20

1907, AJN.

Nabuco to Rodrigo Octavio, Wiesbaden, August 7,
See above, Chapter VII, pp. 159-62.

21

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, New York, October 3, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; and Nabuco to Robert Bacon (Acting
Secretary of State), Washington, October 8, 1907, DS,
4737/5.
22

—

Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Petropolis, October / 3J
1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.
23
Ibid.

,

24

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 129, August 31, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XXII.
25

Ibid.; and Dudley to Root, Petropolis, September
11, 1907, DS, 40/539.
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toward the United States because of the events at The Hague.
Rio-Branco was convinced that the friendship between the two
countries would not be affected by these events, and he told
American Ambassador Dudley that Root knew that Rui, like
himself and Nabuco, was a sincere friend of the United
States.

26

In reference to the United States, Rio-Branco

said,
Our policy toward that country is unchanged, despite
Choate and the approval which that unfortunate delega
tion received in the message. To us that delegation
was unfaithful to the Pan American policy followed since
Blaine and affirmed on various occasions by President
Roosevelt and Secretary Root.27
Nabuco also chose to believe that Brazil's quarrel
had been with the American delegation, and not with the gov
ernment.

He continued to believe in the good will of Root,

a personal friend:
What a great man, what a good friend! The story of The
Hague was an abberation, a gaffe of Mr. Choate alone, at
a time when Mr. Root found himself almost incapacitated
because of great fatigue, which is still visible today
in his changed expression.28
26

Ibid.; Dudley, however, was dubious about RioBranco' s denial_of anti-American motives, but said that,
"Nevertheless / the denial_7 discloses a pleasing anxiety
to defend and save unimpaired the cordial understanding
between the United States and Brazil brought about by Sec
retary Root's visit to this country." Dudley to Root,
Petropolis, August 26, 1907, DS, 40/476. Dudley could not
understand Rio-Branco's insistence that the Brazilian dis
agreement was only with the U.S. Hague delegation and not
with the U.S. government. Rio-Branco to Dudley, memo,
Rio, September 5, 1907, DS, 40/541; and Dudley to Root,
Petropolis, September 11, 1907, DS, 40/539.
_
27
_
Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, no. 1, January / 2_7,
1907 / i.e., 1908_7, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.
28
1907, AJN.

Nabuco to Rodrigues, Washington, December 29,
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Nabuco was anxious to see Root and clear up any mis
understanding arising out of the conference.

Unfortunately

he would not be able to talk with the secretary of state
until he returned from his trip to Mexico on October 19th.
However, knowing Root's sympathy toward Brazil, and his sta
ture in the government, he did not think the discord between
the two conference delegations would leave any resentment.
Privately, Nabuco was not so optimistic.

29

He felt

that Brazil had been excessivley preoccupied with her own
position at The Hague and had taken the situation too ser
iously.

He said, "We are the only nation which is impas-

sioned over The Hague."

30

Nabuco was so pessimistic that he

told Graga Aranha that, as far as foreign policy was con
cerned, there was no reason for him to continue in his post.
He believed that the conference had undone all of his work
in Washington.

He realized that the friendship between Bra

zil and the United States depended upon mutual respect and
cooperation.

He was distressed that the Rio press had rep

resented the conference as a duel between the two countries,
terminating in a Brazilian victory.

31

He even came to the

point where he believed that Brazilian-American relations
had been so altered that it would have been better if there
29

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, October 5, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no.
162, October 8, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII.
30

_

Nabuco to Tobias / Monteiro_7/ Washington, October
9, 1907, AJN.
31
1907, AJN.

Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, December 5,
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had been no conference:
In reference to The Hague, it would have been better if
there had not been a Conference.
It caused a great con
fusion in our ideas and made us forget for a while that
there is only one possible foreign policy. The American
Delegation was much rebuked; Choate does not have the
ideals of Root in respect to our Continent, but at the
first blow to us Root intervened. The more quickly we
forget this incident, which however served to enhance
the Brilliance of Ruy, the better for us. At times, it
appears that we are the. Great Power and the United
States is the small one.32
Even before he was able to speak with Root, Nabuco
began to make preparations for giving him assurances of Bra
zil's friendship with the United States.

The ambassador

sent a personal cable to Rio-Branco informing him that Edith
Root, daughter of the secretary of state, would marry on No
vember 27th.

Nabuco's wife was planning to leave London on

November 2nd to return to Washington and Nabuco suggested
that she could bring a small wedding gift for the bride-tobe, "if you wish to give Root this proof of friendship."

33

Rio-Branco approved of the idea and Nabuco sent the gift
with an accompanying note:
Dear Miss Root,
I have received from Baron do Rio Branco to hand you
in the name of the Brazilian Government, the accompany
ing little souvenir to remind you,_on your wedding day,
of the interest our people feels / sic J in your future
happiness.
The fact that you marry the grandson of General
Grant, whose name is cherished among us by the proofs he
gave us of his friendship, makes the wedding doubly mem
orable to us.
32

Nabuco to Rodrigues Alves, Washington, January 7,

1908, AJN.
33

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, personal, Washington, Octo
ber 23, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.

With my best wishes believe me
Yours very truely,
Joaquim Nabuco34
While Nabuco in Washington was working to restore
the Brazilian-American pre-conference cordial relations,
Ambassador Dudley in Rio observed that the controversy sur
rounding the debates on the Permanent Court of Arbitration
at The Hague had affected relations between the two countries, but he believed the effect to be temporary.
*

*

35

*

The "fame" of Rui, as trumpeted by the Brazilian
press and in paid magazine articles, preceded Rui to Paris,
Salvador, and Rio.

At each of these places he received a

welcome fit for a conquering hero.

Rui revelled in the adu

lations of his countrymen and acted as if he believed the
reports that he alone had defied the great powers of the
world in the name of Brazil and had been victorious.
Following the peace conference Rui went to Paris,
where he was warmly received by the Brazilian colony.

The

celebration there in the Hotel Continental on October 31st
was highlighted by a discourse by the Brazilian minister in
Paris.

After Rui responded to the speech, he was presented

with a large bronze statue representing Glory crowning
34
Nabuco to Edith Root, Washington, November 9,
1907, AJN.
35
Dudley to Root, PetrSpolis, October 14, 1907,
DS, 2098/69.
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Genius.

36

The symbolism of the gift could hardly have been

more appropriate, for the Brazilians had always considered
Rui to be a genius, and now they felt he had brought glory
and honor to Brazil by his role at The Hague.

This was to

be only the first of several receptions during the course
of his triumphant return to Brazil, culminating in the gala
celebration in Rio.

37

During this period the Rio press re

ferred to Rui as,"The Eagle of The Hague," and the epithet
was echoed with pride by the Brazilian populace.
In 1907 Rui's name was still remembered in connec38
tion with the Encilhamento,
which he was accused of caus
ing by his actions as finance minister nearly twenty years
before.

It was widely believed that his role at The Hague

was calculated to improve his popular image, and he was ac
cused by the American consul in Pernambuco of trying to at
tain this goal at the expense of the good relations with the
36
^
Virginia Cortes de Lacerda and Regina Monteiro
Real, Rui Barbosa Em Haia (Rio de Janeiro: Casa de Rui
Barbosa, 1957), pp. 83-84; and Viana, Vida de Rui, p. 319.
37

On the return voyage there was a jubilant cele
bration in his native Salvador, Bahia, after a port call
in Pernambuco. A planned stop in Lisbon, including an au
dience with the king, was cancelled because Rui's wife in
jured her foot in a fall.
"O Maior Dos Brasileiros," A
Bahia, December 28, 1907; "0 Embaixador Ruy Barbosa," Diario
da Bahia, December 29, 1097 / i.e., 1907_7; Rui to Conselheiro Lampreia, Paris, December 12, 1907; and Rui to Bra
zilian Minister in Lisbon, Paris, December 12, 1907.
38
The Encilhamento was a period of inflation and
easy credit, fuelled by speculation, which produced bogus
companies and unsound finance. This period of financial
instability began in Brazil soon after the overthrow of the
monarchy in 1889, and reached its peak in 1898. Burns, A
History of Brazil, pp. 212, 223.
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United States.

39

Public opinion in Brazil was being prepared by RioBranco for a great demonstration in Rui's honor, upon his
return from Europe— a popular saying at the time was, "Bra
zil was discovered at The Hague."

Part of this preparation

was the exaggeration of his exploits and, coincidentaly, the
denigration of the American stance.

40

An example of the

propaganda is the following material, excerpted from William
Stead's Courrier, which appeared in the Jornal do Commercio
on October 14th:
'But of all the two hundred and twenty-five dele
gates, the man who caused the most profound impression
was Dr. Ruy Barbosa. He is the principal figure of the
Conference. He surpassed for Brazil the emulation of
the other South American powers and conquered the re
spect and admiration of the European delegates.
'When he demanded that the smaller countries should be
represented on the Court of Arbitration on an equal
footing with the Great Powers, . . . / Dr. Barbosa became_7 the real leader of South America in the Confer
ence, and not of South America only but of all the les
ser powers of Europe as well.
'Joseph H. Choate, presenting the American doctrine,
was the champion of the Great Powers.
'I learn that upon his return to his country the
Brazilians will endeavor to make Barbosa president at
the next election. He ought to be a splendid chief
executive.'41
39

George Chamberlin to Assistant Secretary of
State, Pernambuco, October / i. e., September_7 24, 1907,
DS, 1113/5.
40

Dudley to Root, Petropolis, October 14, 1907,
DS, 2098/69; Victor de Sa, Ruy e os Constituintes de 91
(Rio de Janeiro; Departamento De Imprensa Nacional, 1950),
p. 60; and Orlando Ferreira, Ruy Barbosa e Seus Detractores
(Uberaba, Minas Gerais; Typ. Jardim, 1921), p. 93.
^ Jornal do Commercio, October 14, 1907, quoting
Willaim Stead in Courrier de la Conference.
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Outwardly at least, the propaganda in the Rio papers
did not affect the friendliness of the Brazilian government
42
toward the American government.
In fact, both the Brazil
ians and the Americans desired a return to cordial relations
and both sides expressed the hope that the Rio port call of
the "Great White Fleet" in January of 1908 would allow the
opportunity for restoration of the former relationship.

43

Indeed, Dudley felt that relations would soon return to nor
mal for,
Important reasons of self-interest, indeed, strongly
counsel Brazil to cultivate the good-will of the United
States, and I believe it beyond question, notwithstand
ing her recent course, that President Penna and Baron
Rio Branco would sacrifice much to avert its loss.
I
may also observe that, in connection with proceedings
at the Hague, no word has been spoken in Congress in
criticism of the United States.44
The government in Washington took care to advise Nabuco that
cordial feelings were still entertained toward Brazil, and
that the hope was for an eventual satisfactory solution to
the problem of the Court of Arbitration.

45

42

Dudley to Root, Petropolis, October 14, 1907,
DS, 2098/69.
43

Ibid.; Nabuco to Rodrigues, Washington, December
29, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, Jan
uary 11, 1908, A H I , 235/3/2 tel. rec. The naval squadron
was Theodore Roosevelt's sixteen-ship fleet which circled
the globe between December 1907 and February 1909; for an
account of the visit to Rio see Robert A. Hart,. The Great
White Fleet (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965),
pp. 96-121.
44

Dudley to Root, Petropolis, October 14, 1907, DS,

2098/69.
45

Bacon (Acting Secretary of State) to Dudley,
Washington, November 14, 1907, DS, 2098/70.
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Despite Nabuco's continuing support for a close
Brazilian-American friendship, Rio-Branco apparently did not
continue to be so unreservedly pro-American.

By the end of

1907 Rio-Branco had receded from his position where he main
tained that the disagreements had simply been between the
two Hague delegations.

Hilario de Gouveia told Nabuco that

Rio-Branco was now doing his best to minimize the Brazilian
popular support for the United States.

He said that Rio-

Branco had intended to boycott the banquet given in honor of
the American naval squadron, but Rui's last-minute refusal
forced him to attend.

46

Until the end of 1907 the State Department had been
predisposed to believe that Rui was acting on his own ini
tiative in his disagreement with Choate at The Hague.

In a

speech on December 28, 1907, Rio-Branco quoted a portion of
his telegraphic instructions to Rui.

47

When a copy of the

speech was received in Washington, the Second Assistant Sec
retary of State sent it to Root with the following handwrit
ten memo attached:
Dear Mr. Secretary
This will interest you. Rio Branco herein gives the
text of the instructions sent to Ruy Barbosa, upon which
the latter acted in his squabble with Choate.
We had supposed that Ruy Barbosa's egotism and chau
vinism were responsible for his course, but it now seems
that he merely obeyed orders. I suspected as much at
the time, from some remarks made by Gurgel do Amaral in
^Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, Rio, March 10, 1908,
AJN.
47

Rio-Branco, speech, Rio, December 28, 1907, quoted
in A Imprensa, December 30, 1907.

his execution of Rio Branco's cabled instructions to
him*
_
AAA / Alvey A. Adee_/
Nabuco was distressed at Rio-Branco's new attitude
and informed the foreign minister that he should be looking
for a replacement for him if Brazil's foreign policy were to
change from friendship with the United States.

Nabuco also

told Rio-Branco, "You will remember that I only accepted
this post so as to accomplish in it the policy of approximation with America.

..."

49

Later Nabuco wrote a friend,

asking his help to improve the situation in Rio:
During your stay in Rio, do what you can in favor of
the approximation with the United States. . . . You,
who are one of Rio-Branco's intimates and who had a
part in the creation of this Embassy, could render so
great service to the country by sustaining the policy
of approximation. . . ."50
*

*

*

Upon Rui's return from the Hague Conference, he
received a hero's welcome.

A cannon shot rang out from the

fort, causing great excitement among the populace of the
city.

On December 29, 1907, this salute from Morro do Cas-

tello announced that Rui's ship had crossed the bar at the
entrance to the harbor of Rio de Janeiro.

The waiting

crowd, in a delirium of patriotism and gratitude, broke into
48

Adee to Root, memorandum, January 23, 1908, at
tached to: Dudley to Root, Petropolis, December 30, 1907,
DS, 40/689.
49

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 18,
1908, ABR-B, 74/1 recibidas.
50
1908, AJN.

Nabuco to Gomes Feirerra, Washington, February 18,
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spontaneous and enthusiastic applause.

A multitude of

launches, boats, and small steamers escourted the ship as
it slowly entered Guanabara Bay.

A band played continuous

ly, and as the ship passed by, onlookers waved hankerchiefs
and shouted "viva's".
After anchoring, the ship was boarded by the ranking
admiral of the Navy and other high, officials anxious to
greet the returning delegate.

So many persons came aboard

that even standing room was difficult to find.

A represen

tative of the academic community pronounced a beautiful dis
course, effusively welcoming the illustrious Brazilian.
As Rui was transfereed by launch from the ship to
the quay, there was a surge and movement of the throng, at
tempting to catch a glimpse of the great Brazilian.

The

crush of humanity broke the cordon formed by policemen, and
the crowd surged nearer.

As Rui disembarked, he was greeted

by the Brazilian vice-president and the foreign minister.
The Cais Pharoux, the point of debarkation, and the
Praga Quinze de November immediately behind, were gaily
decorated.

Along the quay were rows of flags and banners,

and the lamp posts were completely decorated with foliage.
Scattered about the area were bunches of beautiful fresh
flowers.
Because of the crowd, it was difficult for the dig
nitaries to begin the procession, which finally commenced
with a fanfare of clarions by military bands.

The Avenida

Central was filled with people wanting to greet Rui and thus
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demonstrate to him that his act of "exceptional patriotism"
was appreciated.

People also lined the Avenida Beira-Mar,

and as the procession arrived in front of the Presidential
Palace, the Brazilian President invited the honoree to a re
ception, where he was affectionately toasted by the coun
try’s leaders.
The procession resumed and entered the Rua Sao Cle
mente, which was decorated along its full extent in a fes
tive aspect.

Enormous banners were hung along the street,

and flags of the nations were unfurled from closely-spaced
flag staffs along the route.

Placards were much in evi

dence, with such inscriptions as "The Country Salutes Her
Greatest Son," "Rights Are Equal For All Nations," and "To
The Paladin Of Peace."

The balconies of the buildings along

the street were festooned with bright and festive colors.
A reception was held where a series of multi-colored
electric lights were strung across the street in front of
the residence of the returning delegate.

Here the reception

committee presented him with a plaque which read, "To Ruy
Barbosa, From The People, 30 December 1907."

That afternoon

an official vehicle called to take Rui back to the debarka
tion point for another reception on the quay, where an or
chestra played the National Anthem.
further honored at a gala banquet.
51

That evening he was

51

The above description is based on contemporary
newspaper accounts, especially A Imprensa, December 30 and
31, 1907; and Diario de Noticias, December 30 and 31, 1907.
For the description of a similar reception for Rui held
earlier in Salvador, Bahia, see A Bahia, December 28 and 30,
1907; and Diario da Bahia, December 29, 1907.
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While on opposite sides of the ocean, Rui and RioBranco had managed to cooperate quite effectively in car
rying out Brazil's foreign policy.

However, it appeared

that there might now be a strain in the relations between
the two, for it would be difficult for them to equally share
the glory after Rui's return to Rio.

After Rui's triumphant

return, Rio-Branco was jealous of the spectacular reception
accorded him.

The Baron even boasted of a banquet given in

his own honor, which he said was more extravagant than any
given for Rui.

Rio-Branco was also very critical of Rui for

neglecting to pay him a visit in the ten weeks after his return from Europe.

52

Nabuco, in hopes of dispelling any ill-feelings
against Brazil stemming from the Hague Conference, urged Rui
to accept an invitation from Yale University to deliver a
series of lectures.

53

In May of 1907, at the suggestion of

Root, Rui had been invited to give the 1908 Dodge Lectures
on the theme, "The Responsibilities of Citizenship."

54

Na

buco was grateful to Root for the invitation and said that
it would be a great honor for Rui to speak after the Secre52

Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, Rio, March 10, 1908,

AJN.
53

Nabuco to Rui, London, September 24, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XVII.
54
Yale University to Rui, New Haven, May 23, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XV; Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May
26, 1907, A H I , 235/3/IB tel. rec.; and Nabuco to Root, note,
Washington, May 29, 1907, AJN. See above, Chapter III,
footnote 22, p. 75.

tary, who delivered the 1907 lectures.

55

On behalf of Yale University, John Barrett wrote
some of the university alumni, asking them to contact Rui
and to urge him to accept the invitation.

56

One alumnus,

on his way to Rio via Europe, was sent with a letter of in
troduction from Root to personally invite Rui to give the
Yale lectures, and to answer any questions Rui might have.

57

Mr. Barrett also sent Rui another letter, enclosing a clip
ping from the New York Daily Tribune, which discussed the
benefits of Rui's possible acceptance.

He also requested a

photograph of Rui and urged him to accept the lectureship.

58

During the conference Rui failed to reply to the
Yale invitation, despite repeated urgings of Nabuco and
Yale alumni.

Rio-Branco finally sent an urgent telegram,

encouraging Rui to accept, and explaining that Yale needed a
reply so that in case of a refusal, they would have time to
obtain a substitute.

59

After hearing from Nabuco, Rio-

55

Nabuco to Root, Washington, May 29, 1907, AJN;
and John Barrett to Rui, Washington, June 25, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XV.
56

For example see Elbert J. Baldwin to Rui, Karls
bad, August 3, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV. To Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, a conference delegate, he wrote,
"If you have a chance to talk to him and strengthen the
invitation, I hope you will do so." Barrett to d'Estournelles, Washington, June 29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV.
57

Lee McClung to Rui, aboard the Deutschland, July
4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.
CQ

Barrett to Rui, Washington, July 23, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XV.
59

—
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, / no. 176A_7, December 3,
1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco; another copy in Haia Pasta XI.
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Branco again cabled Rui urging acceptance and informing him
that the trip would be treated as an official mission.

The

foreign minister urgently requested that Nabuco contact Rui
directly, with additional information about the lecture
series.

60

Rui finally decided to decline the Yale invita

tion, giving ill health as the reason.

Nabuco expressed his

regrets to Root over the decision, and Root said that he
understood that fatigue from the conference and the long
absence from home perhaps made the time unfavorable for the
61
invitation.
Nabuco conveyed Root's sentiments to Rui and
expressed his own dissappointment that Rui would be unable
to speak in the United States.

62

Since Rui was unable, or unwilling, to come to lec
ture in the United States, Nabuco began looking for another
opportunity for the improvement of Brazilian-American rela
tions to present itself.

He felt that perhaps the Rio port

call of the American Naval squadron in January of 1908 would
.u purpose. 63
serve .
the
Rio-Branco had decided that Rui would be the appro
priate person to give the principal speech at the upcoming
60

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, October 28, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XII; and Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, October,n.d.,
1907, A H I , 235/3/15 tel. exp.
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Nabuco to
Nabuco, Washington,
62
Nabuco to
Haia Pasta XXVI.
63
Nabuco to
1907, AJN.

Root, Washington, n .d ., AJN; and Root to
November 9, 1907, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
Rui, Washington, December 31, 1907, CRB,
Rodrigues, Washington, December 29,
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banquet for the American Naval officers.

While Rui was

still aboard ship on his return voyage, Rio-Branco informed
Nabuco that Rui would be the principal speaker.

64

It gave

Nabuco "great pleasure" to hear of Rui's selection and he
fiR
sincerely congratulated Rio-Branco for nominating him.
Rio-Branco had, however, neglected to request Rui's partici
pation, and the day after Rui's return, Rio-Branco asked him
to deliver "the principal toast to the American Nation and
her Navy."

66

He apologized for the late date of the invita

tion, but said he had not had the opportunity to extend it
earlier.

Rio-Branco closed with the appeal that, "The ef

fect in the United States will be immense after the incidents at The Hague."
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Nabuco encouraged Rio-Branco to show the American
squadron a great welcome, which would have a "great impact"
on the relations between the two countries.

He believed

that the situation offered them a perfect opportunity to re
move the bad impression caused by The Hague.

Nabuco sug-

64

The American ambassador also reported to Root
that Rui was to be the principal speaker, and closed by
saying, "His selection, under the circumstances, appears to
be an exceptionally happy one, and calculated to streng
then the existing good relations of the two governments and
countries. Dudley to Root, Petropolis, January 3, 1908,
DS, 40/692.
65

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December 30,
1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; copy in CRB, Pasta Rio Bran
co; Nabuco's handwritten draft in CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
66

Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, December 31, 1907, CRB,
Pasta Rio Branco.
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gested that the two presidents should take the opportunity
of the Naval visit to
At almost the

68
congratulate each other.

last minute, Rui

informedRio-Branco

that he would be unable to be present at the banquet for
the American Naval officers.

The foreign minister pessimis

tically cabled Nabuco:
I received with regret the letter of Rui excusing him
self from delivering the toast at the Monroe / Palace_7
banquet, saying he was fatigued and sick.
I also think
the incidents in which he figured and the agressions
suffered / at The Hague_7 impel him to have reserva
tions about a position which would require him to applaude the Pan American policy of approximation.
I will
insist, in the name of the President, but I do not ex
pect to persuade him.69
In his letter to Rui, Rio-Branco said he did not
think Rui's excuses were very good.
not be bad, after the

He said that it would

incidents at The

Hague, for Rui to

make a speech complimenting the United States.

Rio-Branco

told Rui that a speech now would demonstrate to the American
government and people that he did not hold the United States
responsible for the misunderstandings of her delegation at
The Hague, nor for the exaggerations of the Herald correspondent.

70
68

Nabuco to Root, Washington, January 11, 1908, AHI,
235/3/2 tel. rec.
69

Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, January 11, 1908, AHI,
234/4/1 tel. exp.
70

Rio-Branco to Rui, Petropolis, January 12, 1908,
CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco; handwritten draft in Pasta Rio Bran
co. Rio-Branco apparently desired to show independence from
the U.S., and thereby promote Brazilian nationalism, but at
the same time he did not wish to alienate the Americans.
Thus he attempted to temper both the pro-American views of
Nabuco and the anti-American reputation of Rui.
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Rui responded to Rio-Branco's appeal that he recon
sider his refusal to deliver the principal toast to the
American Naval squadron, first thanking him for not insis
ting that he do it.

Then Rui denied that his refusal was

based on resentments from The Hague, saying "I do not hold
the least resentment against the great American nation for
the disrespectful actions of her delegation at The Hague."

71

In support of this claim he then explained, in great detail,
an incident in which he came to the aid of Scott and the
American delegation, rescuing them from a position of great
embarassment before the entire conference.

He then quoted

an extremely friendly note from Scott to support his conten
tion.

He then summarized his own attitude:

You can thus see that my heart is not the least
grieved by the actions of the Americans at The Hague.
I continue to hold a great admiration for the United
States, and I would be most happy if I could concur,
in a manner which would bring us honor, in making our
relations closer.72
Rui concluded the letter with an explanation of why he re
fused to take part in the ceremonies honoring the fleet:

/_ It

is_/ a military demonstration, the greatest and
the least opportune and ostentatious naval force which
the seas have yet seen.
To praise this martial display during a time of
peace would not only violate my sentiments, but would
even contradict my actual role at The Hague.
Your position, as Foreign Minister, is different
and you must show hospitality and courtesy, which you
are not able to avoid.
If I were in the same position,
I would have to submit to it. However, in my position,
71

Rui to Rio-Branco, Rio, January 16, 1908, ABR-B,
8/8 recibidas; typescript in CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
72
Ibid.

without such constraints, I am not forced to contribute
an apology to a fact which I d eplore. 73
Machado de Assis wrote Nabuco to inform him of the
festive atmosphere in Rio surrounding the visit of the Amer
ican fleet and concluded by saying,
In the true pathway there is courtesy on both sides,
and you, who collaborated with Rio-Branco in the work
of approximation of the two countries, shall receive
your portion of the satisfaction.74
Nabuco meanwhile had spoken privately with Root and filed
this confidential report with Rio-Branco:
Today I had a glorious conservation with Root. He told
me, 'There is not the slightest /_ resentment_7 on my
part.' He did not know of the incidents between the
delegations; he was sick and was only consulted on vital
questions.
His instructions were that Brazil was to
always have the highest recognition.
He had no more
than an academic or humanitarian interest in the ques
tions to be discussed at The Hague. He said, 'If I had
wished to obtain any advantage for the United States at
The Hague, I should have asked you to help me. . . . S o
far as our interest goes we did not consider we had any
involved. For that reason we did not make any effort to
secure assistance of any country. . . .' He is the
greatest friend that Brazil has in the world. Please
show this to the President. N a b u c o . 75
The American and Brazilian presidents exchanged con
gratulatory telegrams during the fleet visit to Rio, and af
terward Nabuco was ecstatic and he told Rio-Branco that the
event was viewed with great importance in the United
73

Ibid.

74
_
Machado de Assis to Nabuco, Rio, January 14, 1907
/ i.e., 1908_/, AJN
75

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 15,
1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec., partially encoded, transla
tion supplied.
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States.

76

Nabuco saw a copy of the message by President

Roosevelt before it was released to the press.

Nabuco

thanked Assistant Secretary of State Bacon for showing it
to him, and continued:
As one who is devoting the remainder of his active life
in helping enthusiastically to draw closer the ties of
mutual reliance between the United States and Brazil, I
consider myself happy in expressing to you my sense of
the great service that President Roosevelt's Message
will render in the two Countries to that work of the
most far reaching consequences and incalculable possi
bilities for b o t h . 77
Root and Rio-Branco also exchanged, through their
embassies, messages which were released to the press several
days later and served to prolong the effect of the visit.

78

Through Ambassador Dudley, Admiral Evans, commander of the
fleet, and Rio-Branco also exchanged cordialities.

79

Dudley

was pleased with the outcome of the fleet visit and sent his
congratulations to Admiral Evans:
We are endeavoring to maintain and, so far as possible,
advance the exceptionally happy relations which have
prevailed so conspicuously between the United States and
Brazil since Secretary Root's speeches in this country,
76

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 16,
1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec.
77

Nabuco to Bacon, Washington, January 15, 1908,

AJN.
78

^
Dudley to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, January 16,
1908, DS, American Embassy Brazil: Notes to the Foreign
Office; and Rio-Branco to Dudley, Rio, February 5, 1908,
DS, American Embassy Brazil: Notes from the Foreign Of
fice.
TQ
Rear-Admiral Robley D. Evans to Dudley, aboard
the USS Connecticut, Rio, January 19, 1908, DS, American
Embassy Brazil: Miscellaneous Letters Received; and Dud
ley to Evans, PetrSpolis, January 23, 1908, DS, American
Embassy Brazil: Miscellaneous Letters /~Sent /.
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and his contact with leading Brazilian statesmen, in
1906. I may be permitted, therefore, to congratulate
myself, and I do you, upon the magnificient / sic _/
effect produced upon the relations between the two coun
tries by the visit of your great fleet at Rio de Jan
eiro. 80
Since Rui had been announced as the one to give the
principal toast, his absence from the banquet required an
explanation.

At the banquet Rio-Branco read a message of

explanation and regret from Rui, which stated that he de
clined to speak because of the long strain of the Hague Conference and the precarious nature of his health.

81

Rui's

statement was published by the New York Herald, and the
press published the greetings exchanged between Root and
Rio-Branco and between Roosevelt and Pena.

Nabuco pro

nounced himself satisfied that the mutual sympathy ex
pressed in the messages would prevent any damage to their
relationship as a result of the Hague Conference.

82

After

the fleet departed; Root, Roosevelt, Pena, Nabuco, and Dud
ley were all of the opinion that the ill effects of The
Hague on Brazilian-American relations had been dissipated.
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Dudley to Evans, Petropolis, January 23, 1908,
DS, American Embassy Brazil: Miscellaneous Letters.
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Dudley to Root, Petropolis, January 27, 1908, DS,
American Embassy Brazil: Despaches to Department of State.
82
Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 21,
1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec.; Nabuco to Rio-Branco, January
22, 1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec.; and Nabuco to Rio-Branco,
January 23, 1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec.
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Root to Nabuco, Washington, January 23, 1908, AJN;
Nabuco to President / Pena_7* Washington, January 23, 1908;
Azeredo Castro to Nabuco, London, January 25, 1908, AJN;
and Nabuco to Virgilio Gordilho, Washington, January 27,
1908, AJN.
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However, Nabuco was concerned because the Americans were now
apprehensive about a rumored Latin American alliance, inclu
ding Brazil and Argentina, against them.

To calm this fear,

Pena reassured Nabuco that there was no possibility that the
Brazilian policy toward the United States would be aban•, 84
doned.
Nabuco wrote a twenty-page letter to Rio-Branco giv
ing his view of the results obtained from the naval visit to
Rio.

He felt that the exchange of presidential greetings

was an historic event, and that the events of The Hague were
being forgotten.

He regretted, however, that not every ves

tige of resentment was wiped out by the visit and he encour
aged Rio-Branco to make every effort to protect Brazilian
integrity by avoiding any actions which could be construed
as anti-American.

Nabuco said he was dedicating the rest of

his career to maintaining a close relationship between the
two countries, and he repeated that Rio-Branco should replace him if he contemplated a change in this policy.
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Ambassador Dudley was of the opinion that all the
resentment arising from the situation at the Hague Confer
ence had been dissipated after the naval visit:
While doubtless far other aims than the exchange of in
ternational courtesies determined the great cruise of
the battle-ship fleet under Admiral Evans, the recep
tion given it at this point of call has afforded the
84

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 18,
1908, ABR-B, 74/1 recibidas; and Pena to Nabuco, PetrSpolis,
February 10, 1908, AJN.
85

Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 18,
1908, ABR-B, 74/1 recibidas.

President and you every reason for gratification.
If
ever there were grounds to suppose that the effect of
your visit here was marred by subsequent happenings at
the Hague, I may assure you that now the last trace of
irritation has been effaced. Such was, in effect, the
statement made to me by President Penna as we watched
the departing fleet from his yacht near the entrance to
Rio de Janeiro harbor. At the same time he remarked
that his sentiment and that of the members of his Gov
ernment towards the United States had remained un
changed by any occurrence since the manifestation of
friendship it was their pleasure to extend to you in
1906.86
Nabuco never ceased in his efforts to maintain and
improve the good relations with the United States.

In this

continuing effort he attempted to convince Rui that his
poblems with the American Hague delegation had been largely
due to misunderstandings.

Nabuco wrote to Rui and sent a

letter he had received from James Brown Scott explaining
how Choate came to omit Rui's name from the list of suitable
candidates for court judges.

Nabuco said he believed the

explanation and did not think that it was a last-minute ex
cuse.

He also explained that many of the misunderstandings

at The Hague were due to the fact that some members of the
American delegation did not have a good command of French
and erroneously interpreted many things.
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To commemorate Rui's triumphant return from the
peace conference, President Afonso Pena personally presented
him with a medal struck especially for the occasion.
86

Riding

Dudley to Root, Petropolis, January 27, 1908, DS,
American Embassy Brazil: Despatches to Department of State.
87
Nabuco to Rui, Washington, January 20, 1908, CRB,
Pasta J. Nabuco.
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the wave of popularity generated by the glowing reports of
his success at The Hague, Rui became a presidential candi
date in 1910, 1914, and 1919.

In his campaign he took the

issues to the people on a scale unprecedented in Brazil, but
he failed to attain the highest elective position in his
country.
The actions of Rui and the extensive coverage in the
Brazilian press exaggerating the importance of Rui's mission
to the peace conference led to a strain in BrazilianAmerican relations.

Rio-Branco and Nabuco attempted to

persuade Rui to assist in smoothing relations by speaking
at Yale and at a banquet honoring the American fleet, but
he refused to accept either assignment.

Despite Rui's re

fusal to cooperate, Rio-Branco in Rio and Nabuco in Washing
ton, were able to prevent the events at The Hague from
causing a departure from the friendly relations that existed
between the two countries.

CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY
Brady B. Tyson has correctly identified the tradi
tional Brazilian foreign policy objectives as:

expansion

then stabilization of her frontiers, maintenance of a bal
ance of power in the Rio de la Plata area, gaining recogni
tion as an important member of the community of nations, and
friendship with the United States.

This study has traced

the last two of the traditional foreign policy objectives of
Brazil at the Second Hague Peace Conference interpreted
through the search for status on the personal, national, and
international levels.
The Brazilian foreign minister, Rio-Branco, with the
aid of his ambassador to the United States, Joaquim Nabuco,
sought a special relationship between Brazil and the United
States.

The respective legations of the two countries were

elevated to embassy status in 1905 and Nabuco was appointed
Brazil's first ambassador.

Nabuco developed a close per

sonal relationship with Secretary of State Elihu Root and
devoted himself to bringing the countries closer together.
Rio-Branco was jealous of Nabuco's success in Washington and
felt threatened by what he interpreted as Nabuco's usurpa
tion of his own pro-American iniative.
-209-

Nabuco detected Rio-
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Branco's attitude and felt himself increasingly isolated
from the foreign minister.
The strained relationship between Rio-Branco and
Nabuco intruded into the process of selection of Brazil's
delegate to the Second Hague Conference— the conflict led to
the eventual designation of Rui Barbosa, rather than Nabuco,
as delegate.

In seeking to attain and maintain personal

status Rio-Branco, Nabuco, and Rui alternately cooperated
and clashed with each other, however, for the duration of
the conference, the three men cooperated with each other in
the interest of promoting their country in the international
sphere.

The stand of Brazil's representative, dictated by

Rio-Branco, led to increasing conflict with the United
States delegation, to the dismay of Nabuco.
The principal Brazilian decision-makers of the con
ference were members of the ruling elite who sought status
and prestige for themselves, then endeavored to project
these characteristics on the national and international
scene.

Rio-Branco and Nabuco were from families who were a

part of the ruling oligarchy and Rui, after climbing the
political ladder to become vice-president of the Senate,
came to be accepted into the group.

These men were law

graduates of broad, cosmopolitan culture and members of a
small group of literate, European-oriented Brazilians.

Na

buco and Rui were classmates in law school along with Rod
rigues Alves and Afonso Pena, future Brazilian presidents.
In this elite group, the paths of the three often crossed—
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Nabuco and Rui were fellow members of the imperial Brazilian
Parliament and Rio-Branco and Nabuco both served in the Bra
zilian foreign service.
When Brazil accepted the invitation to attend the
1907 Hague Conference, Rio-Branco needed a nationally known
person of prestige to represent the country.

He selected

Joaquim Nabuco, then ambassador to the United States.

How

ever, before the choice was made public, Rio-Branco decided
to also extend an invitation to Rui Barbosa,

This created a

dilemma because Rio-Branco wanted both of them on the dele
gation, but neither felt he could attend as second delegate.
After delaying until almost the last possible mo
ment, Rui accepted the nomination as chief of the delega
tion, and Nabuco then absolutely refused to be a delegate,
despite the insistence of the president and Rio-Branco.

Na

buco was in poor health, which provided a plausible reason
for the refusal.

The conflicts and political maneuvering of

the three individuals thus delayed the appointment of the
Brazilian representative until little time remained for Rui
to make other than personal preparation before departure for
The Hague.

This delay put Brazil's representative at some

disadvantage vis-a-vis the other delegates, but left the
formation of policy firmly in the hands of Rio-Branco.
Nabuco had earlier requested a leave from his ambas
sadorial duties in Washington in order to seek a health cure
at European spas.

Rio-Branco had not yet responded to the

request for leave, so the foreign minister devised a confi-
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dential plan to assign Nabuco a special mission in conjunc«

tion with the proposed trip to Europe.

Nabuco's friendahip

with Secretary of State Elihu Root proved invaluable, as he
learned from him the details of the American stance at the
upcoming conference, and succeeded in securing American sup
port for a position of honor for the Brazilian delegate.
With the bickering over delegate selection behind
them, Rio-Branco, Nabuco and Rui united in their efforts to
gain recognition for Brazil at the conference.

Nabuco and

Rio-Branco went to great lengths to boost Rui, and thus Bra
zil, among the conference attendees.

In Europe, Nabuco gave

Rui valuable information concerning the conference, which
greatly assisted him in the unfamiliar diplomatic environ
ment.

The egotistical Rui was spurred to tremendous expen

diture of time and energy to live up to their advance bil
ling.

Rio-Branco cabled detailed instructions to Rui, but

allowed the delegate to receive all the credit.

By the end

of the conference, Rui believed himself to be responsible
for Brazil's gains there.
During the preparations for the peace conference the
Argentines attempted to gain, through the intervention of
the United States, an advantage over the Brazilians.

Nabuco

and Rio-Branco immediately sought to counter the move of the
traditional rival of their country.

Together they succeeded

in persuading the United States to obtain for Brazil the
highest honorary position of any Latin American country.
From the time of Rui's appointment to lead the Hague
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delegation, he, Nabuco, and Rio-Branco cooperated with each
other.

However, after the conference, personal animosity

began to surface again.

Rui believed himself the conquering

hero and harbored presidential ambitions, much to the cha
grin of Rio-Branco.

Nabuco blamed Rui and Rio-Branco for

greatly straining United States-Brazilian friendship and
jeopardizing the result of his years of work in Washington.
Rio-Branco, for his part, was jealous of Nabuco's close,
personal relationship with American leaders and his singleminded pursuit of rapprochement with the United States.
In her first global conference, Brazil was deter
mined to make a good impression by persuading the other
delegations of the culture and intelligence of her dele
gates.

Rui, a gifted and verbose orator, monopolized many

of the discussions and irritated the representatives of the
great powers.

The eight most powerful nations had expected

to dominate the conference, and the impertinence of the
delegate firom a second-rate country was annoying to them.
In this conference, Brazil aspired to become accepted as one
of the great powers, but this was unrealistic.
The most important conference deliberations for Bra
zil were those pertaining to immunity of private property at
sea, arbitration of contractual debts, the International
Prize Court, and the International Court of Justice.

The

Brazilian delegate supported the American position in the
first two cases, to the consternation of the HispanicAmerican delegates.

Nabuco was pleased to hear that Rui was
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cooperating with the Americans.

However, the Brazilians

disagreed with the Americans on the Prize Court proposal,
and violently clashed with them over the proposed court of
justice.
Because she was not consulted on the proposal for
the selection of judges for the International Court of Jus
tice, and because of the low rank assigned her, Brazil re
fused to endorse the American project, using the pretext of
defending the equal rights of sovereign states.

The other

Latin American nations, and all the smaller countries sup
ported the Brazilian position, from which she later found
herself unable to retreat.

As a result, she defended that

position to the end of the conference and prevented the cre
ation of the proposed court.
The American Hague delegation had received orders to
support Latin American aspirations at the conference.

How

ever, Elihu Root was ill during most of the period of the
conference and was only consulted by the State Department on
the most important matters.

Nabuco, who had a great deal of

influence in Washington, was in Europe.

Thus Joseph H.

Choate, chief of the American delegation, had a great deal
of discretion during the deliberations.

Rui and Choate

often disagreed and it appeared to evolve into a personal
feud.

Their disagreement threatened to disrupt the Brazil-

ian-American friendship which had been cultivated by Nabuco,
Root, and Rio-Branco.

However, both governments chose to

interpret the difference as being primarily between the in
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dividuals involved, and the threatened break never material
ized.
Rui attempted to do all the work of the Brazilian
delegation except the clerical duties.

He personally pre

pared and delivered all the speeches of the many committees
on which he served, regularly working nineteen hours a day.
Since he was so involved in the conference deliberations, he
tended to take anti-Brazilian moves personally.

Thus he

blamed Choate when the American and Brazilian positions dif
fered.

His dislike of Choate was heightened when Choate

omitted Rui's name (intentionally, Rui felt) from a list of
those considered suitable to serve as judges on an interna
tional tribunal.
Rio-Branco controlled the outlines of Brazilian pol
icy at The Hague, but Rui contributed to modification of the
stance.

There was almost daily telegraphic communication

between them and they cooperated in projecting a favorable
image of their country.

They aspired to have Brazil accep

ted as the ninth great power of the world, but above all, to
assure that she outranked her perennial South American ri
val, Argentina.

At the beginning Rui faithfully followed

Rio-Branco's instructions, but later began to formulate
ideas of his own which he submitted to Rio for approval.
Rui received approval to defend the proposition of the
equality of sovereign states, and his persistent insistence
convinced Rio-Branco that Brazil should maintain that posi
tion until the end of the conference.

The outcome was
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trumpeted in Rio as a Brazilian victory over the great pow
ers, but the powers were irritated over this tactic of obstrucion

which blocked approval of a new court plan.
Brazil's insistence on defending the rights of sov

ereign states caused her relationship with the United States
to become strained.

Rui, prompted by Rio-Branco, pursued

this course over the objections of Nabuco, who felt that it
would lead to permanent damage to the Brazilian-American
friendship he had so carefully cultivated and nurtured.
Rio-Branco was the one primarily responsible for in
fluencing Brazilian public opinion toward the conference, as
he personally edited telegrams from The Hague and released
the information to the press.

The Brazilian press presented

Rui as the dominant personality of the conference, over
shadowing the delegates of even the major powers.

The Rio

papers especially emphasized Rui's antagonism toward Choate,
and used that as a pretext to arouse ill feeling against the
United States,
One important aspect of the Second Hague Conference
which has been virtually ignored in earlier studies was the
Brazilian international public relations effort.

The Bra

zilians began early in the conference to publicize their
country by distributing reprints of illustrated magazine ar
ticles to the delegates and reporters,

Rio-Branco also

authorized the withdrawal of a large sum from a special ac
count to be used to buy influence at the conference by en
tertaining the principal correspondents.

Rui commissioned,
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in a Brazilian magazine, an extensive article lauding Brazil
and her conference delegation.

Over a thousand copies of

the article were distributed to conference delegations and
throughout Europe.
Another part of this public relations effort in
volved William T. Stead, a respected British jourlalist, who
was editor of Le Courrier de la Conference, an unofficial
daily chronicle of the conference deliberations.

Stead

wielded a great deal of influence.at the peace conference
through his articles and editorials.

Stead was also editor

and proprietor of the British Review of Reviews, and in that
capacity approached Rui about placing a paid advertisement
about Brazil as a supplement appended to the November, 1907
issue.

The Brazilian government was delighted to accept the

offer and Rio-Branco suggested additions to the proposal,
which brought the published supplement to thirty-two pages.
As part of Stead's fee, he also agreed to make a separate
world-wide distribution of the supplement to statesmen, pub
lic libraries, and commercial establishments.
Stead was a booster of Rui in the Courrier and made
frequent laudatory comment about him in his editorials.

The

Review of Reviews article contained general information
about Brazil, as well as an extremely flattering section
about the accomplishments of Rui and Brazil at the confer
ence.

The supplement proved to be very popular in Brazil,

and a Portuguese version appeared, which purported to be the
translation of a "book" by Stead giving the unbiased assess-
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ment of Brazil's position at The Hague by an imminent and
impartial foreign journalist.
Rio-Branco's international propaganda campaign suf
fered a serious blow when the New York Herald began to pub
lish derogatory reports of Rui and of Brazil's stance at the
conference.

Alarmed, Rio-Branco ordered the Brazilian

charge in Washington to go to New York for a personal talk
with the editor, where he persuaded him to publish a front
page article containing a speech by Rui and portraits of
Rio-Branco and Rui.
The Brazilian government agreed to fund publication
of Rui's Hague speeches in the original French text, as well
as in an English translation by Stead.

The English version

was published in pamphlet form and given world-wide distri
bution by Stead.

Other publications took note of the money

Brazil was spending on public relations, and several in
quired if they might be able to also help Brazil in her pub
licity campaign.
Besides use of publications, Brazil sought to en
hance her image through sponsorship of social events.

The

Brazilians gave more banquets than most of the other dele
gations and were acknowledged to be the most extravagant
with food, wines, and lavish decorations.

For their most

spectacular event the Brazilians imported orchids, roses,
ferns, and palms to decorate the banquet hall in a tropical
motif.
After the peace conference .Rui went to Paris, where

the Brazilian community christened him, "The Eagle of The
Hague."

The Brazilian government prepared a huge popular

reception for his return to Brazil, but there immediately
arose friction between Rui and Rio-Branco because of the
difficulty of equitably sharing the honors.
Nabuco talked with Rui about the Brazilian dele
gate's difference with Choate, and upon his return to his
Washington post, immediately set about to reassure Root of
the friendly intentions of the Brazilian government and to
repair any damages done at The Hague to the Brazilian-American friendship.
In an effort to smooth Brazilian-American relations,
Nabuco urged Rui to accept an invitation to deliver a series
of lectures at Yale University.

After Rui- refused to do

that, Nabuco hoped he would help dissipate any residue of
ill will by delivering the principal toast at a banquet in
Rio for the American naval officers of the Great White
Fleet.

Rui also refused to cooperate in this instance, but

the banquet proved to be a success, and provided the occa
sion for the exchange of presidential greetings which con
tributed to the normalization of relations between the two
countries.
Both the American and Brazilian governments chose to
believe that the disagreement had been principally between
their conference delegations and was only an abberation in
the history of friendship between the two nations,

Nabuco

was upset that Brazilian public opinion had been so aroused.
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and that the exaggerated reports of the clash with Choate
had caused such a wave of anti-American feeling.

Nabuco

bent every effort to restore the relationship, and he be
lieved this had been achieved, for the most part, after the
cordial reception of the American fleet.
The search for status on the personal, national, and
international levels was the principal motivation for Bra
zil's attendance at the Second Hague Peace Conference and
played a role in the selection of her delegate, her stance
on the conference issues, and her relationship with the
United States.

At the conference Brazil sought recognition

as the ninth world power.

This aspiration jeopardized Bra

zil's special relationship with the United States, which had
been cultivated.

In the process of promoting Brazil, Rio-

Branco created a hero's image for Rui Barbosa, who promptly
sought to use it for political gain.
The traditional Brazilian foreign policy objectives
of international prestige, and of friendship with the United
States did not prove to be mutually exclusive, despite some
incompatibility.

Through the tenacious efforts of Nabuco,

the Brazilian-American relationship was salvaged in spite of
the hostility of Rui, and the indifference of Rio-Branco.
Despite the conflicts over status, the conference did gain
for Brazil the reputation of a cultured and cosmopolitan na
tion able to give a respectable showing in a meeting with
the powerful nations of the world.
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